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Foreword
In 1983, I wrote an article entitled ‘Decentralization: The Latest 
Fashion in Development Administration?’. I argued that there was 
‘a growing interest in decentralisation among the governments of  a 
number of  Third World countries, especially – but not only – in Africa’ 
and ‘an even greater interest on the part of  international development 
agencies, bilateral aid donors and academic circles’ (Conyers 1983: 97).
That was more than 30 years ago, and at the time, I was a relatively 
young and idealistic student of  development – and an ardent supporter 
of  decentralisation. I believed that decentralisation was the answer to a 
wide range of  local development problems. I am now considerably older 
and, I hope, wiser. I realise now that decentralisation is not a panacea. 
In fact, no development policy is; if  there was any one magic solution, 
development practitioners would have been out of  business long ago.
However, although I have modified my views, many of  the basic points 
about decentralisation that I made in that article are as valid now as 
they were then. I would like to highlight five of  these.
Firstly, decentralisation remains a popular development policy. 
I acknowledged in the article that ‘this is not the first time that 
decentralisation has been advocated by those concerned with the theory 
and practice of  development administration’. I also suggested that ‘the 
relationship between centralisation and decentralisation is, to some 
extent, similar to the movement of  a pendulum, in the sense that a 
strong movement in one direction may well result in an opposite move 
as a reaction’ (op. cit.: 98). This remains true today.
Since 1983, there have been several more ‘waves’ of  decentralisation, 
within individual countries and in international development policy. 
The most significant, perhaps, was the promotion of  decentralisation by 
international agencies such as the World Bank as part of  the neoliberal 
agenda of  ‘rolling back the state’. This ‘wave’, which emerged in the 
1990s, broadened the scope of  the decentralisation debate to include 
privatisation as well as decentralisation within the state. It also brought 
economists into a field that had previously been dominated by political 
scientists and public administration specialists.
Secondly, decentralisation is still advocated as a means of  addressing 
a wide range of  development issues. It is seen as a way of  increasing 
participation and strengthening democracy, promoting national unity, 
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improving the coordination of  development efforts at the local level, 
increasing efficiency and maximising the use of  scarce resources, and (as 
indicated previously), reducing the role of  the central state. In fact, it is this 
multiplicity of  potential benefits that make it such an attractive policy – 
and thus one that will probably always be in fashion somewhere or other.
Thirdly, decentralisation can take many different forms and there is still 
a big debate about the ‘best’ form. In the 1983 article, I argued that 
the form of  decentralisation then being promoted, especially in Africa, 
was significantly different to that advocated earlier. The main difference 
was that powers were being decentralised to bodies comprising a 
mixture of  central and local government representatives, rather than 
to autonomous local governments. I suggested that this model was 
more appropriate to ‘third world’ conditions and thus might be more 
durable. But I was to be proved wrong. A decade or so later, this ‘new’ 
model was being widely criticised as merely another means of  central 
government control and there was a reversion to more ‘traditional’ local 
governments, composed entirely of  elected local representatives.
There are also ongoing debates about the extent and type of  powers 
that should be decentralised (how does one maximise local autonomy 
while maintaining national standards of  service provision and without 
threatening national unity?); the levels to which these powers should be 
transferred (one level or a hierarchy, homogeneous or functional regions, 
large regions that are economically viable or small ones that foster 
participation?); and the financing of  local governments (government 
transfers or local taxing powers, conditional or unconditional grants, 
allocation on the basis of  need or of  development potential?).
Fourthly, although decentralisation policies are widely advocated, 
their outcomes are often disappointing. Despite my enthusiasm for 
decentralisation at the time, I was forced to admit in my 1983 article 
that ‘there does seem to be an increasing feeling – both within the 
countries concerned and among international agencies, academics and 
other interested ‘outsiders’ – that many of  the programmes are not 
living up to their expectations’ (op. cit.: 106). And this is as true now as it 
was then.
The reasons for this, I now realise, are complex and probably to some 
extent inevitable. Some of  them relate to the ‘design’ of  the reforms, 
and in particular the failure to match objectives and form. I suggested 
earlier that one of  the attractions of  decentralisation is that it can 
achieve many different objectives. However, this also creates problems 
because there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ type of  decentralisation that will 
achieve all of  these objectives. Specific objectives require specific forms 
of  decentralisation. Thus, the ‘new’ model to which I referred in 1983 
was relatively effective as a means of  coordinating local development 
efforts but far less appropriate for promoting local democracy.
However, many of  the reasons for the frequent failure to meet 
expectations are political in nature. The main obstacles to effective 
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decentralisation are probably the reluctance of  national officials to 
relinquish control, especially over money, and the ‘capture’ of  power by 
elites at the local level. Although ‘technical’ issues have to be taken into 
account, decentralisation is above all a political process.
The fifth point that I made in the 1983 article is the difficulty 
of  substantiating any of  the claims and counter-claims about 
decentralisation because of  the lack of  detailed studies of  its impact. 
This remains a problem today. It is not easy to study the impact of  any 
public sector reform and particularly one as complex as decentralisation: 
reforms are often not fully implemented; it takes time before their impact 
can be assessed; the impact varies from one part of  a country to another 
and over time – due in part to variations in local conditions but also to 
the role of  individual actors; and it is difficult to separate the impact of  
decentralisation from that of  other policy changes.
It is for this reason that I welcome this IDS Bulletin and am honoured 
to write a foreword for it. The collection of  articles presented here 
provides detailed evidence of  the impact of  decentralisation reforms 
at the local level in a number of  African countries, each of  which has 
adopted a different approach to decentralisation. This evidence will 
help us to understand the multitude of  factors that affect the impact 
of  such reforms. Moreover, because the studies have adopted a variety 
of  methodologies, the collection will also be useful for those wanting to 
know how best to study this fascinating phenomenon in the future.
Diana Conyers 
Programme Convenor of  the IDS MA Governance and Development, retired
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Introduction: Interrogating 
Decentralisation in Africa
Shandana Khan Mohmand and Miguel Loureiro
Abstract Decentralisation is a major policy item across many emerging 
African democracies. However, repeated waves of local government 
reforms have had little impact on the region’s continuing problems 
with governance, and the decentralisation agenda remains incomplete. 
Yet, within this larger story there are smaller stories, of how different 
regions and different actors experience differential outcomes in the 
decentralisation process. Such stories have not been told in enough detail 
in the overall narrative on Africa’s decentralisation efforts. This IDS Bulletin 
is an attempt to get at these micro, comparative stories by accumulating 
evidence on how decentralisation works differently in a series of countries, 
and the factors that are responsible for differential outcomes. Together, the 
six articles of this issue interrogate the extent to which decentralisation has 
affected change at the local level and identify the factors that may allow 
decentralisation efforts to have greater impact through future reforms.
Keywords: decentralisation, Africa, Ibrahim Index of  African 
Governance, comparative studies, mixed methods.
1 The state of governance in Africa
In many parts of  the world, increasing dissatisfaction with conventional 
representative systems of  democracy has led to the emergence of  
various strategies to ‘deepen democracy’ by improving the quantity 
and quality of  participation, and to deliver services that better meet the 
expectations of  citizens. Decentralisation reforms have been a central 
and popular strategy within these efforts. In theory, the decentralisation 
of  government to a more local level, where state officials can engage 
with citizens more directly and regularly, is meant to create more 
participatory and deliberative spaces for decision-making, and lead to 
more effective and efficient service delivery and better policies. There 
is certainly literature that supports this perspective (Crook and Manor 
1998; Heller 2001; Ribot 2002a; Wunsch and Oluwu 2003; Bardhan 
and Mookherjee 2006a, 2006b; Crawford and Hartmann 2008; Faguet 
2012, 2014; Smoke 2015). At the same time, there is also empirical 
evidence, including from these same authors, that suggests that we may 
need to be more cautious about decentralisation and its impact. Quite 
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Figure 1 Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2016: ranking of the five country cases
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often, discussions of  decentralisation provide useful ‘ideal types’ of  
government – that lie closer to people, have budgets that more closely 
match local needs, and reflect greater citizen voice in decision-making 
on service provision – but which are quite difficult to realise in practice. 
Most often we find that the decentralisation agenda in emerging 
democracies remains incomplete (Treisman 2007; Faguet 2012; Bratton 
2012; Joshi and Schultze-Kraft 2014).
Decentralisation has been a major policy agenda item across many 
African countries over the last few decades (Conyers 2007), and efforts 
to strengthen local governments have been aimed at dealing with the 
region’s continuing problems with governance. However, after repeated 
waves of  decentralisation – including quite recent reforms to strengthen 
and rewire the system in Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, 
the five countries studied in detail in this IDS Bulletin – many of  these 
problems remain. The Ibrahim Index of  African Governance (IIAG) 
2016 provides a comparative sense of  these issues (Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation 2016a).
The IIAG shows some improvement in overall governance performance 
across the continent (the latest edition of  the IIAG provides not only the 
annual scores and ranks for the 54 countries of  Africa, but also trends 
over a decade). Of  the five countries studied in this issue, Ethiopia and 
Kenya have shown encouraging improvement – 7 and 5.1 per cent 
improvement, respectively, in the overall governance score assigned to 
them by the IIAG over a ten-year period from 2006 to 2015. Uganda 
and Nigeria have registered slight improvements with 3.4 per cent and 
2.5 per cent respectively, and Ghana’s score has decreased by 2.1 per 
cent over the last decade. In terms of  the 2016 IIAG ranking, these 
countries cover a full spectrum of  African cases. Ghana is part of  the top 
ten African countries in terms of  overall governance, ranked 7th despite 
its recent decreases. Kenya and Uganda lie above the African average, 
ranked 12th and 19th respectively, while Ethiopia and Nigeria lie below 
the average, at 31st and 36th of  a total of  54 countries in the IIAG.
Figure 1 helps nuance these comparisons by providing a disaggregated 
ranking of  each of  these countries across a few key governance indicators, 
vis-à-vis the African average in 2016. This reveals that despite Ghana’s 
impressive ranking overall, sub-indicators related to public management 
have registered a decrease in scores over the last decade. Some of  these 
sub-indicators include effectiveness of  public administration, budget 
management, ratio of  revenue to expenditure, fiscal policy, and revenue 
mobilisation. In other words, Ghana is doing well vis-à-vis other African 
countries on governance, but it has not yet solved its problems in terms of  
public administration and fiscal management.
Of  the other two countries that lie above the African average, Kenya 
has registered a real improvement in health outcomes between 2006 
and 2015. This seems to be accompanied by a slight improvement 
also in the health sub-indicator that measures public satisfaction with 
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how the government handles basic health services. Uganda though, 
appears to be an interesting puzzle. While many education indicators 
have improved over the past decade, primary school completion figures 
have remained stagnant and the score for ‘education provision’, which 
measures public satisfaction with how government handles educational 
needs, has decreased. So while inputs into service delivery may be 
improving – an increase in school enrolment, of  teachers in primary 
schools, in funding, and in the involvement of  more actors from the 
private sector – neither outcomes of  this delivery nor satisfaction with 
government services are registering commensurate increases.
For the two countries that lie below the regional average in terms of  
overall scores, we notice in Figure 1 that Ethiopia ranks above the 
African average in three out of  the four categories – safety and rule of  
law, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development – but 
lags in participation and human rights on measures such as ‘political 
participation’, ‘civil society participation’, and various freedoms. Nigeria’s 
problems are of  a different variety. Its major issues seem to be safety and 
rule of  law, on which it ranks 44th out of  54 countries. It has seen some 
improvements, mainly in police services that have contributed to stronger 
scores on ‘personal safety’, but this has not led to improvements in terms 
of  how safe people actually feel. In fact, there has been a decrease of  
public perception of  neighbourhood safety in particular.
What is the significance of  all this information? For instance, Ghana has 
one of  the strongest governance systems in Africa but its bureaucratic 
processes seem to be lagging. Nigeria has one of  the weakest systems 
but it has registered improvements over the last decade on some 
important indicators, including on rule of  law and safety. What types of  
conclusions do we draw from such findings?
The problem with most composite measures, as with studies that focus 
on macro narratives and broad conclusions, is that they often conceal 
and conflate more than they reveal. A focus on decentralisation is an 
important way of  giving a more realistic sense of  how the governance 
reform agenda is working out at the grass roots. The decentralisation 
reforms that were instituted to deal with many of  these governance 
problems may have few big stories to tell of  transformative local 
governance, but there may be smaller stories – either of  positive 
outcomes, or at least of  how different parts of  each country and different 
actors experience differential outcomes in the decentralisation process. 
Such smaller, more micro and comparative stories have not been told in 
enough detail in the overall narrative on Africa’s decentralisation efforts.
This IDS Bulletin is an attempt to get at these micro, comparative 
stories by accumulating evidence on how decentralisation works 
differently within each country, and the factors that are responsible for 
differential outcomes. Decentralisation reforms in their most recent 
form in Africa have had three main aims: ‘improved service delivery, 
democracy and participation, and a reduction in central government 
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expenditure’ (Conyers 2007). The studies in this IDS Bulletin deal with 
all three of  these aims – the articles on Kenya, Uganda and Ghana 
look at issues of  service delivery at the local level; those on Ethiopia 
and Nigeria raise questions about local democracy and participation 
by formal and informal actors; and the article on Ghana by Crook 
looks at issues of  local revenue mobilisation. In doing so, each article 
considers in particular the country-specific areas highlighted in the 
IIAG 2016 previously mentioned – public administration in Ghana, 
security provision in Nigeria, participatory local governance in Ethiopia, 
education provision in Uganda and maternal health care in Kenya.
Together, the six articles of  this issue interrogate the extent to which 
decentralisation has affected change at the local level – in terms of  
democratisation, participation and service delivery – and identify the 
factors that may allow decentralisation efforts to have greater impact 
through future reforms.
2 Contributing to the narrative on decentralisation in Africa
What are the smaller stories hidden within the larger trends highlighted 
by the IIAG 2016 on governance in Africa, and to what extent has 
decentralisation managed to affect change in these areas? More 
importantly, what are the factors that keep local government reforms 
from achieving more complete outcomes? These are the main questions 
that this IDS Bulletin asks. The articles in this collection focus on 
providing more nuanced and grounded explanations for the impact of  
decentralisation at the local level in Africa through detailed case studies 
of  local governments in five countries.
This issue is also special because it brings together a unique set of  
African scholars who live under the region’s decentralised systems 
(with the exception of  Crook), and study them with a proximate lens 
often denied to visiting scholars from other, usually Northern countries. 
More importantly, these scholars regularly work together as a team to 
conduct annual trainings on research methods for university staff from 
across the African continent. This orientation is obvious in the design 
of  each study, uniquely formulated to deal with research questions 
that are on the policy agenda in each country. The questions are all 
currently relevant – and so it is no surprise then that the topic chosen 
for investigation by each country team matches the issues highlighted 
by the IIAG 2016 – and they are held together by the common belief  
that more innovative methods should now be applied to these questions 
in order to achieve better and deeper explanations. The composition 
of  the team and their approach to the subject brings a thematic and 
methodological freshness to this issue.
The two articles on Ghana look at public administration, fiscal transfers 
and local revenue mobilisation. In other words, they look specifically at 
the indicators on which Ghana has registered decreases over the past 
decade. Crook looks at the issue of  local versus central funding of  local 
government expenditures, and explores in particular whether democratic 
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decentralisation means that Ghana’s District Assemblies can raise more 
local revenues, and in the process engage more with citizens to deliver 
better services. His article deals centrally with the question of  whether 
public administration and service delivery are negatively affected by 
the way in which democratic decentralisation interacts with the logic of  
a clientelist political system. Doh’s article, on the other hand, looks at 
the extent to which staff quality within the local bureaucracy makes a 
difference to local service provision. In the context of  plans for greater 
decentralisation in Ghana and giving District Assemblies more devolved 
responsibility for service delivery, Crook and Doh’s articles draw our 
attention to the types of  factors that can limit performance both within 
the system (through staff quality) and outside it (through clientelism).
The study on Kenya looks at citizen perception of  maternal health-
care provision by local governments, and demonstrates how this is 
commensurate with the improvements in health care registered by the 
IIAG 2016. Kilonzo, Kamaara and Magak tell us, however, that there 
are differences in the perceptions of  service users and service providers. 
Users are generally satisfied while providers, with a broader and more 
intimate view of  the system, complain about the inadequacy of  a 
number of  facets, largely the result of  limitations placed on local health-
care provision by higher tiers of  government. The fact of  perceptions 
being closely linked to sectional views of  the system is an important one, 
especially when it applies to deepening ethnic discrimination in more 
heterogeneous counties (the unit of  local government in Kenya).
This works the other way round in Nigeria in the context of  high 
insecurity and citizens’ growing concerns about their own safety. Here 
better services do not seem to be connected to better perceptions of  
provision by communities. In this case, the authors Ojebode, Onyishi 
and Aremu tell us that perceptions are closely related to expectations 
that are built through the practice of  local democracy, in particular 
through campaign promises made in a context of  very limited 
resources, an echo of  the impact of  clientelism in Ghana. Democratic 
decentralisation interacts with limited fiscal decentralisation and 
autonomy to lead to unfavourable perceptions by constituents, and a 
feeling of  being let down yet again by politicians.
The Uganda study explores the conundrum of  how some of  the country’s 
education indicators have improved over time (for instance, human 
resources in primary schools and government support for education), 
while completion rates remain stagnant (they actually decrease if  we look 
at the trend over the past 15 years (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2016b)). 
Maractho points out that part of  the answer might lie in how government 
handles educational needs, with the liberalisation of  education widening 
a gap between public and private education, and, once again, resource 
differentials affecting the quality of  provision by local governments.
The Ethiopia article uses the case of  waste management in the capital 
city of  Addis Ababa to provide a quite unique perspective on why 
(Endnotes)
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the country is not performing well on indicators for participation and 
human rights. Alemu examines the decline in the quality of  waste 
collection and recycling services in the city by comparing the role of  
formal and informal actors, based on the premise that it is the increasing 
centralisation tendencies of  the Ethiopian government that is leading to 
reduced participation by previously active actors within service delivery 
networks. The study alerts us to the fact that decentralisation reforms 
that formalise processes and procedures indiscriminately may lead to 
worse, rather than better, services.
What particular contributions does this issue make to the above debates 
over decentralisation and governance reform? First and foremost, it 
highlights an area where the literature continues to be very limited. By 
this, we do not refer simply to literature on decentralisation in Africa, 
but also to literature on this subject by African scholars, and to studies 
that are comparative and provide a systematic analysis of  the outcomes 
of  decentralisation efforts. In other words, this IDS Bulletin offers 
studies by African scholars that observe the functioning and impact of  
decentralisation at the most micro level through detailed cases that draw 
out nuanced differences between different parts of  the country, different 
political systems, and different political actors. Besides this fundamental 
contribution, this IDS Bulletin also provides insights into three main 
issues within the study of  decentralisation.
2.1 An incomplete agenda
Decentralisation reforms have been put forward as the answer to many of  
the governance problems of  emerging democracies. As suggested earlier, 
the argument is that bringing decision-making closer to people provides 
greater opportunities for participation, more relevant policies, more 
rational expenditure, and so helps improve local governance. However, 
the literature also accepts that the decentralisation agenda remains 
incomplete in most countries. Sometimes this is because of  the partial 
implementation of  administrative, political and fiscal devolution, while at 
other times it is because of  the absence of  other complementary changes 
that are required to ensure that decentralisation efforts will succeed. This 
is the overall, collective story that the articles in this issue tell.
It is not a surprise that each study highlights a fairly similar set of  
missing elements. Almost everyone agrees that there is a lack of  funds at 
the local level – in some cases central transfers do not adequately match 
local needs, or do not correspond to the functions legally devolved to 
local governments; in other cases, political manoeuvres and clientelistic 
politics lead to funds being distributed unevenly or ineffectively across 
districts; and in almost all cases, local authorities do not have the power 
to raise adequate local funds.
Another regularly cited issue is the continuing centralisation tendencies 
of  higher tiers of  government. The reluctance by African governments 
to decentralise power, noted by Conyers in the foreword of  this issue 
and in her earlier articles (1983, 2007), remains true today. This is 
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recent renewed commitments to decentralisation in some countries, 
such as in Ethiopia in 2005, and in Kenya in 2010. A number of  papers 
point out that national and state governments’ need to hold on to 
power leads to limited space available for lower tier governments within 
districts and counties to make substantive decisions that would lead to 
service delivery improvements within their areas.
The studies approach decentralisation by examining specific aspects of  
local administration and the delivery of  specific services – local revenue 
mobilisation and the motivation of  frontline workers for public service 
in the case of  Ghana, security provision in the case of  Nigeria, urban 
solid waste management in Ethiopia, maternal health care in Kenya, 
and primary education in Uganda. This case-based exploration leads 
them to identify the key factors that limit the quality and efficacy of  
delivery in each case. For instance, there is a need:
 l For central governments to provide more untied funds – and 
therefore more autonomy – to local governments (see the cases of  
Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda);
 l To provide incentives to attract better quality staff to far flung parts 
of  each country, avoiding an internal ‘brain drain’ to better-off urban 
centres and nearby regions (see Ghana and Uganda);
 l To strengthen local accountability, ensuring greater fairness and 
equity in service delivery, reducing the impact of  political patronage, 
as well as allowing more actors to participate in more democratically 
organised spaces (see Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia).
Any one of  these reforms may not in itself  ensure better access to and 
quality of  local services, but if  decentralisation is to remain on the 
agenda, it cannot function within the strangleholds placed on it by 
limited funds, restricted autonomy, exclusive spaces and clientelistic 
politics. The lack of  such complementary reforms only sets local 
governments up for failure, and risks fostering disillusionment with the 
system as a whole, as argued by several of  the contributors.
2.2 The need for multi-actor coalitions
Effective service delivery at the local level usually involves coordinated 
multi-sectoral and multi-actor efforts. Together the articles in this issue 
tell us that when such broad cooperation is missing, the performance of  
local governments suffers. In fact, they make an interesting observation 
as a set: decentralisation does not mitigate against the centralising 
tendencies of  different levels of  government – state governments in 
Nigeria that maintain control over the disbursement of  funds that come 
from the centre, as well as over the electoral process by appointing 
rather than electing many local governments; the city government of  
Addis Ababa that will not share responsibilities with other departments 
or with informal actors; and the concentration of  development around 
headquarters of  councils and counties, as in Uganda, Kenya and 
Ghana. In other words, decentralised government does not mean that 
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power will be shared with local governments, or by local governments 
with other state departments and non-state actors, or by towns with 
more remote parts of  the county or district.
Cooperation across formal actors requires that different state 
departments coordinate their efforts at the frontline. Coordination 
between formal and informal actors occurs when local governments 
open up more participatory decision-making spaces for actors who 
have no formal responsibility for service delivery, but play an active and 
significant role within it in any case. The impact of  informal actors and 
institutions, however, can work in two very different ways.
On the one hand, their inclusion in local government processes can 
strengthen local democracy by allowing budgetary and distributive 
decisions to more closely reflect local needs, and for services to be 
delivered more cost-effectively through existing channels (Scheye 2009; 
Ananth Pur and Moore 2010; Mohmand and Mišić Mihajlović 2014). 
This is the view that both Alemu and Ojebode et al. take in the Ethiopia 
and Nigeria articles respectively.
Alemu’s study of  Addis Ababa’s solid waste management system 
adequately demonstrates how service delivery suffers when state 
institutions that are given prime responsibility to deliver a service 
refuse to build broad-based coalitions with other state and non-state 
actors. In this case, those actors include the health department and a 
range of  informal actors who facilitate the collection and recycling of  
waste in the city. Ojebode et al.’s article on security provision by local 
governments in Nigeria also demonstrates how, despite the fact that 
various non-state actors, such as community leaders and groups of  local 
volunteers, play an important role in ensuring safe communities, their 
integration into formal processes is ad hoc and arbitrary.
On the other hand, the involvement of  local non-state actors can 
strengthen clientelistic politics at the local level (Baldwin 2007; Gay 
2009), limiting the fairness and equity of  distribution as service delivery 
becomes a quid pro quo arrangement tied to votes. The local power 
and privilege of  some non-state actors could also interact with greater 
resources at the local level in ways that skew distribution and lead to the 
capture of  development funds and services (Bardhan and Mookherjee 
2006a). This is the view that both Crook and Ojebode et al. take in their 
articles on Ghana and Nigeria.
Crook shows how, despite years of  consolidated democratic local 
government in Ghana through its District Assemblies, neither local 
resource mobilisation nor developmental efforts have improved 
substantially, largely because of  clientelistic politics that represent the 
interests of  only sections of  the population. Politicians at all levels, 
including at the local level, often provide services to constituents in 
return for votes, and not because they are the section of  population that 
most require those services. This form of  politics distorts theoretical 
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linkages – such as ‘principal-agent’ models of  political accountability – 
between decentralisation reforms and outcomes. Ojebode et al. make a 
similar argument, and highlight in particular the ability of  local political 
‘godfathers’ in Nigeria to squeeze local government resources to the 
extent that they leave little room for effective delivery by councils.
The impact of  a greater number of  actors playing a role in local service 
delivery is also highlighted in some way by the other articles. The 
Uganda article by Maractho focuses on differences in the provision 
of  primary education by local governments when donors and private 
actors get involved. Both these sets of  non-state actors use selection 
criteria for provision that are not always obvious to other stakeholders, 
but their involvement in a given district can substantially improve its 
performance indicators. This makes the point that despite one of  the 
most impressive decentralisation efforts in Africa and a programme 
fully focused on the improvement of  delivery of  primary education, 
Uganda’s local governments are unable to deliver quality services, 
and the existence of  ‘islands of  efficiency’ appear to be a result of  
interventions by external actors. The Kenya article makes reference 
to the impact of  more political actors at the local level. Here, as in 
other countries, the new tier of  local government has introduced party 
competition at the local level, and a greater role for opposition parties. 
Decentralisation has, therefore, increased the number of  political actors 
at the local level, made room for political coalitions, and in the process, 
given citizens a larger space for demanding services.
2.3 Comparative analyses of decentralisation
Ribot’s (2002b) review of  studies on decentralisation in Africa points 
out that a comparative lens is an under-utilised tool for examining 
local government reforms in the continent. This has not changed 
much in the decade and a half  since then. There is a clear need to 
use more innovative methods and more incisive tools. Comparative 
analysis carried out at the most local level – within councils that can 
be studied either in comparison to one another, or then contrasted as 
two cases – can yield more grounded, empirical stories and narratives. 
However, the African research context is a difficult one. There are three 
constraints in particular: limited availability of  existing data; difficulty 
of  access to data that does exist because of  bureaucratic processes, 
and concerns about quality and rigour (Smoke 2015). While these 
constraints call for the gathering of  more primary evidence, resources 
for doing so are limited.
These are constraints that this team of  researchers faced in good 
quantity, and so they set out to look for fresh evidence to the extent that 
the resources available to them could afford. Each of  the articles in this 
issue makes a concerted effort to use a detailed, micro and comparative 
lens to the extent possible. In some cases, the teams persevered. In 
others, it became so difficult given the circumstances that they had to 
modify their strategy to a more modest objective. But the contribution 
to the understudied comparative field of  decentralisation in Africa, and 
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particularly of  people’s perception of  what decentralisation means to 
them, is obvious in each case.
The Nigerian article compares citizens’ perception of  the efficacy 
of  local councils that are elected with those that are appointed, in 
delivering security services, and finds that quite unexpectedly, citizens 
have a better impression of  the work of  unelected councils as compared 
to elected ones. Doh’s study of  Ghana does not directly compare the two 
districts in which it is based, but does examine how staff quality explains 
service delivery outcomes in two different District Assemblies – one that 
is at the top and the other at the bottom of  the official District League 
Table – making an effort to draw out a detailed pathway to explain the 
different outcomes in each case. The Ugandan study compares two 
districts and their differential primary schooling outcomes to find that 
donor and private sector involvement provides positive distortions in the 
quality of  primary education. In Kenya, Kilonzo and her co-authors 
consider the perceptions of  citizens regarding improvements in access to 
health services in two different counties, comparing these largely positive 
perceptions to the less favourable ones of  service providers themselves 
in both cases, a difference they suggest comes from improved access 
itself. As the number of  users increases, while fiscal remittances from the 
national government do not, the local health-care system is put under 
ever increasing pressure. In the article on Ethiopia, the comparison is 
between the role of  formal and informal actors in waste management.
The articles also use a variety of  other tools to develop their arguments. 
Alemu uses social network analysis to compare the role of  formal 
and informal actors in Addis Ababa. Kilonzo et al. make use of  
ethnographic methods to understand access to maternal health care in 
Kenya, while Maractho uses in-depth interviews with key actors. Both 
Doh and Ojebode et al. combine qualitative and quantitative tools to 
draw out causal mechanisms, or pathways, to explain how a set of  initial 
conditions led to the observed outcomes in each case.
Each author is able to draw out a very particular perspective based 
on the method they use to investigate the question, and the choice 
of  method is to a large extent based on the question itself. So, for 
example, ethnographic research is employed when the purpose is to 
probe complex and multidimensional processes; social network analysis 
is used when the purpose is to uncover actors and actions; and paired 
case and pathway analysis is used to explain how a particular outcome 
may have occurred. This is good practice, and recent calls for the use 
of  more innovative and mixed methods, such as by Creswell and Plano 
Clark (2007), have argued that methods should be determined by the 
questions we ask and the contexts in which we apply them.
3 A diverse yet unified approach
This IDS Bulletin as a whole tests the relationship between decentralisation 
and a list of  outcomes – from maternal health care and education, to 
solid waste management and crime prevention – using a mix of  methods 
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to answer questions about whether or not decentralisation can lead to 
better services in emerging economies. The contents of  these pages 
should be of  particular interest to scholars working on decentralisation in 
Africa, policymakers in African ministries, aid agencies, and civil society 
organisations working on the delivery of  essential services in Africa. 
Each case study is led and researched by an in-country team of  scholars, 
all of  whom come from different disciplines and use different methods 
and approaches to the central question. This allows the issue to present 
a real diversity of  viewpoints from across the African region – allowing 
us to hear more directly from African scholars who work and teach in its 
universities, in their voice and in their style.
At the same time, the work of  these authors is held together by a 
commitment to more innovative and rigorous approaches to studying 
Africa’s policy questions. The researchers that came together to produce 
this issue represent a group of  scholars who work with the Partnership 
for African and Social Governance Research (PASGR) and IDS to train 
early and mid-career researchers in African universities in a variety 
of  methods. They are alumni of  the programme themselves, and are 
now its main instructors. This coalition of  institutions and researchers 
represents important steps forward in the direction of  strengthening 
research in Africa – introducing new methods, working with university 
bureaucracies to expand the available space for research, improving 
university-based teaching of  methods, and raising funds for new 
research – but the challenges remain large.
Decentralisation is an important issue in Africa, but the challenges 
faced by university-based researchers in the region mean that systematic 
analyses of  its outcomes are still limited. The studies in this IDS Bulletin 
represent first efforts by a set of  scholars to use more innovative and 
incisive methods to understand decentralisation and its impact in Africa. 
With more resources and time, these lines of  enquiry can be both 
strengthened and deepened to provide better explanations. The set of  
studies presented here already represent exciting and important new 
contributions to a field of  study that requires more attention.
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Democratic Decentralisation, 
Clientelism and Local Taxation 
in Ghana*
Richard C. Crook
Abstract It is generally assumed by advocates of democratic decentralisation 
that maximising locally-raised revenue sources will help to enhance 
accountability through a closer and more legitimate relationship between 
the local government authority and citizens. Research on Ghana and other 
African countries shows, however, that the dominance of clientelist forms 
of politics undermines the legitimacy of local taxation; where voters expect 
their representatives to provide specific pay-backs to themselves or their 
communities in return for support and payment of tax, it is extremely 
difficult to establish a ‘collective interest’ for the local government area. 
Citizens tend to interpret allocation decisions over expenditure of revenues 
as products of patronage relations rather than as a collective public good. 
This problem is especially acute where resources are very scarce and the 
revenue base limited. Central government transfers are, therefore, likely to 
remain the fairest and most effective way of financing local government in 
such contexts.
Keywords: democratic decentralisation, Ghana, clientelism, taxation, 
local revenue, intergovernmental transfers.
1 Introduction: accountability and central vs local revenue sources
One of  the most commonly recognised problems of  local or 
decentralised government in less developed countries is lack of  resources 
to carry out their basic functions and services – the so-called ‘unfunded 
mandates’ or ‘responsibility-resource gap’ (Dafflon 2013). How to fund 
decentralised government in poor or developing countries is the subject 
of  a continuing debate between those who argue that decentralisation 
should seek to maximise locally-raised revenue, and those who argue 
that central government transfers are the only realistic and equitable 
way to ensure adequate resources, even if  those transfers become the 
dominant source of  revenues.1
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The main arguments in favour of  central government funding are:
 l In countries where the majority of  the population live in poor rural 
areas, there are extreme inequalities of  tax base resources; outside 
the major cities, most local authorities suffer from an inherent 
poverty of  resources such that improvements in local tax mobilisation 
will only improve revenues ‘at the margin’, and can rarely provide 
sufficient funds to carry out their mandated functions (Aziz and 
Arnold 1996; Dafflon 2013; Davey 1994).
 l Attempts to substantially increase local taxation in such 
circumstances will therefore inevitably run into political resistance, 
especially where there is already a ‘vicious circle’ of  poor 
performance caused by lack of  resources and unwillingness to pay 
tax when there are no perceived benefits.
 l Central government funding is therefore essential for ‘pump-priming’ 
the resources of  local authorities, enabling them to provide the 
services they are expected to provide.
 l Central government funding is also essential to equalise resources 
and redistribute to poorer areas, using the usual device of  a 
‘distributable pool’ of  national revenues, as well as earmarked and 
matching grants (Bahl and Linn 1994; Dafflon 2013).
 l Concerns over the autonomy of  local governments which are highly 
dependent on central government can be dealt with through legal 
and administrative devices which guarantee stable, assured funding 
and permit expenditure autonomy. What is required is a good 
balance between mechanisms of  central monitoring and auditing on 
the one hand, and an adequate flow of  block grants, combined with 
targeted funds for generic areas.
The main argument for central funding therefore rests on the assertion 
that the source of  funding for local government is less important than 
its adequacy for the functions allocated, and how it is controlled and 
monitored, including the role of  political accountability mechanisms at 
local level.
Those in favour of  maximising local revenue mobilisation base their 
arguments primarily on the desirability of  enhanced accountability 
of  government, linked with democratic decentralisation. The main 
assumptions are as follows:
 l Internalisation of  costs and benefits: the greater the proportion 
of  local revenue in the total revenue of  a local authority, the more 
closely the costs and benefits are restricted to local residents.
 l This, combined with the greater proximity of  decision-makers 
to local citizens and their demands, leads to greater ‘allocative 
efficiency’ of  service provision and development expenditure, since 
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local citizens will only demand what they are really prepared to pay 
for (Bird 1994; Tanzi 1995; World Bank 2004).
 l Citizens’ demands (through the ‘long route of  accountability’ – World 
Bank 2004) will also be heard better because of  the democratic 
accountability of  elected representatives as well as other participatory 
devices; this will make local government more responsive to 
local needs, particularly those of  the mass of  poor citizens, and 
improve local service provision. Indeed, it has been argued that 
over-dependence on central government transfers, especially in 
resource-poor areas which benefit from equalisation grants, is likely to 
create ‘rentier’ sub-national governments which do not have to engage 
democratically with local citizens because they are under no pressure 
to impose taxes (Gervasoni 2010). (This is a variant of  the argument 
that governments which need to tax their citizens will naturally 
develop a more accountable and reciprocal relationship with them, 
which is more likely to be sustained by democratic representation – 
see Brautigam, Fjeldstad and Moore 2008.)
 l Improved accountability and responsiveness will therefore enhance 
the legitimacy of  local taxation, given its more direct link to 
perceived benefits, and will create a ‘virtuous circle’ in which more 
responsive services will encourage more tax paying, and lead to 
further increases in revenue.
 l Local governments which raise a greater share of  their total revenue 
from local sources will also become more autonomous and have 
greater discretion over expenditure decisions than those which 
are heavily dependent on transferred revenues. This again results 
in a mutual reinforcement of  local accountability and responsive 
expenditure patterns.
In this article, some of  the assumptions underlying the advocacy of  
maximising local revenue mobilisation will be challenged, focusing 
particularly on the alleged link between democratic representation, 
greater willingness to pay local taxes, and improvements in the provision 
of  public goods including investment in pro-poor development 
programmes. The key institution linking government and citizens in 
this context is that of  the elected representative. To what extent does 
accountability through elections really ensure that local governments 
will be able to improve local tax mobilisation, and produce more 
developmental outputs? And what do citizens in today’s poor or 
developing countries actually demand of  their local representatives? 
The ‘principal-agent’ models popular with development analysts and 
donor agencies tend to assume that citizens as ‘principals’ will demand 
collective or ‘developmental’ public goods and accountability for 
expenditure decisions. But this is not necessarily the case (cf. Booth 2012).
These questions will be examined through a review of  the experience 
of  democratic decentralisation in Ghana, with some comparative 
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observations on other African and Asian countries, including a 
rather different form of  decentralisation in Côte d’Ivoire based on a 
Francophone model of  local government. These cases show that even 
after many years of  consolidated democratic local government, there 
are still enormous problems with local tax mobilisation, and with the 
developmental responsiveness of  the local authorities. The problems 
derive primarily from the role of  representatives in societies dominated by 
a patron–client form of  political competition, and also from the logic of  
the particular forms of  electoral representation which have been adopted.
2 The Ghana District Assemblies
2.1 Formal structures and functions
Ghana’s District Assembly system was introduced in 1989 by the then 
military government of  Jerry Rawlings. The ‘Rawlings Revolution’ of  
1981 was based on radical populist ideas of  direct participation and 
no-party people’s democracy (inspired partly by Gaddafi’s Libya), and 
the decentralisation reform of  1989 was portrayed as a fulfilment of  
that commitment to introduce a ‘truly Ghanaian’ form of  grass-roots 
democracy. With the transition to a more conventional, representative 
multiparty democracy in 1992, the District Assemblies (DAs) were 
incorporated into the 1992 Constitution of  the Fourth Republic and are 
now governed by the Local Government Act of  1993. Politically, the 
reform was clearly an attempt to create a rural power base for Rawlings, 
embodying as it did a privileged position for pro-Rawlings ‘revolutionary 
organisations’ (which later became the core of  his party, the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC)), and mechanisms for co-opting rural 
business, professional and agrarian elites (see Crook and Manor 1998).
There are now 216 Assemblies, ranging from 170 rural DAs with 
populations ranging from 75,000 to 250,000–300,000, to 40 Municipal 
Assemblies for towns with populations of  over 95,000, and six 
Metropolitan Assemblies for the large cities including the capital Accra, 
population 2.4 million. Their primary function is to be responsible for 
the ‘overall development of  the district’, together with a very wide range 
of  specific service responsibilities. In the rural DAs, these are mainly the 
provision of  educational and health infrastructures, minor roads, public 
works, markets, town planning and other projects.
Administratively, they are a mixed form of  decentralisation in that their 
other main function is to supervise the various former line ministries 
which have been deconcentrated to district level since 1989, to form 
an integrated district governmental and financial apparatus. They are 
therefore responsible for drawing up an overall District Plan and a 
composite District Budget, although this remains problematic even after 
27 years of  operation. The district is administered, not by an elected 
mayor, but by a centrally appointed official, the District Chief  Executive 
(DCE), who is normally a political activist loyal to the government of  
the day, assisted by a small group of  senior civil service administrators 
and technical officers. Other staff (e.g. revenue collectors, drivers, clerks, 
labourers) are employed locally.
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2.2 DA funding
Since 1994, the majority of  funding for the DAs (currently around 
82 per cent overall) has come from central government transfers 
(Gilbert, Hugounenq and Vaillancourt 2013); this represents a 
continuing trend towards increases in both the absolute amounts and 
the proportion of  funding coming from central government or external 
sources, which, as will be argued, is linked to the political imperatives 
of  democratic decentralisation. The main funding source is the District 
Assemblies Common Fund (DACF), a distributable pool account 
which is allocated 7.5 per cent of  national government revenues; 
other elements come from the District Development Fund (DDF) (a 
channel for donor funds), Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
funds, royalties from natural resources and customary land rents, and 
government payment of  some district staff salaries. The largest source 
of  local revenues is ‘fees and charges’ which includes local business 
taxes, followed by licences and property tax (Table 1).
2.3 Democracy and the political context
Rawlings’ original populist vision of  the DAs was that they would build 
a genuinely grass-roots form of  participatory democracy which would 
focus on ‘community-based forms of  self-reliant economic and social 
development’ (or ‘self-help’, as it is called in Ghana). Rawlings was 
especially hostile to liberal, multiparty-based competitive politics, which 
he saw as an inappropriate, colonial imposition on African societies, 
and a harmful distraction from building communal consensus around 
practical development measures. Hence the ban on parties in local 
elections, which not only echoed the Libyan system, but was similar 
Table 1 Breakdown of District Assembly funding sources (national aggregates)
Central government transfers %
DACF 44
DDF (donors) 25
HIPC funds 17
Government salary payments 11
Ministry sector grants 3
Local revenues %
Fees and charges 34
Licences 20
Property tax 18
Permits and land 14
Miscellaneous (poll tax, special levies, trading services, etc) 14
Source Gilbert et al. (2013).
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to the Ugandan system introduced by Museveni’s ex-guerrilla army 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) regime in 1986 (Crook 1999). 
(A similar approach has characterised other authoritarian regimes 
which have resisted political competition at the national level, such as 
Bangladesh under Ershad, or Pakistan under Musharraf).
These participatory aspirations were embodied in the democratic 
institutions of  the DAs at both district and sub-district levels. At the 
lowest level, there are elected Unit Committees for every group of  
500 electors (in practice, villages and quarters); above them are Area 
and Town Councils, not directly elected but composed of  DA-elected 
members for those areas.
At the district level, which because of  the size of  the DAs has necessarily 
to be a form of  representative politics, there are Assemblies which 
consist of  two thirds-elected Assembly Members (AMs), elected by 
‘first-past-the-post’ elections as single members for very small wards. 
The average ratio of  AMs to electors is 1: 2,000; in the two case 
study districts studied by Crook and Manor in the 1990s (East Akim 
and East Mamprusi), the ratios were 1:1,800 and 1:2,200 (Crook 
and Manor 1998). This was clearly designed to foster a very close 
and direct relationship between elected AMs and their constituents. 
Together with the one third of  AMs appointed by government on local 
recommendations, this has produced relatively large Assemblies, for 
example 79 members for East Akim and 69 for East Mamprusi, with 
populations in the 1990s of  209,710 and 183,839 respectively.
The original political context of  the DAs changed substantially after 
1992, following Rawlings’ acceptance of  the need to move to a 
multiparty, constitutional democracy with an elected executive president 
and national Parliament. Rawlings secured his continuation in power for 
another eight years through his NDC party, which used his incumbent 
power to mobilise support; control of  the resources of  the rural DAs 
through his loyal DCEs and his Committees for the Defence of  the 
Revolution (CDRs) played a significant part in the election victories of  
1992 and 1996. After the opposition, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), 
won power in 2000, Ghana became established as a relatively stable 
two-party competitive democracy, with the NDC returning to power 
in 2008. The two main parties represent two competing ‘political 
traditions’ associated with both class and regional power bases; the 
NPP is descended from the conservative nationalist movement of  the 
1950s, which had its main power bases in the southern Akan regions 
of  Eastern and Ashanti, and is based on traditional elites and the 
established business and professional classes. The NDC grew out of  
Rawlings’ more radical, anti-establishment movement which looks back 
to the Nkrumah era of  state socialism and is especially strong in the 
northern and Volta (south-eastern) regions.
Nevertheless, in spite of  these broad historic differences, both parties 
have adapted to multiparty democracy since 1992 in similar ways, 
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to construct what Whitfield has called a system of  ‘competitive 
clientelism’ (Whitfield 2011). This system is built on the ‘mercantilist’ 
nature of  the economy. Ghana’s economy still depends mainly on 
the export of  primary commodities such as gold, timber and cocoa 
grown by small/middle farmers, and more recently, crude oil. The 
state’s revenues are drawn from the rents it extracts from the export/
import economy, and the domestic business classes are relatively 
weak and small. Whichever party controls power uses access to state 
contracts and other opportunities to reward its supporters, creating 
a dependent or client business class, those who have ‘invested’ in the 
party’s victory. Competition for power is a zero-sum game for those who 
depend on political patronage. And winning elections is therefore an 
essential prerequisite for sustaining these patronage machines. Parties, 
which are quite weakly organised and factionalised, also depend on 
regional and local elites to invest in securing election victories, and are 
expected to reward victorious MPs as well as the party’s ‘foot soldiers’ at 
constituency level after an election win.
Most importantly, these expectations of  the purpose of  elections and the 
use of  political power are generally shared by voters. One study of  MPs 
in competitive and non-competitive constituencies found that 70 per cent 
of  voters voted for their preferred candidate on the expectation that 
they would be able to provide specific local development projects or job 
opportunities (so-called ‘club goods’); 15 per cent expected personal 
benefits to be given out during the election campaign, and further rewards 
for particular forms of  support. (These expectations were higher in the 
more competitive constituencies; Lindberg 2003, 2010.) To be successful 
(and re-elected), MPs therefore have to cultivate clientelist links with 
higher levels of  the party and government ministers if  they are to deliver 
on their patronage promises; they also need to generate pay-back for 
their ‘investment’, through kick-backs on brokering access to government 
contracts and other useful opportunities. Voters themselves (especially 
‘swing’ voters) therefore vote on clientelist principles, rather than choosing 
parties or representatives who will provide more programmatic public 
goods (cf. Keefer and Khemani 2005; Levy and Kpundeh 2004; van de 
Walle 2012; Vicente and Wantchekon 2009). It is the clientelist basis of  
relations between voters and their representatives, and between citizens 
and government authorities, which seriously undermines the notion 
that democracy will produce governments which are more directly 
accountable to citizens for the way they spend public money, or that will 
spend more on redistributive developmental policies, even if  the funds are 
the product of  general taxation rather than ‘rents’.2
2.4 Representative democracy and clientelism at the local level
The clientelist assumptions of  voters are reproduced at the local level in 
the politics of  the DAs. Indeed, they have been officially acknowledged 
in the 6 per cent share of  the DACF which was allocated to MPs to 
be spent on ‘Constituency Development’, or projects they choose for 
their constituencies as a way of  fulfilling constituents’ expectations 
(Lindberg 2009). MPs are also included in the DA as ex officio members, 
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and can therefore bring their political concerns to bear on DA planning 
and spending.
In the election of  AMs, the no-party rule and the very close, grass-roots 
character of  the representation offered by AMs has strongly reinforced 
the idea that the Assembly representative is a delegate of  his or her 
specific community – a ward of  one or two villages, with only a few 
thousand electors. The rules for the election of  an AM limit the number 
of  candidates to five; they must be resident in the district (to exclude 
absentee urban elites), and have to stand on their ‘personal merit, 
integrity and proven participation in community development’ (Crook 
1999). The government then organises and funds a three-week period 
of  public hustings at which the candidates present their ‘life histories’ 
and manifestos, and take questions from the public. Once elected, one 
of  their official duties is to encourage and develop ‘self-help’ projects in 
their communities. And they have a duty to maintain regular contact with 
their constituents. The record of  the elected AMs in developing good 
participatory relationships was in fact quite good for the first few years 
of  the new system. In the districts studied by Crook and Manor in 1992, 
3.83 per cent of  electors could name their AM, 32 per cent said they had 
attended a meeting with their AM, and 12 per cent had contacted their 
AM individually, which in comparative terms is quite impressive. The 
first elections for the DAs were also met with enthusiasm, as reflected in 
the 58 per cent turnout (Crook and Manor 1998).
The pressure on such representatives to fight for projects for their 
own areas, and assistance with their self-help projects is clearly very 
strong. The DAs have therefore become arenas in which there is little 
debate over development policy for the district as a whole; instead, 
they are battlegrounds over the allocation of  whatever resources are 
available to the communities represented by each of  the AMs. In a 
situation of  extreme scarcity and inadequate revenue sources, only a 
very few of  the hundreds of  villages or towns within a district can be 
offered any development project in any single year.3 And in a political 
system dominated by patron–client linkages, whatever decision is taken 
will be interpreted (whether rightly or wrongly) by the unlucky ones 
as a consequence of  the greater ‘influence’ or patronage connection 
of  that community’s representative; maybe he or she is close to the 
DCE, the MP and the ruling party in the district, or other influential 
government officials and ‘big men’ in the area. (Similar problems have 
been reported from Uganda: in one study of  local primary health-care 
services, citizens did not bother to complain about poor service, or 
use ‘participatory’ user complaint mechanisms because they believed 
that local councillors were involved in corrupt patronage relationships 
with clinic staff, and therefore complaints would never be listened to 
fairly (Golooba-Mutebi 2005).) With the growing intensity of  party 
competition after 2000, it also become more plausible to suspect 
that communities which were known not to have voted for the ruling 
party in Parliamentary elections were being discriminated against in 
development expenditure decisions.
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2.5 Community representation and the legitimacy of local taxation
One of  the consequences of  such a system, dominated by strong 
community representation and clientelist politics, is that it undermines 
the legitimacy of  local taxation, and makes it increasingly difficult 
to improve local revenue mobilisation. Where the fairness of  district 
allocations of  expenditures is constantly challenged, it is difficult to create 
a sense of  the ‘collective interest’ of  the district, and hence acceptance 
of  the idea that taxation is for the general good. It is here that clientelist 
politics has its most damaging effect, insofar as it makes the link between 
democratic representation and acceptance of  local taxation difficult to 
sustain, and therefore undermines any move to reduce dependence on 
central government transfers. As Luttmer and Singhal have shown, ‘tax 
morale’, or intrinsic motivations to comply with tax demands based on 
factors such as citizens’ relationship to the state, and ideals of  reciprocity, 
is an important element in the success of  any taxation system (Luttmer 
and Singhal 2014). In the Ghanaian DAs, each community – indeed 
each individual voter – wants to pay the equivalent of  a ‘hypothecated’ 
tax in which the community will get back what it paid as a specific 
service or project for their particular community. They do not want to 
fund benefits for other communities. This attitude was actually reinforced 
by a government decision to introduce ‘local rebate’ schemes, according 
to which a proportion of  locally collected taxes was returned to the Area 
or Zonal Councils in which they were collected on a pro rata basis. The 
problem was also exacerbated in the early years of  the Assemblies by the 
contradictory official roles of  the AMs.
On the one hand, they were supposed to encourage payment of  
local direct taxes (flat levies or ‘poll taxes’, market and lorry park 
tolls, property taxes) which were justified in terms of  the necessity for 
collective development resources; citizens were told that development 
progress depended upon them paying their taxes. In the case study 
districts, AMs took part in ‘pay your tax’ campaigns alongside Rawlings’ 
CDR militants, who used increasingly heavy-handed methods in 
local markets. In Africa, both the association of  direct taxation with 
colonialism, and the poor past performance of  local government 
made it especially difficult to persuade citizens of  the ‘rightness’ – and 
benefits – of  paying their taxes. Yet AMs ended up being accused by 
the government officials and CDR militants of  being ‘saboteurs’ of  
government policy when tax collection did not meet targets (Crook 
and Manor 1998: 221). When the promises made by AMs that paying 
taxes would lead to funding of  local projects were routinely unfulfilled, 
encouraging tax payment became even more difficult.
On the other hand, AMs were supposed to lead local, self-help-based 
community development efforts as a way to bolster their own popularity 
and legitimacy. They knew they would ultimately be judged on their 
success in ‘bringing development’ to their wards. For citizens, this 
could be seen as a double jeopardy; they were told they had to pay 
their taxes in order to sustain the development programme of  the local 
government. But when they requested specific projects they were told 
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they had to organise their own self-help, which could also involve paying 
locally agreed project levies. This led AMs to increasingly withdraw 
from encouraging payment of  tax, and instead to focus mainly on 
self-help projects, with whatever help they could get from other patrons.4
The longer-term consequences for the DAs of  these interactions 
between intensely local community representation and shortage of  
resources have been on balance very negative.
2.6 Decline in participation and increasing distrust of District Assemblies
In the first place, disillusionment on the part of  both citizens and 
representatives rapidly set in. In spite of  the good initial improvements 
in participation, by 1992, 3.71 per cent of  respondents in the case 
study districts felt that the Assembly ‘could not meet their needs’, a 
view amply proven by comparing the actual outputs of  the Assemblies 
with citizens’ statements on what they saw as the main developmental 
priorities for their communities (Crook and Manor 1998). Twenty-two 
years later, little had changed; a national survey by Ghana’s Center for 
Democratic Development (CDD) found that 65 per cent of  citizens did 
not trust the DAs and gave poor ratings to their performance in key 
areas of  public service provision (Ayee, Ahwoi and Deku 2014: 152). 
Participation in local elections declined, from 58 per cent in 1989 to 
41 per cent in 1998, and has continued to fall since (Crook 1999). 
Worse, the most recent assessments have confirmed that the sub-district 
structures – Town, Area and Zonal Councils, and Unit Committees 
– which were supposed to be the core of  grass-roots participation – 
remain for the most part ‘paper’ institutions which have never really 
been activated (Ayee et al. 2014: 71). When elections for the Unit 
Committees finally took place in 1998, 65 per cent were uncontested. 
The initial cohorts of  elected AMs also lost heart: by 1994, only one 
third on average of  the original AMs stood for re-election, and it has 
since proven consistently difficult, except in the main urban areas, to 
secure good candidates for the Assemblies.
2.7 Political pressure to increase central government funding, decline in 
local revenue mobilisation
Secondly, there has been little or no progress in improving local revenue 
mobilisation. The political and administrative difficulties outlined 
previously, combined with the increasingly powerful clientelist basis of  
local and national politics, have led to continual increases in central 
government transfers to the local government system, both in absolute 
and proportionate terms. Before the DA reform, Ghana’s District 
Councils, which were administratively run, received between 24 and 
43 per cent of  their revenues from central government transfers. In the 
first few years of  the DA system, when central government transfers 
came primarily from ceded revenues, salary payments and earmarked 
grants, central government funding continued to account for around 
40–50 per cent of  total revenues (although this actually declined 
somewhat in the two case study districts) (Crook and Manor 1998). 
A major change occurred with the introduction of  the DACF in 1994; 
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initially set at 5 per cent of  national revenues, political pressure led to 
the fund being increased to 7.5 per cent in 2008 after the election of  
the NPP government (Gilbert et al. 2013). The NDC regime (which 
lost office in December 2016) was considering increasing this to 10 per 
cent. Over the past 20 years, funding for the DAs coming from the 
DACF has resulted in a tenfold increase in central funds compared to 
the former ceded revenues system. The increases have been especially 
significant over the 2008–13 period (see Table 2). In 2008, total central 
government and external funding accounted for between 74 per cent 
(largest quintile by population) and 93 per cent (smallest quintile by 
population) of  total revenues, the differences reflecting the equalisation 
formulae (Gilbert et al. 2013). (The three big cities, Accra, Kumasi and 
Tema, received 59 per cent, 68 per cent and 47 per cent respectively 
Table 2 DACF yearly allocations, 1994–2013 (in million Ghana cedis)
Year Actual amount (million GHS) % Increase/decrease
1994 2.60 -
1995 5.40 106.46
1996 7.80 44.31
1997 7.90 1.28
1998 15.53 96.48
1999 11.24 (-27.6)
2000 14.95 33.01
2001 18.87 26.22
2002 26.53 40.6
2003 64.86 144.42
2004 85.86 32.17
2005 70.19 (-18.11)
2006 139.16 98.2
2007 173.34 6.63
2008 217.01 46.24
2009 188.57 (-13.11)
2010 340.40 80.52
2011 392.96 43.32
2012 571.70 45.49
2013 648.13 13.36
Total 3,072.89 -
Source Ayee (2014).
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from central government transfers.) Latest estimates suggest that the 
proportions are between 80 and 99 per cent (Ayee 2014).
As noted, this significant and continuing growth in central funding has 
raised the average annual per capita revenue for all DAs to between 
US$5 and US$10 – still not very impressive, given the responsibilities 
of  the district and Metropolitan governments. At the same time, local 
revenue mobilisation continues to experience the same difficulties 
and remains weak. One indication is the persistence of  unrealistic 
budget estimating, whereby every year DAs set budgets based upon 
estimates of  revenue collection which are never achieved, often by huge 
margins. In the two case studies, the gap between revenue estimates 
and actual revenues in the early 1990s was routinely between 200 and 
400 per cent. In 2014, it was calculated that the actual revenues of  all 
Assemblies were only 37 per cent of  budget estimates (Ayee et al. 2014).
An example of  the difficulties is to be found in the poll tax or ‘flat basic 
rate’, a legacy from the colonial era which Assemblies have retained 
and still attempt to collect. It is usually a very small, even token amount 
(Ayee suggests it is typically the equivalent of  £0.10), but collection 
rates are very low – in the case studies, the revenue figures showed 
that only around 12–14 per cent of  the adult population were paying 
the tax. Nevertheless, an official report on the performance of  the 
decentralisation programme still recommends that the tax be retained, 
but at a more useful level (for example, the equivalent of  one day of  
the official minimum daily wage), on the grounds that it provides an 
accountability link between the provision of  services and payment of  
tax (Ayee et al. 2014). Clearly, the fundamental political difficulties at the 
root of  local revenue mobilisation have not been addressed, given the 
context of  ever-increasing pressures to provide central funding. Such a 
centrally-dominated system can be seen as an important element in the 
control of  patronage which permeates the democratic political system, 
side by side with the laudable goal of  providing realistic and adequate 
funding for the decentralised authorities.
3 Would a different kind of representation and electoral system work 
better?
If  the community basis of  representation on large district governments 
creates such deep problems, would a different form of  democratic 
representation work better? Côte d’Ivoire introduced a ‘Francophone’-
style local government system between 1985 and 1996, based on 
‘communes’. The distinguishing feature of  the commune system is that it is 
based on an urban conception of  local government, in which each town 
is made a self-governing unit, incorporating only a small surrounding 
rural area. By 1996, Côte d’Ivoire had 196 communes, the majority of  
which had populations of  less than 20,000. Each is run by an executive 
mayor who is elected by the winning council at its first meeting. A closed 
list system of  election is used which means that the councillors do not 
officially have any constituency responsibility or ‘community’ link. But 
the ratio of  representation is even closer and more ‘grass roots’ than 
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that of  Ghana: 1:1,000 on average, with ratios of  1:400 more common 
in the smaller communes such as the four studied in the 1990s (Crook 
and Manor 1998).
Unfortunately, the Ivorian list system does not work any better than 
single-member wards for encouraging local democratic responsibility and 
collective action including local revenue mobilisation for development. 
A survey of  local residents revealed that 58 per cent could not name any 
elected councillors, whilst 90 per cent could name the mayor (Crook 
and Manor 1998). The political logic of  the list means that most mayors 
are elite political entrepreneurs who put together their list before the 
election; they are his supporters and if  the list is victorious will elect the 
patron mayor as expected. Worse, the list election is a ‘winner takes all’, 
so the winning list takes control of  the commune council and there is no 
representation of  any opposition. This means that collecting local taxes 
and even special levies for agreed commune projects is difficult because 
those who did not vote for the winning list and its mayor do not consider 
themselves in any way obliged to contribute. In one commune studied, 
a project to build a much-needed secondary school for the area had to 
be abandoned as it was impossible to collect sufficient funds through 
a commune special levy, even though the prefect was enlisted to try to 
enforce it. The mindset of  Ivorian local electors is very much focused on 
central or national politics; they see ‘development’ as something which 
the mayor, as a big ‘patron’, should bring to the locality through his 
political connections with capital city politicians and officials.
4 Conclusions
The issues emerging from the experiences of  decentralised government 
in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Uganda, as well as Africa more generally, 
suggest that representative local democracy does not necessarily lead to 
improved local revenue mobilisation, particularly where it involves any 
form of  direct or individual taxation. Indirect taxation is probably easier 
to collect but still does not deal with the problem of  how to give greater 
legitimacy to resource allocation decisions by an elected council, where 
there is little or no sense of  a collective public good at that level of  
action. Neither single-member electoral representation of  communities 
on a ‘no-party’ basis, nor party list elections seem to work well, within 
the context of  a national political system dominated by competitive 
clientelism.
Competitive party competition at local level could perhaps help to 
aggregate a broader sense of  collective interest, but can also lead to an 
even stronger sense of  exclusion and resentment if  resources are denied 
to communities which voted for the losing party, as happens in many 
countries. In India, which has a nationwide system of  local democratic 
governments, what does seem to work better is the presence of  real 
opposition, which can challenge the most blatant examples of  clientelist 
allocation of  resources; this, combined with the very high rate of  
turnover in Indian elections (ruling parties at state level were thrown out 
after one term in over 70 per cent of  elections, 1980–2008) has led to the 
28 | Crook Democratic Decentralisation, Clientelism and Local Taxation in Ghana
Vol. 48 No. 2 March 2017: ‘Interrogating Decentralisation in Africa’
emergence of  ‘post-clientelist’ initiatives in which politicians try to appeal 
to broader groups of  voters with generic development programmes 
(Manor 2016). In India, such approaches are further encouraged by the 
enormous increase in national funding resources handed down to local 
governments by anti-poverty programmes such as the National Education 
Guarantee Programme and the National Rural Employment Guarantee. 
These initiatives can of  course feed local patronage politics; but active 
democratic competition and popular accountability initiatives can help 
to make them into tools of  broader developmental initiatives. There is 
some evidence that this may be starting to happen in parts of  Africa as 
well (van de Walle 2012); but the continuing dominance of  clientelist 
politics means that it is still very difficult to establish the legitimacy of  
local taxation. It may be argued, therefore, that attempting to increase 
the proportion of  local government revenues deriving from local taxation 
faces many obstacles, and is not necessarily helped by the current form of  
democratic electoral politics in Ghana. Central government transfers are, 
therefore, likely to remain the fairest and most effective way of  funding 
local government in Africa for some time to come.
Notes
* This article uses material from research on local government in West 
Africa and South Asia funded by the British Overseas Development 
Administration (now Department for International Development, 
DFID). The views expressed are those of  the author and should not 
be attributed to DFID.
1 See Cabral (2011) for a useful summary of  the main arguments for 
(and against) democratic decentralisation more generally.
2 Some scholars nonetheless remain puzzled that democracy has not 
produced more redistributive policies; Ardanaz and Scartascini’s 
(2011) study of  Argentine fiscal federalism explains it in terms of  the 
‘overrepresentation’ of  richer districts in the national parliament. 
But this simply transfers the same argument to parliamentary 
representation, on the assumption that government policy will 
somehow directly reflect the interests represented in parliament. But 
there is little evidence that parliaments in either South American or 
African democracies have much influence on policymaking or policy 
implementation (see Barkan 2010).
3 In the early 1990s, the per capita development expenditure in East 
Akim and East Mamprusi districts was the equivalent of  US$0.18 
and US$0.45; even by 2008, after substantial increases in central 
funding, the average per capita revenue of  all the Assemblies was 
only US$5.31, and US$10.62 for the smallest/poorest quintile (2012 
exchange rates) (Crook and Manor 1998; Gilbert et al. 2013).
4 In one of  the case study districts, respondents identified 66 per cent 
of  the projects which had been started in their villages as ‘self-help’; 
but 71 per cent were dissatisfied with them because few ever got 
completed (Crook and Manor 1998: 255).
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Is Election a Disadvantage? 
Nigerian Local Councils and 
Security Provision 
Ayobami Ojebode, Ike Ernest Onyishi and  
Fatai A. Aremu*
Abstract Deepening democracy through local elections is a major aim 
of decentralisation. But do elections always work to strengthen the 
relationship between local politicians and citizens, or can they set elected 
officials up for failure? This article examines security provisioning by local 
governments in Nigeria, understanding that some local governments are 
elected, while others are appointed by state governors. Our hypothesis 
was that elected local councils should be better rated than those that 
are appointed. By looking at local government areas that differ mainly 
in terms of whether their council is elected or appointed, we found 
that local elections are not enough singly to build strong connections 
between democratically elected local politicians and citizens. Democratic 
decentralisation in the context of limited financial resources, and limited 
autonomy vis-à-vis state governors and political bosses, can set elected 
governments up for failure to the extent that they are viewed as worse 
performers than their appointed counterparts.
Keywords: democratic decentralisation, Nigeria, local government 
elections, security provision, citizen perception.
1 Introduction
Nigeria operates a three-tier federal system made up of  the federal 
government, 36 state governments and 774 local governments. Whereas 
assumption of  the office of  the president or state governor is usually by 
election, assumption of  the office of  the local government chairperson 
can be by election or appointment. Elected local government chairpersons 
emerge from multiparty elections organised by state governments, while 
appointed local government chairpersons are handpicked solely by state 
governors from their party loyalists. Among the 774 local government 
chairpersons in Nigeria, only 202 (26 per cent) are elected while 572 
(74 per cent) are appointed. In other words, although local councils are the 
closest tier of  government to the people, in three-quarters of  these, citizens 
have had no input in deciding who leads them at this level.1
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Democracy theorists and pundits (Marcus, Mease and Ottemoeller 
2001; Post 2005; Maruatona 2006; Lindberg 2006; Hiley 2006) seem 
to strongly suggest that where citizens do not have input into deciding 
their leaders, there might be some form of  disconnect leading to a 
poor perception of  the government in question, disengagement and, 
ultimately, cynicism. This is, however, not a completely settled argument. 
For instance, citizens’ favourable perceptions of  some non‑democratic 
or authoritarian governments such as China (Saich 2016) suggest that 
citizens’ non-involvement in the (s)election of  political leaders may not 
always automatically lead to disaffection. The jury is thus still out on the 
link between elections and citizen perception of  government.
The structure of  local government in Nigeria provides a useful context 
for further investigating this link. With elected and selected councils 
sharing borders in many places, it was possible to set up a comparative 
study that examined if  and how a local council’s democratic status 
influenced citizens’ perception of  a political administration. By 
democratic status we refer to whether a local council is elected or 
appointed. Existing studies suggest that elected councils should be 
more responsive to citizens and perform duties in a way that pleases the 
electorate, in order to get re-elected or get elected to higher positions 
(Inyang and Abraham 2013; Enejo and Isa 2014). This suggests that 
appointed councils should be more responsive to the state governors that 
appoint them, and should seek to please them so as to retain their seat 
or get selected for higher positions. Accordingly, we hypothesised that 
an elected local government council would be perceived more positively 
by the electorate than a selected one because, being closer to the people 
and being a product of  their choice, an elected council should not only 
initiate programmes that resonate with the aspirations of  the electorate 
but also do so in ways that involve the contributions of  the citizens.
We wove our investigation around the provision of  security by local 
councils because not only is security a major issue in Nigeria, but it is 
also an issue that very often affects how Nigerian citizens perceive the 
effectiveness of  government. For instance, observers pointed out that 
security was a major reason that the government of  President Goodluck 
Jonathan lost re‑election in 2015 (Owen and Usman 2015; Zane 2015). 
Insurgency, herdsmen-related violence, pipeline destruction and oil 
theft, kidnapping and ransom‑taking are some of  the problems that 
make security a topical public agenda in Nigeria.
Although providing security for citizens is not one of  the functions 
of  the local government specified by the Nigerian Constitution, most 
local governments provide security in one form or another. In fact, the 
chairperson of  the local government council is regarded as the chief  
security officer of  the local government area (LGA). This is despite 
the fact that local governments are not permitted to have their police 
or armed forces or to recruit, train or arm any security personnel. In 
providing security for its citizens, the local government necessarily works 
with a variety of  actors. These include agencies of  state such as the 
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police, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and 
the State Security Service (SSS). They also include non-state actors, 
such as traditional rulers and other community leaders, local ‘vigilante’ 
groups (groups of  volunteers that are found nationwide in Nigeria), 
and market‑women leaders. Thus, providing security for citizens can 
become a local government’s way of  providing employment, interacting 
with and getting closer to the citizens, and possibly building a stronger 
reputation for delivery.
In the context of  the decentralisation of  security provision to the lowest 
tier of  government, it is important to pay attention to citizens’ evaluation 
of  their local government for a number of  reasons. First, decentralisation, 
whether it takes the form of  devolution or de‑concentration, is expected 
to broaden local participation in decision‑making (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2006). As a result, local communities should feel a sense of  
ownership, which can only be examined from the perspectives of  citizens. 
Second, most crimes are experienced locally within the community, and 
are committed against individuals. Therefore, it is individual citizens that 
are best positioned to evaluate crime prevention efforts. Third, there is 
often a disparity between actual crime rate and citizens’ perception of  
their safety and security (Ojebode et al. 2016). So long as the purpose 
of  a study is to understand how safe citizens feel, working with crime 
rate figures rather than citizens’ perception can be misleading. Our 
study is thus based on citizens’ perception of  the performance of  local 
governments in providing security, rather than on measures of  actual 
security provision at the local level.
We paired two local government areas: Asa Local Government 
and Surulere Local Government. These two local governments are 
separated from one another by an arbitrarily2 drawn border that 
cuts across them to create two different official political entities, but 
both areas are very similar in many ways. They face similar security 
situations, are identical economically, are both largely rural and 
agrarian, and their populations are similar in linguistic, cultural and 
religious terms. However, there is a key difference. While Asa has an 
elected local council, Surulere’s council was appointed by the state 
governor. If  our hypothesis holds true, citizens of  Asa should express a 
more positive perception of  their local council than citizens of  Surulere.
Contrary to our hypothesis, however, our empirical data reveals that 
in spite of  their shared common experiences of  insecurity types and 
levels, citizens of  Asa, the elected council, remained deeply disaffected 
with their local government, while citizens of  Surulere, the appointed 
council, were satisfied with their council’s performance. This is despite 
the fact that Asa’s local government actually initiated a new project 
to deal with security provision, while Surulere did not. Disaffection 
or satisfaction was not a product of  experience of  crime, or actual 
performance by local governments. Rather, it was a product of  the 
approach to crime prevention adopted by the council, which in itself  is 
traceable to the democratic status of  the council. Our analysis revealed 
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that in its bid to respond to and impress the electorate, the elected 
council initiated new security programmes, recruited citizens and placed 
them on a regular salary but was unable to sustain these programmes. 
This situation led to disaffection on the part of  the citizens. The 
appointed local government, on the other hand, was committed to 
pleasing the state government only; it did not set up any new security 
programmes nor did it recruit any citizens. Its support for existing 
informal and community‑based security arrangements was modest and 
irregular, but consistent. This was appreciated by citizens who, as a 
result, expressed a positive perception of  the council. The rest of  our 
article draws out this argument in detail.
2 What are African elections worth?
A number of  issues with the quality of  national and local elections in 
Africa have been pointed out by different scholars and commentators. 
Low voter turnout, violence during elections, and arrant rigging have 
been the recurring features of  elections almost across the continent 
(Agbaje and Adejumobi 2006; Ikpe 2009). Yet, elections are now a 
regular feature of  African politics, and are organised by most types 
of  regimes, even if  many of  their problems remain (Brown 2001). 
Ake (1996: 137) has pointed out that despite several rounds of  
elections, ‘authoritarian state structures remain, accountability to the 
government is weak, and the rule of  law is sometimes nominal. More 
often than not, people are voting without choosing’. More recently, 
Marcus et al. (2001: 113) describe African elections as the elite’s 
‘mechanism for lending authority to otherwise authoritarian regimes, 
rather than creating competitive processes for the attainment of  power’ 
while Adejumobi (2008: 362) describes them as a fading shadow of  
democracy which endangers the democratic process itself  by leading 
Africa back to the old order of  ‘despotic rulership’.
The poor quality of  elections leads to loss of  accountability and 
legitimacy. Lindberg (2003) studied the electoral practices and tactics 
of  Ghanaian members of  parliament and found a resurgence of  
neo-patrimonial practices as politicians engaged in patron–client 
relationships to reproduce their political power. This threatens both 
vertical and horizontal accountability. Growing apathy and cynicism 
are other consequences of  repeated rounds of  elections that fail the 
standard tests of  transparency and equality in Africa (Ake 1996; 
Maruatona 2006).
Yet, African elections, despite their imperfections, matter. Beyond 
Bratton’s (1998) dictum that there can be elections without democracy 
but there can be no democracy without election, Lindberg’s (2006: 143) 
rigorous study of  the significance of  African elections shows that 
‘elections do not have to be free and fair or fully democratic to have 
democratizing effects’. He goes on to demonstrate that even though 
they were grossly imperfect and far below standard, there was a 
strong correlation between frequency of  elections and the growth of  
democratic ideals, as operationalised by Freedom House ratings. Going 
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beyond ordinary correlations, Lindberg (2006) demonstrates the causal 
pathway that elections in Africa take to produce democratic outcomes.
We imagined that the same principle applies to local governments as 
well, where repeated local elections might produce cumulative positive 
democratic outcomes over time, including on accountability and 
responsiveness. Applying Lindberg’s (2006) findings on democratic 
‘lock‑ins’ to the context of  the current study, we can expect there to be 
a marked difference in the performance of  elected local councils and 
that of  appointed councils. If  we can hold other things constant, this 
difference should be attributable to the conduct of  elections and the 
democratic status of  local councils. This now is our methodological 
challenge. Importantly, we expect this marked difference to be reflected 
in the way citizens perceive and evaluate the performances of  their local 
government authorities, such that citizens of  local councils where there 
are regular elections will evaluate the local authorities better than those 
in local councils where council leaders are appointed by the governor. 
Our two selected cases serve our purpose well here – Asa Local 
Government has remained an elected local government since Nigeria’s 
return to democracy in 1999, while Surulere has moved back and forth 
between being elected and being appointed, but has had an appointed 
status since 2010.3
3 Decentralisation and local government security services provision
Provision of  security services is a constitutional duty of  the federal 
government, the same government that controls the security and crime 
prevention apparatuses, such as the SSS and the police. However, 
crime and insecurity records show that, especially in Africa, the federal 
government is failing in providing these crucial services in spite of  these 
apparatuses. Thirty-one per cent of  nearly half-a-million homicides 
globally in 2012 were committed in Africa (UNODC 2013), and 
Nigeria ranked among the top 20 nations with the highest crime rates 
in the world (Numbeo 2015). The Armed Conflict Location and Event 
Data Project (ACLED 2014) ranked Nigeria the deadliest country in 
Africa, with about 29 per cent of  all organised armed conflict‑related 
fatalities in 2014. That was the year the country recorded 6,383 
deaths largely caused by the insurgency in the North. Property theft, 
kidnapping and pipeline vandalism are among the other rising causes of  
insecurity in Nigeria.
However, Nigeria, like many other governments all over the world, has 
come to the conclusion that state policing alone is incapable of  solving 
or abating insecurity owing to historical, economic, cultural and other 
limitations (Killingray 1986; Marenin 2009). As a result, the country has 
been promoting different forms of  community‑based crime prevention 
(Ojebode et al. 2016). Since these are activities at the community level, 
they undoubtedly call for the involvement of  the local government. 
There are security committees within local government councils that are 
headed by the chairperson and bring together all state security agencies 
with the members of  more informal community‑based crime prevention 
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groups, such as local vigilantes, hunters and watchmen, and community 
leaders. Thus, although providing security services is not one of  the 
duties of  the local government as enshrined in the constitution, the 
Federal Government of  Nigeria has devolved that duty to the local 
government level, designating the local government chairperson as the 
chief  security officer of  the local government area.
Literature on decentralisation is indecisive on whether or not devolved 
service provision is effective. On the one hand, local governments’ 
involvement in the provision of  services is believed to broaden access 
and improve service delivery (Kolehmainen‑Aitken 1999; McLean 
and King 1999; World Bank 2001), enhance accountability (World 
Bank 2000), minimise violence (World Bank 2001) and empower local 
communities (Brinkerhoff and Azfar 2006). On the other hand, local 
government provision of  services could create a platform for clientelism, 
budgetary constraints and bureaucratic bottlenecks (World Bank 2001). 
The tendency also exists for local council leaders to overreach their 
mandates in a bid to garner popular support during elections (where 
councils are democratically elected), creating high expectations among 
the citizens without sufficient budgetary and technical resources to 
deliver (Rawnsley 2001).
This inconclusive state of  the existing literature necessitates context-
specific investigations such as this one. Within the broad construct 
of  decentralisation and in the specific context of  Nigeria, we seek to 
understand citizens’ evaluation of  the performance of  local councils in 
the decentralised provision of  security services, and also why citizens 
hold such views.
4 A typology of local councils’ democratic status
The constitution of  Nigeria mandates local councils to be elected by 
citizens, but at the same time it also allows state governments to select 
members of  a local council if  they believe an election is not feasible. 
Using this constitutional provision, many state governments do not 
organise elections and prefer to nominate local councils. This decision 
is entirely that of  state governors, and the reason most often cited for 
nominating local councils is a lack of  funds for organising elections, 
or a tense atmosphere in the state that can ignite electoral violence. 
A popular perception is that this happens most often when governors 
are unsure if  their party would win the local councils. In other cases, 
some state governments are simply unable to organise local government 
elections owing to resource and logistical constraints.
These different practices allow us to construct a descriptive typology of  
the democratic status of  local councils. When the ruling party selects 
local councils from among party loyalists, we can think of  these Type 1 
councils (as seen in Figure 1) as ‘state envoys’ or representatives of  the 
state government and the ruling party. Their assumption of  office does 
not involve the citizens and they are also the least autonomous type of  
local council vis-à-vis state governments. This type of  local council exists 
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in many states in Nigeria, and constitutes about two thirds of  all local 
governments. When states organise local council elections and the ruling 
party wins, these are Type 2 councils, which we can call ‘dual loyalists’ 
because they have both the ruling party and the local electorate to 
serve. Quite often, such councils emerge amidst widespread allegations 
of  electoral irregularities, which are made more credible by the fact 
that the ruling party is empowered by the constitution to constitute the 
electoral body and appoint the chair of  the electoral commission, so 
that elections can be manipulated to bring their chosen candidates into 
power. However, these are elected councils and have far more legitimacy 
and possibly also greater autonomy vis-à-vis state governments than 
nominated councils.
Type 3 councils – selected by the opposition – are possible theoretically 
but not in practice. It is usually only the ruling party that is able to 
select local councils. If  this does ever happen, it would be a token by the 
ruling party to pacify the opposition, or a strategy to bring it on board 
a coalition. On some occasions, the opposition party is able to wrest the 
control of  some local councils from the hold of  the party ruling at the 
state level. When this happens, it is often an expression of  the locals’ 
dissatisfaction with the performance of  the state government and an 
invitation to the opposition to prove that it can perform better. There 
have been very few local councils of  this Type 4 variety in Nigeria, and 
there are none at the current moment. Given how hard this has proven 
in the history of  democratic decentralisation in Nigeria, we can call 
this category of  local politicians ‘electoral heroes’ for managing to win 
against the state government. This type of  council, when it exists, may 
enjoy the greatest legitimacy and autonomy vis-à-vis state governments.
Each type of  democratic status has implications for the extent to which 
local councils can exercise autonomy in service delivery. However, given 
the distribution of  councils in Nigeria at the moment, we focus on just 
Types 1 and 2 – the state envoys and dual loyalists. Restated in the terms 
Figure 1 A typology of democratic statuses
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of  this typology, our hypothesis is that with regard to the performance 
in providing security services to citizens, dual loyalists would enjoy more 
positive perception by the electorate than state envoys. The rest of  this 
article checks on the extent to which this is true.
5 Methodology
Experimental designs come in handy when researchers try to determine 
if  and how a certain cause produces a certain outcome. These designs, 
which are necessarily comparative, allow the researcher to control the 
environment of  the research, randomly select their subjects and hold 
some factors constant while manipulating others to determine the effects 
of  these other factors on the outcome (Wimmer and Dominick 2011).
In many study settings, pure experiments are impracticable and evidence 
of  causation has to be based on quasi‑experimental designs. One of  the 
key differences between pure and quasi‑experiments is the inability of  the 
latter to randomly assign subjects to groups. In other words, researchers 
have to work with existing groups, not the ones they randomly created. This 
raises the question of  internal validity – a doubt as to the extent to which 
differences between the groups are solely the outcome of  the manipulation 
of  a variable or the presence or absence of  an intervention. Yet, carefully 
constructed quasi-experiments can produce valid causal claims.
With the intention of  studying if  and how the democratic status of  a 
local council influences the way citizens perceive its performance in 
providing public goods, specifically security services, we adopted the 
cross-case spatial comparative case study design. Paying attention to the 
nuances in the democratic status summed up earlier, we selected two 
diverse cases: a council appointed by the state governor, and one elected 
by citizens. We controlled for spatial, ethnic and socio‑demographic 
confounders by choosing contiguous local government councils located 
in neighbouring states. The two local government councils are Surulere 
in Oyo State (appointed council) and Asa in Kwara State (elected 
council). They are separated by the artificial boundary between Oyo 
and Kwara states. Both local councils have Yoruba‑speaking populations 
that are mostly rural subsistence farmers and traders. Both local 
government areas also experience the same kind of  insecurity problems 
– mostly property theft and clashes between farmers and herdsmen. In 
both of  them, there are formal crime prevention agencies (the police, 
the SSS, and the NSCDC) and informal actors, such as vigilantes, 
hunter-volunteers and other forms of  community-driven crime 
prevention arrangements.
With reference to factors that might affect security provisioning, such 
as population size and population mix, neighbourhood density, level of  
urbanisation or industrialisation, presence of  state security agencies, 
and level of  unemployment, among others (Ojebode et al. 2016), the 
two local government areas are identical. According to the 2006 census, 
Asa has a population of  126,432 (Kwara State Government 2015) 
while Surulere has 126,692 (Oyo State Government 2015). Both have 
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population densities below the national average: 90.3 per sq km for Asa 
and 129 per sq km for Surulere against the national average of  200 per 
sq km. Furthermore, both Kwara and Oyo states are ruled by the same 
political party, the All Progressive Congress (APC). The main observable 
difference between the two local government areas is that for one the 
executive council was elected, while in the other it was appointed.
We began with the collection and analysis of  quantitative survey data, 
a stage designed to show citizens’ perception of  the performance of  
their local councils in the provision of  security services. The outcome 
of  that analysis called for, and thus guided, further in-depth qualitative 
investigation in a second round of  data collection. This second round 
focused on understanding why the local councils were perceived as they 
were by the citizens, and helped us unravel the unexpected manner 
in which democratic status influenced citizens’ perception of  security 
provisioning by leading us to map a causal pathway between status and 
security provisioning. The integration of  both findings led us to a third 
and final round of  data collection, which was also qualitative and was 
meant for the purpose of  validation through in‑depth interviews with 
community leaders and security officials, and through field observations.
This sequencing and combination of  methods was advantageous. As we 
show later, the analysis of  the first wave of  quantitative data collection 
largely nullified the hypothesis that the elected council would be better 
perceived by its citizens than appointed councils. The second wave of  
data collection focused on why this was so, as it tried to establish the 
link between democratic status and citizens’ perception, while the third 
wave helped in further clarifying this and validating our claims as we 
discussed our findings with community leaders and security officials.
Although our case and unit of  analysis is the local government area 
and our design is, therefore, a small-N design, our data come from 
an aggregation of  the views of  randomly selected individuals. We 
selected 235 respondents to the questionnaire using a combination of  
systematic and convenience sampling techniques. Focusing mainly on the 
headquarters of  the local government areas – Iresadu town in Surulere 
council, and Afon town in Asa council – we selected the first willing adult 
respondent each from every fifth house with a random start. This gave 
us 139 males and 96 females; 121 respondents from the Surulere Local 
Government Area and 114 from the Asa Local Government Area.
As part of  the qualitative data collection, we conducted 16 interviews 
with local government officials, traditional community leaders, members 
of  the Police–Community Relations Committee (PCRC), two officers of  
the NSCDC, and some community members and leaders. We included 
security personnel because we wanted an insight into the structure of  
security services rendered or supported by the local council, especially to 
be sure these were similar in the two councils; we included community 
members and leaders to gain additional insight into community 
perception of  the local council.
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6 Similar structure, similar experiences of (in)security
We found a tripartite structure of  security provisioning in each 
council that comprised government services; community-led and 
community-driven security services; and private and commercial 
services. The relationship among these is somewhat nondescript and 
required our attention.
The first set of  security services are provided by the government and 
involve the police, the SSS, the NSCDC and the local government 
officials. These agencies are independent of  one another: the police, 
SSS and the NSCDC take orders from their state headquarters 
located in the state capitals, while the local government officials take 
orders from the local government chairperson. Together, they form 
a committee that meets once every month to deliberate on security 
issues and sometimes to plan joint actions. The committee also includes 
community leaders. There are no guidelines or standard operating 
procedures guiding the collaboration between these parties, and the 
chairperson does not have power of  veto. He is more of  a coordinator 
than a chairperson. The main funding for security agencies comes from 
the federal government through the commanding offices in the state 
capitals. However, local government councils support the police, SSS 
and NSCDC materially by donating vehicles (including motorcycles), 
and sometimes also maintaining these vehicles.
Disagreements sometimes occur among them, as happened during 
the last general elections when a chairperson deployed certain 
anti‑opposition tactics which were interpreted by the security agencies 
as being too political and which ‘our commanding officers (in the state 
capital) did not sanction’.4 Such disagreements sometimes fester to the 
point that the committee members have to assert their independence 
and their loyalty to their commanding officers in the state capitals, over 
the wishes of  the council chairperson.
The second set of  community-driven security services are mainly 
the activities of  neighbourhood or village‑based associations led 
by a community leader, or baálé. These associations or network of  
associations hire watchmen who work mainly nights and pay them from 
contributions by members. They may hire members of  a registered 
and recognised national association, the Vigilante Group of  Nigeria. 
Some communities hire members of  hunters’ associations – those 
who professionally hunt for game, mostly in rural areas – that provide 
protection to the community for a fee. In many cases, vigilante members 
simply volunteer ‘without receiving a dime’ from the local government.5 
However, there were indications that the two local councils not only 
involve community leaders in the security committee but also support 
hunters and vigilante groups financially and in kind. They do this using 
different formats, to which we will return shortly.
The third set of  services comprise private and commercial security 
arrangements by banks and a few rich people who can afford these. 
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This category is independent of  the government and community‑based 
security services, and are therefore not included in this analysis.
The three types of  security arrangements – government, community-
based and private security – are unevenly distributed across the local 
government areas. Whereas all three are clearly visible in the local 
government headquarters, the presence of  government and private 
services wanes as one moves from the headquarters to the interior, more 
rural parts of  the jurisdiction, where community‑driven services become 
more prominent. This has a key implication for our understanding of  
decentralisation. Rather than being a process that brings government 
and administrative decisions closer to the grass roots, decentralisation 
has become the process of  multiplying little centres or nuclei rather than 
of  scattering the centre and moving government closer to the citizens. As 
noted by Kauzya (2007), ‘if  decentralization has to be successful it needs 
to be conceived as the transfer of  power and authority to the people and 
not only to local governments’. Local government headquarters have 
become little state capitals where facilities and government presence are 
concentrated, and they present a sharp contrast to the rest of  the local 
government areas that lie just a few kilometres away.
The similarities between the two local governments go beyond the 
structure of  security services that exists. There are also similarities in 
citizens’ experience of  crime. A Chi-square test6 for independence (with 
Yates Continuity Correction) was conducted to test whether citizens in 
Surulere, the appointed local government council, experienced more 
crime than those in Asa, an elected local government council. We asked 
citizens about whether or not they have experienced a serious crime. 
The results in Table 1 indicated no significant association between status 
of  local government and experience of  crime. To be significant, the 
p‑value needs to be .05 or smaller. In this case the value of  .466 is larger 
than the value of  .05, so we concluded that our result is not significant. 
The effect size (phi = –.058) is also considered a very small effect using 
Cohen’s (1988) criteria of  .10 for a small effect, .30 for a medium effect 
and .50 for a large effect.
Table 1 Results of 2 by 2 Chi-square test for status of Local Government Area (LGA) 
and experience of crime
Status of LGA No Yes df x2 p-value phi
Appointed 93 
(76.9%)
28 
(23.1%) 
1 .532 .466 -.058
Elected 93 
(81.6%)
21 
(18.4%)
Total 186 
(79.1%)
49 
(20.9%)
235 (100%)
Source Authors’ fieldwork.
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In addition to comparing the local councils on the frequency of  crime 
experienced by citizens, we also compared them on the type of  crime 
experienced. This is important because types of  crime experienced 
can also influence perception of  safety and how citizens judge the 
performance of  government. Here too we found no significant 
differences across the two local government areas. As Table 2 shows, 
a 2 by 7 Chi‑square test for independence shows that there was 
no significant association between the democratic status of  local 
government and types of  crime experienced by its citizens. The effect 
size (Cramer’s V = .202) is also considered a very small effect.
The two local government areas are similar in terms of  the structure of  
security service provision at the local level, and citizens’ experience of  
crime. This adds to the earlier similarities we pointed out in terms of  
culture, demographics and economics across the two local government 
areas to show that they are largely similar units. And yet, the perception 
of  their citizens of  the performances of  their local government councils 
is not the same, despite the fact that the council that is perceived 
negatively has actually initiated security projects, while the council 
perceived positively has not. We look at and explain this curious finding 
in the next section.
7 Different levels of satisfaction with local government
We asked respondents to state their level of  satisfaction with the security 
services provided by their local governments. Table 3 shows the result. 
An independent-samples t-test7 was conducted to compare the level 
of  satisfaction with security services of  those whose local government 
leaders were appointed and those whose leaders were elected. The 
p‑value results show that there was a statistically significant difference 
(p<0.05) in satisfaction here – those whose local government leaders 
were appointed were more satisfied with security services than those 
whose local government leaders were elected. The magnitude of  
the difference in the means is ‑0.62, and about 10 per cent of  the 
Table 2 Results of 2 by 7 Chi-square test for status of Local Government Area (LGA) and types of crime experienced
Status of 
LGA
df x2 p-value Cramer’s 
V
Unarmed 
robbery 
without 
aggression 
or physical 
threat
Unarmed 
robbery 
with 
assault or 
physical 
threats
Armed 
robbery
Household 
theft
Others Property 
damage
None 6 9.603 .142 .202
Appointed 1 (0.8%) 3 (2.5%) 5 (4.5%) 17 (14.0%) 2 (1.7%) 3 (2.5%) 90 (74.4%)
Elected 1 (0.9%) 1 (0.9%) 1 (0.9%) 10 (8.8%) 0 (0.0%) 8 (7.0%) 93 (81.6%)
Total 2 (0.9%) 4 (1.7%) 6 (2.6%) 27 (11.5%) 2 (0.9%) 11 (4.7%) 183 (77.9%) 235 
(100%)
Source Authors’ fieldwork.
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variance in satisfaction with security services is explained by the groups 
(appointed and elected).
The contrast in the perceived performance of  both councils is starker 
in the interview data. Interviewees in Asa Local Government Area (the 
elected council) could hardly find a kind word to describe the security 
services of  their local government council. Recurrent references were 
made to the recruitment of  the vigilantes and the local government’s 
inability to pay them. Some claimed that even when the vigilantes were 
being paid, they were deployed to guard government property not 
citizens. An interviewee8 in Asa (elected) Local Government Area stated 
why the local government was unresponsive:
The local government authority has done nothing to ease the pains of  the 
security threats… They have not performed to the expectations in other aspects 
too. In my opinion, they have good intentions but are being thwarted by financial 
constraints. Joint Account with the state government has made progress at 
local government impossible.9 I am an insider myself. The local government is 
paralysed; they can’t even pay the salary of  their workers.
On the other hand, interviewees in Surulere Local Government Area 
(an appointed council) were satisfied with the performance of  the local 
government council in terms of  security provision. An interviewee10 in 
Surulere Local Government Area (appointed) said:
The Local Government Authority has been a tremendous supporter of  the 
Security Agents. They assist with money and other necessary gadgets. The police 
and vigilantes have benefited from this good gesture. They are doing very well.
In spite of  the shared common experiences of  insecurity types and 
levels across the two local government areas, citizens of  Asa, the elected 
council, remained deeply disaffected while citizens of  Surulere, the 
appointed council, remained satisfied with their council’s performance. 
The difference in the level of  satisfaction could not have been a 
product of  experience of  crime or a result of  any cultural, economic 
or demographic differences, since these were held constant. As the 
next section shows, it is rather a product of  the style of  security service 
provision of  the local government councils, which is itself  traceable to 
their democratic status.
Table 3 Local government democratic status and citizens’ satisfaction with local 
government’s security services
Group N M SD t p-value Eta  
squared
Appointed 114 9.75 2.12
Elected 121 9.13 1.82 -2.37 0.05 .100
Source Authors’ fieldwork.
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8 How democratic status matters
Why would the citizens in a local government area perceive the 
security services of  its local council poorly while another next to it 
perceives those of  its local council in much better light when these two 
groups of  citizens have similar experiences of  insecurity and similar 
security provision structure, among other germane similarities? Our 
analysis shows that the reason for this disparity in perception was not 
the security situation or the performance of  the local government 
authorities but rather in the approaches adopted by each council in 
providing security. We discovered that these approaches are a reflection 
of  the democratic statuses of  these local government authorities. The 
two different approaches are presented graphically in Figure 2.
Both local governments adopted a formal approach to working with 
formal agencies such as the police, SSS and the NSCDC. There are 
regular monthly meetings, with minutes of  meetings and other formal 
procedures. However, they have markedly different approaches to 
working with informal security providers, which constitute a significant 
part of  security provision in both areas. Asa Local Government 
Council, an elected council, adopted a formal approach in providing 
security services with the traditional informal security service providers 
– the community leaders and associations, vigilante groups and local 
hunters – by starting a major project with these groups. They were 
recruited, trained, kitted out and put on a monthly salary of  N7,000 
(less than US$20). However, the local government could not sustain this 
and the arrangement failed, creating a feeling of  disaffection on the 
part of  the citizens. On the other hand, Surulere Local Government 
Council, an appointed council, adopted an informal approach to 
working with informal partners. By implication, the appointed council 
did not have a commitment to regularly support or sponsor the informal 
agents. If  there were funds, the council supported the agents, if  funds 
were unavailable, the council did not support them. Why did the two 
local governments adopt such different approaches?
8.1 Asa
We probed further to understand why the elected council in Asa 
would embark on the formalisation of  an informal but widespread 
Figure 2 Approaches adopted by elected and appointed local governments with formal and informal agencies
Source Authors’ own.
Asa (elected)
Formal partners:  
police, SSS, NSCDC
Informal partners:  
communities, hunters, 
vigilantes
Surulere (appointed)
Formal approach
Formal approach
Formal approach
Informal approach
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and reportedly effective security arrangement (Ojebode et al. 2016). 
Recruiting and kitting up local vigilante members and hunters, it seems, 
has apparent strategic and intrinsic value for security provisioning. Being 
locals, they have a thorough knowledge of  the geography of  the area and 
can therefore monitor movements and follow trails. Not only this, they 
know the residents in the communities and have a better idea of  likely 
offenders than the police would have, and they are also known by the 
community, and so are most likely to abstain from conduct unbecoming 
of  a community member – such as extortion or victimisation. Selecting 
them and training them was thus strategic. Closely related to this is the 
fact that recruiting and kitting out locals was also a way of  providing 
employment and reducing the incidence of  crime.
There are extrinsic values of  this strategy as well. The council 
strategically chose a method that would have the greatest impact on 
the psyche of  the locals: official uniform, training (including drills and 
march‑pasts) and kits. In a seminar paper presented on the non‑verbal 
significance of  official uniforms, Deinde (2013) explained that the 
official uniform in colonial and postcolonial Africa was more than 
mere clothing or, as it is in the West, an expression of  state presence. It 
was also an expression of  the wearer’s worth and importance. To kit a 
person out was, therefore, to give them legitimate state presence as well 
as enhance her or his worth in the community. This, according to him, 
explained the awe with which colonial police officers were treated and 
the widespread cases of  corruption against them even at that time.
At the beginning, our interviewees observed, the programme attracted 
the attention and commendation of  communities for its ingenuity and 
its immediate impact, not just on security, but also on employment.
Everybody was happy. Hunters and many of  these other jobless people were 
bringing something home at the end of  every month. They had uniform and salary. 
Like soldiers. And their families were happy too and they were proud. And people 
said this chairman had good ideas and he was like a saviour. We said he made 
(electoral) promises and we voted for him, and now he is fulfilling them.11
However, the chairperson could not sustain the programme beyond 
the first 18 months. A community leader who also worked in the 
local government informed us that funds coming in from the federal 
government through the state reduced, and internally-generated 
revenue did not increase. Soon, the chairperson stopped paying the 
recruited and kitted-out locals.
When our salaries stopped coming, (there was) nothing to show at home at the 
end of  the month. What is uniform? What is boots? Is that food? People even 
made jest of  us; uniform without salary.12
The economic and social aspects of  this funding discontinuation was 
negatively felt by both the affected workers, their dependants and others 
in the local government area. The eventual outcome was palpable 
disaffection against the local government authority.
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A simple depiction as the one in Figure 3 risks over-simplifying a 
complex situation, yet it is invaluable in laying out the basic skeleton of  
a complex problem. Figure 3 summarises the likely reasons the elected 
council may be perceived negatively by the electorate, in this case with 
reference to their performance in providing security services.
An elected local government chairperson is a dual loyalist: he has the 
electorate to serve but also has party stalwarts to please. Figure 3 shows 
that the dual loyalist faces pressure from two separate directions. At 
the top of  the list of  these loyalists are those influential people, called 
‘godfathers’, who dictate the distribution of  party tickets to contest 
elections and can influence votes and victory. Edigin (2010) points out 
that large resources are expended to please and service these godfathers 
or ‘kingmakers’. Those who refuse to serve the godfathers after their 
electoral victory are ‘subjected to indecent manipulations’ and risk 
being impeached (Albert 2005: 105). Edigin (2010) cites examples 
of  such impeachments, which godfathers can affect either through 
legislative means, which they also control in many cases, or through 
more informal means, such as gangs that are used to create violence 
and other forms of  crisis in the jurisdiction of  their estranged ‘godsons’ 
(Ellis 2008; Olarinmoye 2008). We do not have firm evidence of  how 
many resources went into pleasing the godfathers in our two cases, 
but most analyses suggest that Nigerian politicians expend substantial 
financial resources to service godfathers. In fact, Albert (2005: 103) 
explains that while there are powerful people all over the world who 
are capable of  influencing electoral victory, the Nigerian political 
godfather is unique in that he has ‘turned politics into a money-making 
business… an economic investment that must yield superlative dividends 
by all means’.
Election, 
promises and 
victory
Pressure to 
‘perform’
Creation of 
big projects 
(Vigilante, etc.)
Projects 
abandoned
Disaffection, 
poor rating
Expectations 
from electorate
Funds to ‘settle’ 
godfathers, 
party, etc.
Poor funding 
from state
Pressure from 
godfathers, 
party, etc.
Figure 3 Causal pathway from elected democratic status to poor perception of performance
Source Authors’ own.
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The second source of  pressure comes from the electorate and their 
expectations of  effective delivery, based on promises made during 
election speeches, rallies and campaigns. To meet these, the elected 
council chairperson creates big projects, in this case security projects. 
However, as funds eventually reduce but demands from godfathers 
and party bosses do not, projects are abandoned. People lose jobs 
and the community at large witnesses other obvious signs of  the local 
government moving away from projects and electoral promises, and 
as disaffection sets in, the chairperson is seen as yet another deceitful 
politician by citizens.
8.2 Surulere
Why would a state envoy, that is, the appointed local council 
chairperson, neither adopt a formal approach to security nor initiate 
a new security project? The chairperson of  Surulere local government 
council did not initiate a project; he depended on instructions from 
the state government for every project. He had no independence and 
could not recruit workers for a project except with the approval of  the 
state governor. Since he did not campaign for elections, he did not 
make promises and therefore, there is little or no expectation from the 
electorate. Given the ubiquity of  godfather‑ism in Nigerian politics, 
as discussed previously, we suggest that he is faced with pressures from 
godfathers as well, but that is the only set of  pressures he faces since 
there is no electorate in this situation.
Our interviewees from Surulere expressed satisfaction with the performance 
of  the local government in security provision. A leader of  the local 
watchmen (hunters) whom we interviewed13 claimed that the chairperson:
supports us very well. He donated motorcycles to us and also gives us money 
from time to time… not every month. We don’t get money every month since we 
Figure 4 Causal pathway from appointed democratic status to good perception of performance
Source Authors’ own.
No election; 
no promises
Instruction from 
governor
Support existing informal 
security arrangements 
without commitment
Favourable 
perception
Funds to ‘settle’ 
godfathers, 
party, etc.
Poor funding 
from state
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are not civil servants. Sometimes the money is much; sometimes the money is 
small. We all know that things are hard in this country.
It is important to note that the motorcycles were regarded as donations 
rather than entitlements. Donations evoke a sense of  gratitude; 
entitlements do not.
Another interviewee commended the chairperson of  Surulere for 
occasionally attending their meetings or sending his representatives. This 
was a sign that the chairperson recognised and respected them. Others 
spoke of  his ‘closeness’ to the traditional rulers which is interpreted as a 
sign of  his humility and respect for tradition and culture: ‘He does not 
pass on this main road without stopping to greet our leader’. That these 
simple and generally common gestures are commended shows that the 
citizens did not expect these from the appointed chairperson who, in 
their view, is not under any obligation to make such gestures.
Occasionally, when specific needs arise, the leaders of  the informal 
security agents approach the local government chairperson in Surulere 
for financial assistance. One such instance was when the vigilante group 
wanted to buy uniforms. The chairperson donated some money for this. 
At another time, he donated money for repairing their motorcycles. 
At other times, he simply invited them and gave them some money for 
their operations and logistics, such as when the state governor visits the 
local area and all informal agents are mobilised and put on high alert. 
The spontaneity of  such acts, and the fact that they were unexpected, 
left the informal agents deeply impressed.
From the perspectives of  the citizens of  Asa and Surulere, one 
chairperson represented unmet expectations and unfulfilled promises, 
while the other represented unexpected gestures. The former was 
thus regarded with disaffection while the latter was positively rated. 
It seems that democratic status and its attendant politics matters in 
citizens’ perception of  the performance of  local councils, and that the 
pathway works through two particular factors – whether citizens have 
expectations of  delivery from their local governments, and whether 
there are enough resources available to elected leaders to meet the 
various pressures that they must operate under.
9 Conclusion: is being elected a disadvantage?
The evidence presented in this article shows that local elections in a context 
of  party control, godfather‑ism, and a lack of  financial resources and 
autonomy sets elected local councils up for failure, and disaffection from 
their constituents. Elections lead to a sense of  entitlement by citizens, a 
particular strength of  democracy, but this needs to be accompanied by 
an ability to deliver on electoral promises and on the particular expressed 
needs of  the electorate. When promises are not met by delivery, disaffection 
results. Where no promises are made, any delivery or gesture by leaders 
is unexpected, and therefore, considered generous. In either case, the 
imperatives of  democracy and the needs of  citizens are not well served.
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As opposed to Lindberg’s (2006) findings on the significance of  
African elections and on democratic ‘lock‑ins’, our findings suggest 
that local government elections that operate under political and 
financial constraints may actually create a constituency against further 
democratic decentralisation. If  community members perceive the 
performance of  those democratically entrusted with leadership positions 
as being worse than those appointed to these positions by party bosses, 
then it is possible that support for elected local governments may reduce 
over time. Making democratic decentralisation work requires a legal and 
constitutional framework that protects elected council chairpersons from 
the stranglehold of  political ‘godfathers’, and provides them with some 
measure of  fiscal independence and autonomy vis-à-vis state governors 
to provide services.
Notes
* Acknowledgements: We are grateful to the Partnership for African 
Social and Governance Research (PASGR) for a grant for this 
research, and to two anonymous reviewers and Shandana Khan 
Mohmand at the Institute of  Development Studies for detailed 
comments on our article.
1 An appointed local council is made up of  a caretaker committee 
headed by the chairperson: all the members of  this committee and 
the chairperson are appointed by the state governor. An elected 
council is headed by an executive chairperson who chooses his/her 
own cabinet.
2 Like most African borders, these borders are not coterminous with 
language, ethnicity or cultural boundaries. They are arbitrary.
3 About four months after our data collection, the Kwara State 
governor dissolved the elected council of  Asa Local Government, 
thereby turning the local government into an appointed one.
4 Interview with official of  a security agency, May 2016.
5 Interview with member of  Vigilante group, June 2016.
6 We used the Chi‑square test to analyse categorical outcome variables.
7 We used the t‑test to analyse continuous outcome variables.
8 July 2016.
9 State governments created what they called Joint Accounts to which 
all funds sent by the federal government for local governments are 
deposited. This account is controlled by the governor who decides 
which local government gets what and for what purpose.
10 July 2016.
11 June 2016.
12 July 2016.
13 July 2016.
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Formal and Informal Actors 
in Addis Ababa’s Solid Waste 
Management System
Kassa Teshager Alemu*
Abstract Decentralisation reforms in Ethiopia aimed to empower 
both formal and informal actors involved in different socioeconomic 
development efforts. However, an investigation of solid waste management 
in Addis Ababa shows that informal actors that play a significant role 
in solid waste collection – and especially in recycling, in which the city 
government has no capacity of its own – are not recognised by the city 
government and excluded from the management of the system. Using 
social network analysis, this article argues that the integration of informal 
waste collectors and recyclers within the city’s waste management system 
will improve the state of services offered to Addis Ababa’s residents.
Keywords: participatory decentralisation, Ethiopia, informal sector, 
solid waste, recycling, networks.
1 Introduction
Solid waste management is a serious challenge faced by African cities 
today (Guerrero, Maas and Hogland 2013). Most cities are unable 
to manage the alarming increase in volumes of  solid waste due to 
rapid urbanisation and population growth. As a result, poor urban 
environment, poor public health and illegal dumps are evident in the 
major cities of  Africa. In response to these problems, African cities 
adopted decentralisation policies and strategies for solid waste collection 
and disposal (UN-Habitat 2010a). The aim was to give more power to 
lower levels of  city administrations to deal with these issues at a more 
local level, and to bring non-state actors into solid waste management in 
order to enable ‘good rubbish governance’ through more public–private 
partnerships and more cost-effective service delivery (UN-Habitat 2010b).
In Ethiopia, solid waste management was highly centralised until 
2003. As part of  a broader decentralisation effort in that year, the city 
administration of  Addis Ababa was divided into ten sub-cities and 
117 districts that comprise the local administration (FDRE 2003). 
The purpose of  reorganising the city was to give more power to lower 
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levels of  the city administration, and to empower local communities 
and their institutions (Taye and Tegegne 2007; Paulos 2007). As part 
of  the reforms, the city government promoted integrated solid waste 
management by local administrations, and strengthened the role 
of  both formal, informal, public and private sectors in solid waste 
collection, transportation, disposal and recycling activities (FDRE 2003). 
At the beginning of  the reform, many informal private enterprises 
were involved in the collection and disposal of  waste, and were allowed 
to operate without paying taxes. In a very short period, the number 
of  actors involved in solid waste collection and disposal increased 
significantly. There was high competition among the informal operators 
and this reduced the price they charged for their services. The problems 
related to solid waste in the city were subsequently reduced; more waste 
was collected and the city became cleaner (Zelalem 2006; Bjerkli 2015).
The city government decided to change the system of  solid waste 
management in 2005. It shifted the focus of  waste collection, 
transportation and disposal activities towards government-affiliated 
cooperatives and micro- and small-scale enterprises (MSSEs). Informal 
private collectors were now excluded, and this resulted in the systematic 
eviction of  pre-existing informal enterprises from their established 
service areas (Zelalem 2006). Part of  this decision was politically 
driven, as the MSSEs and cooperatives provided an additional source 
of  employment that the city government and the ruling party could 
use to distribute patronage to party members. Today, the majority of  
waste collection, transportation and disposal is carried out by these 
government-affiliated organisations together with the city, sub-city 
and district-level governments. This politically driven reconfiguration 
of  services worsened the situation of  solid waste management in 
the city. The existing waste management system is rated inefficient 
and characterised by inappropriate collection, lack of  provision of  
containers and collection trucks, illegal dumping, and complex waste 
collection fees (Bjerkli 2013).
The fact that the informal sector can contribute in significant ways to 
the improvement of  local government service delivery is supported by 
a growing number of  empirical studies, and by experiences in other 
countries (Azam and Ali 2004, 2006; Baud, Grafakos and Post 2005; 
Kaseva and Mbuligwe 2005; Oteng-Ababio 2010; Tukahirwa, Mol 
and Oosterveer 2010). Mohmand (2016) argues that the inclusion of  
informal institutions in formal governance can make a difference to 
service delivery by encouraging greater citizen participation in decision-
making around services, and ensuring that public service delivery meets 
the specific needs of  different populations. Rouse (2004, 2008) argues that 
informal enterprises are vital parts of  urban service provision and there 
is a need for a paradigm shift in the way informal service providers are 
viewed. Other scholars in both the academic and donor literature call for 
policies aimed at integrating informal actors into municipal solid waste 
management strategies (Asmamaw 2003; Azam and Ali 2004; Wilson, 
Velis and Cheeseman 2006; UN-Habitat 2010b; Omer et al. 2015).
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In line with this literature, this article aims to investigate the role of  
informal actors in the solid waste collection and recycling system in Addis 
Ababa. There is evidence to suggest that despite their exclusion from waste 
management services in Addis Ababa, informal actors play an important 
role in waste collection, and especially in recycling waste material, in which 
the city government has no capacity of  its own. The main question the 
article asks is about the extent to which informal actors continue to be 
involved in the waste management system in Addis Ababa – given all the 
changes over the last decade – and about the particular nature of  their role 
within the system. Social network analysis is used to provide answers to 
both questions. It helps define the specific role that various informal actors 
play; to better understand the nature of  the interaction between different 
formal and informal actors; and to identify bottlenecks in resources and 
information sharing that affect daily operations and strategic planning, 
and which have led to the deterioration of  Addis Ababa’s waste collection 
and disposal system. The finding that informal actors are indeed a key 
part of  this system, and that they help connect a number of  formal and 
informal actors within the network of  solid waste management in Addis 
Ababa, leads to the conclusion that a greater integration across formal and 
informal actors would lead to more sustainable and effective solutions to 
the city’s current waste management issues.
2 Solid waste management in Addis Ababa
Addis Ababa – the capital city of  Ethiopia and the diplomatic centre 
of  Africa, where the African Union is head-quartered – was founded 
in 1887. According to the Central Statistical Authority (CSA 2016), 
close to 4 million people now live in Addis Ababa, over 30 per cent of  
the urban population of  Ethiopia, and it is one of  the fastest growing 
cities on the continent. Its population has nearly doubled every decade, 
and as a result, Addis Ababa has expanded geographically to cover 
about 540sq km. Its geographic location, combined with its political 
and socioeconomic status, have made it a melting pot for hundreds of  
thousands of  people that come from all corners of  the country in search 
of  employment opportunities and services (SBPDA 2003; UN-Habitat 
2008). Demographic pressure has led to a high rate of  unemployment, 
high concentration of  slum dwellers, and very poor quality housing 
infrastructure and sanitary development (AACG 2006).
Prior to 2003, solid waste management in Addis Ababa was highly 
centralised (Kokebe 2007). Addis Ababa Health Bureau was responsible 
for managing solid waste in the city and the municipal system for 
waste collection was based on door-to-door collections and the use of  
containers. However, this door-to-door service was only available to 
households near main roads, where containers were placed in open 
spaces close to the roads. The system was largely ineffective due to a 
lack of  trucks, high operational costs, lack of  awareness among people, 
and the lack of  a proper landfill site (SBPDA 2003).
In response to the need for better service, the city government 
reorganised the structure in 2003 and changed the centralised solid 
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waste management system to a relatively decentralised approach, at 
least in principle. An agency called the Sanitation, Beautification and 
Park Development Authority (SBPDA) was established and made 
responsible for solid waste collection, transportation and disposal. It 
was also responsible for the coordination of  different stakeholders in 
solid waste management. Compared to the previous system, more 
power was given to the lower level administrative bodies. A solid waste 
manager was appointed for each sub-city and district level. The aim 
was to stimulate more efficient delivery of  urban services by promoting 
decentralisation, participation, transparency and accountability, in line 
with good governance in service delivery (Bjerkli 2015).
During this time, the city government recognised and formalised the 
informal collectors operating in the city. The city administration seemed 
quite amenable to these informal actors. They were registered and 
given licences to allow them to operate as private enterprises, and were 
exempted from tax payments. As explained earlier, all this changed in 
2005, when the city government suddenly decided to establish MSSEs, 
and forced informal enterprises out of  solid waste management. The 
city government has now formally established cooperatives to manage 
solid waste under the supervision and support of  the city government.
Currently, the daily solid waste generation by households, institutions 
and public spaces in Addis Ababa is estimated to be 0.36kg per capita 
per day. The majority of  waste generated is organic in nature. While 
wastes like vegetables, wood, bone, combustible and non-combustible 
leaves, and miscellaneous other wastes are collected and disposed by 
the government solid waste collection system, informal actors remain 
involved in the collection of  plastics, metals, glass, paper and clothes 
for resale and recycling purposes. They are particularly central to the 
recycling system, so that even though there is no formal waste recycling 
in the city, informal recyclers use solid waste to produce glue, plastic 
bags, shoes and different types of  equipment. The picture on the left 
in Figure 1 shows valuable waste materials collected by informal actors 
and traded for recycling.
Figure 1 The waste collection system in Addis Ababa: waste materials identified for 
sale (left) and a container for collecting waste (right)
Source Author’s own.
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Waste collection and disposal in Addis Ababa, therefore, follows formal 
and informal approaches. The formal approach is the sole responsibility 
of  the city government. This is handled in two ways: door-to-door 
collection for households along accessible streets, and the container 
system under which residents are expected to carry and dump their waste 
in containers located at accessible sites. The picture on the right in Figure 
1 shows these containers, where most non-recyclable waste in the city 
finds its way. Once these are full, municipal trucks dispose of  this waste in 
two major landfill sites in Addis Ababa, called Repi and Koshe. Door-to-
door primary collection is carried out by pre-collectors’ associations and 
street sweepers, and this too is put in containers for final disposal by the 
waste management agency, SBPDA. So in practice, the majority of  waste 
is collected via the containers system, but the efficiency of  this method 
is limited because of  a lack of  capacity of  the city government to deploy 
adequate numbers of  vehicles and waste containers. Besides, containers 
are not protected from rain and sun, which makes the rubbish rot and 
smell, creates unsightly urban spots, and leads to the deterioration of  
neighbourhoods and a disturbance of  human activities. The site is also 
exposed to stray animals that scatter the waste while scavenging.
Figure 2 Waste management system in Addis Ababa
Source Escalante, Rymkiewicz and Kranert (2010).
Kurales
Waste sources
Formal waste 
managementInformal recovery sector
Valorisation chain
Known material flows
Suspected material flows
Street 
sweepers
Communal 
containers
Waste 
Management 
Authority
(SDPDA)
DumpsitePrivate 
collectors
Market
Industrial 
sources
Streets 
and public 
areas
Pre-
collectors
Waste 
pickers at 
communal 
containers
Formal 
recyclers
Informal 
recyclers
Middlemen
Limited 
access 
containers
Households
Public and 
private 
institutions
Waste 
pickers at 
dumpsite
58 | Alemu Formal and Informal Actors in Addis Ababa’s Solid Waste Management System
Vol. 48 No. 2 March 2017: ‘Interrogating Decentralisation in Africa’
The second approach is the informal recovery and recycling system. 
Qoralés1 buy waste materials door-to-door from households and 
institutions. Waste pickers collect waste materials from municipal 
containers and from Rupi or Koshe dumpsites. Once the materials 
have been collected by Qoralés and waste pickers, they are taken to the 
market at Minalesh Tera, a central market of  Addis Ababa, and sold 
to middlemen or wholesalers. These then sell the materials to formal 
and informal recyclers. Figure 2 illustrates Addis Ababa’s full waste 
management system and shows both formal and informal actors. 
Despite the role that informal actors quite obviously and visibly play 
within this system, their role is ignored and unacknowledged by the 
city government. This has put pressure on the system which makes 
it important to re-examine both formal and informal institutional 
arrangements and networks for waste management in Addis Ababa. 
The following sections deal centrally with this task.
3 Methods and data
Social network and stakeholders’ analysis methods are used to better 
understand actors’ roles, actions and interactions within networks, and 
to investigate relationships between individuals, groups and systems 
(Wasserman and Fraust 1999; Caniato et al. 2014). This is, therefore, 
a useful methodology to better understand the nature of  the role and 
influence of  the various formal and informal actors involved in the solid 
waste management network in Figure 2.
The study targeted solid waste collection, disposal and recycling in 
the whole city of  Addis Ababa. In social network analysis, sampling is 
not possible. Therefore, all stakeholders were identified and included 
in the study. First, 31 stakeholders were identified with the help of  
local experts in the waste management sector and then categorised 
as informal actors, formal (public), formal (private), formal (local 
non-governmental organisations, NGOs), academia, households, media 
and international organisations.
The following were included under the category of  informal actors:
1  Qoralés (itinerant scrap buyers who purchase small quantities of  waste 
such as plastic, paper, glass, metals, etc. from households);
2  Scavengers (those who collect different kinds of  materials at the 
municipal landfill site);
3  Foragers (those who pick waste materials from municipal containers, 
rubbish bins and streets);
4  Wholesalers (those who buy the waste materials from the collectors);
5  Middlemen (those who supply waste material to wholesalers or factories);
6  Local factories (who use the collected waste in the manufacture of  new 
metal or plastic products);
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7  Small artisans (who are involved in recycling the waste materials in the 
form of  shoes, metal equipment); and
8  Rural traders (who come from rural areas to buy waste materials to 
resell).
Formal government organisations identified as stakeholders include:
1  Addis Ababa City Administration (AACA);
2  Sub-city administrations;
3  District (kebele) administrations;
4  Sanitation, Beautification and Park Development Authority 
(SBPDA);
5  Addis Ababa Environmental Protection Authority (AAEPA);
6  Ministry of  Health (MoH); and
7  Ministry of  Urban Development (MOUD).
A number of  other organisations were also identified and included 
in the study. These included formal private organisations, such as 
cooperatives, MSSEs, private companies, and the plastic Union, as 
Table 1 Parameters and value scales used in key informant interviews
Parameter Possible response Score
Interest: This measures the interest 
stakeholders have in solid waste collection, 
disposal and recycling.
No or minimum interest
Limited interest
General interest
High interest
Primary interest
1–2
3–4
5–6
7–8
9–10
Power: This measures the power and level of 
influence of stakeholders in decisions on solid 
waste collection, disposal and recycling.
Low power
Medium power
High power
1–3
4–7
8–10
Interaction: This measures the level of 
interaction between the stakeholder 
interviewed and other stakeholders. 
Rare interaction
Quite frequent interaction
Frequent interaction
1
2
3
Material exchange: This measures whether 
there was waste material exchange between 
the interviewed actor and other actors.
No exchange
There is exchange
0
1
Source Adapted from Caniato et al. (2014).
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well as some local NGOs and international organisations, like GIZ and 
the International Labour Organization (ILO). Moreover, universities, 
Wub Consult (a consulting firm working in environmental issues) and 
some media groups were also included in the study. A few households 
were included for the purpose of  understanding how they interact 
with pre-collectors and Qoralés, and were selected purposively and 
interviewed as a group.
The empirical data analysed in this study was collected from each 
category of  stakeholders using semi-structured interviews. First, a total 
of  31 stakeholders were identified, of  which eight were informal actors 
and 23 were formal actors. All of  them were then interviewed as key 
informants. Both formal and informal actors were asked standardised 
questions regarding their power, interest, interaction and material 
exchanges in solid waste collection and recycling. Power in this case 
refers to the decision-making ability of  stakeholders and their level of  
influence within the solid waste management system. Interest refers 
to their level of  involvement within the network, based either on their 
responsibility to play certain roles, or because they derive economic 
benefit from the activities they are involved in (Ackermann and Eden 
2011). Respondents were asked a range of  questions within each of  the 
categories indicated in Table 1, and measures were assigned accordingly.
Stakeholders were analysed with respect to their power and the interest 
they have in solid waste management, using a power–interest matrix 
that illustrates how powerful different stakeholders are, and the extent 
to which they are interested in solid waste management. The scores 
for power and interest were recorded, calculated and then visually 
represented in a matrix (see Figure 4).
The network data were collected with the various stakeholders 
considered as ‘nodes’, and the relationship between them as ‘oriented 
ties’. Arrows (as in Figure 3) indicate the direction of  the flow of  
resources or relations as reported by the interviewees. Social networks 
were graphically represented with the use of  the UCINET software 
program (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman 2002). Three main social 
network measures were used to see how actors interact in the solid 
waste management network. These are: (a) degree centrality (a measure 
of  connectedness in the network, calculated by recording the actual 
number of  ties as a proportion of  the maximum number of  possible 
ties); (b) closeness (the degree to which an individual lies closer to all 
others in the network); and (c) betweenness (the extent to which a node lies 
between and helps connect other nodes) (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman 
2013). Each of  these measure different aspects of  the centrality of  an 
actor within a network, and imply the following: an actor with a higher 
degree score indicates a very active actor with many direct connections 
with other actors within the network; an actor that has a higher 
closeness score indicates that the actor has the shortest paths to all 
others, and is thus in an excellent position to monitor the information 
flow in the network; and an actor with a greater betweenness score 
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implies that the actor can play a broker role in the network because 
they connect the other actors in the network to one another. In addition 
to the social network data, other qualitative data from key informant 
interviews and document reviews were used to support the argument.
The remaining sections of  this article present the results and findings 
of  this methodological strategy, and are organised as follows. Section 4 
provides a descriptive overview of  the types of  exchanges that take 
place between the different actors involved in the network of  solid waste 
management in Addis Ababa. Section 5 then maps these various actors 
in terms of  their influence and interest within this network. The aim 
here is to find where power really lies within the decentralised system, 
and whether power has been devolved to local actors. Section 6 then 
analyses centrality measures for the various types of  actors, formal and 
informal, to provide more concrete evidence for the extent to which 
informal actors play a role within solid waste management networks in 
Addis Ababa.
4 Informal actors and the waste material exchange network
The interviews probed respondents on the particular exchanges that 
occur between different actors, especially informal ones, in the system 
of  waste management in Addis Ababa. Their responses revealed that 
waste material flows from the source – from households and institutions 
– to recyclers in a fairly organised way in Addis Ababa, and involves 
a wide array of  informal actors that include Qoralés, scavengers, 
wholesalers, middlemen, small artisans, rural traders and recycling 
Figure 3 Waste material exchange network among informal actors in Addis Ababa
Source Field data, 2016.
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factories. These exchanges are mapped in the network diagram in 
Figure 3, and described in the rest of  this section.
Households and institutions are the primary sources of  waste materials. 
Most of  this waste is collected by street sweepers and pre-collectors that 
are employed by government-affiliated cooperatives and MSSEs to keep 
streets and neighbourhoods clean. However, waste that can be recycled 
– such as metals, plastics, glasses, old shoes, electronic materials, and so 
on – is often separated out by households and sold to Qoralés, who are 
scrap buyers that collect these directly at the house. Qoralés carry bags 
over their shoulders and wander from neighbourhood to neighbourhood, 
calling out ‘Qoralé’ as they go to inform people of  their presence, so 
that people can come out to the street with their recyclable materials. 
According to interviewees, the value of  the waste material depends on 
its type, quantity and quality. In principle, the formal employees – street 
sweepers and pre-collectors – are not allowed to sell waste material to 
anyone, especially since the city government is now trying to curb the 
activities of  the informal sector, but they often sell large volumes of  waste 
materials to Qoralés informally to make some extra income.
There are a number of  other informal actors that also sell material to 
the Qoralés. These include foragers, who are young boys that sit near the 
municipal containers and wait for valuable materials to arrive, which 
they collect and sell to the Qoralés. Sometimes these foragers also collect 
waste materials directly from pre-collectors. Scavengers work as gangs 
who collect different kinds of  materials at the municipal landfill site, 
around which they usually live. They collect waste material from the 
dumping sites on a regular basis and sell it mainly to wholesalers and 
Qoralés as a means of  livelihood.
Qoralés sell their collected materials to middlemen or directly to 
wholesalers who specialise in certain materials. Quite often, Qoralés 
have a contractual agreement with wholesalers, who may also extend 
them financial assistance and guarantee to purchase their collected 
waste. Middlemen supply these used waste materials to several recycling 
factories in and around the city. They act as brokers to link Qoralés with 
wholesalers, and wholesalers with recycling factories. These factories use 
the waste to produce glue, plastic bottles, shopping bags, and plastic shoes.
Wholesalers and middlemen also sell their waste to small artisans and 
rural traders, who come from rural areas to buy waste materials (plastic 
or metal) to sell in rural areas for reuse. Small artisans recycle waste 
materials based on traditional technology, such as, for example, plastic 
shoemakers, blacksmiths and electronic maintenance service providers.
Constructing the network of  waste material exchange in this manner 
helps establish that although the city government does not recognise 
the contribution of  informal actors within this system now, they play a 
critical role in solid waste collection and recycling in Addis Ababa, and 
that Qoralés and wholesalers in particular are key players in the network. 
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Figure 4 Stakeholders power–interest matrix in Addis Ababa
To what extent are these actors able to play a defining role within the 
formal management of  this system? This is answered next.
5 Mapping actors by power and interest
Bjerkli (2015) points out that one of  the main aims of  decentralising 
the delivery of  urban services in Ethiopia was to promote greater 
participation by local actors, and that the city of  Addis Ababa had 
introduced various reforms to bring more power to local actors. 
Interviews confirmed these efforts. However, to what extent has this 
really happened? A power–interest matrix, using the key concepts 
developed earlier, is a useful instrument for answering this question.
According to Gardner, Rachlin and Sweeny (1986), power–interest 
matrices classify stakeholders in terms of  the power that they hold and 
the extent to which they are likely to be involved in a given network, in 
this case the network of  solid waste management in Addis Ababa. The 
level of  power of  each stakeholder is measured on the vertical axis in 
Figure 4, and their level of  interest is measured on the horizontal axis. So 
actors in Group A in the lower left corner of  the matrix have little power 
and interest, while those in Group D in the upper right corner have a lot 
of  both power and interest. Actors in Group B have more interest than 
power, and those in Group C have more power than interest.
Source Field data, 2016.
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The power–interest matrix can be used to identify the type of  strategy 
required to interact with each set of  actors within any proposed policy 
reforms. The stakeholders in Group A require only minimal effort and 
monitoring since they are not influential and they have fairly low stakes 
and interest within the network. The stakeholders in Group B should be 
kept informed. They have little power but their stakes may be higher, 
and they can thus be important and committed allies in influencing the 
more powerful stakeholders. The stakeholders in Group C are powerful, 
but their interest is low. They are generally relatively passive, but certain 
events and moments can spike their interest and move them to Group D 
on that issue. The stakeholders in Group D are the key players within 
the network. They are both powerful, and highly interested in the 
strategies of  the solid waste management sector. Any proposed strategies 
and changes must be acceptable to this group to be effective. Figure 4 
uses the empirical data to map the various actors of  Addis Ababa’s 
waste management system according to these categories, and the rest of  
this section provides details of  the actors that fall within each quadrant.
Quadrant A: As stated earlier, this group represents actors that have low 
power and low interest within the network of  solid waste management 
in Addis Ababa. Media, academia, and consultants fall within this 
category – they are connected at the periphery but they do not play 
an important role in solid waste management. For example, both the 
media and some scholars may regularly report on the state of  pollution 
or other environmental hazards in the city, but beyond that they do not 
have invested stakes within the sector, and usually have little influence 
on government policy in this area. The interviews revealed that interest 
within such sectors was quite low, and this may explain why very 
few studies are launched in solid waste collection and recycling. It is 
also evident that in Ethiopia the role of  this sector is limited by the 
autocratic nature of  the government. Various interviews revealed that 
researchers, academia and consultants have an important role to play in 
highlighting environmental problems and suggesting workable solutions, 
but that they do not play a prominent role in this respect.
Quadrant B: This group represents a low power of  influence on 
the system but a high level of  interest in the issue of  solid waste 
management. In this category lie international NGOs (ILO, GTZ), 
formal local NGOs, such as ENDA (Environmental Development 
Action), HOA (Horn of  Africa), SOS Addis and IGNIS, which work 
on environmental and waste management issues, some formal private 
actors (pre-collectors, street sweepers and private companies) and all 
informal actors (middlemen, recycling factories, small artisans, foragers, 
wholesalers and scavengers). International and local environmental 
NGOs are engaged in a variety of  environmental protection activities 
and sustainable waste management projects. Some NGOs have played 
a very important role in several waste collection and recycling projects 
in the past few years, but they have relatively few resources and little 
influence over the city government in terms of  policy.
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Informal actors are amongst the most interested stakeholders of  waste 
separation and recycling, because for many this constitutes their main 
economic activity and livelihood. Their influence over the system 
on which their business depends, however, is low and in the current 
situation, their role has no recognition from the city government. Their 
risk is high, and so their capital investment is low. The restriction of  
their role, regardless of  their high interest in the sector, has created 
waste management issues with detrimental effects for the whole city. 
The interviews suggested that more recognition, financial support and a 
conducive working environment for these actors could help resolve the 
current deterioration of  waste management in the city.
Quadrant C: Actors in this group represent a high power of  influence 
but low interest in the sector. The ministries of  Health, and Urban 
Development and Construction fall within this category. They have the 
power to influence the system but the interviews revealed that they have 
not shown much interest in getting directly involved in solving the existing 
issues within this sector. However, this is not how things have always been. 
Officials from Addis Ababa’s health bureau mentioned that their role 
within the same had been much greater five years ago, but that this had 
shrunk considerably once the main responsibility for managing the waste 
collection and disposal system moved to SBPDA. This is the main reason 
for their lack of  interest now. This division of  responsibility has contributed 
to a less integrated and less multi-sectoral approach to waste management.
Quadrant D: This group of  actors have both high power of  influence 
and high interest. In Addis Ababa, government organisations such 
as AACA and SBPDA, sub-city and district (kebele) administrations, 
government-sponsored cooperatives, MSSEs and households are 
included in this category. The city government is the most important 
actor related to policymaking, strategic planning, solid waste operation 
and supervision. However, the whole system is dominated by either 
government or affiliated organisations.
Mapping where actors lie within the matrix in terms of  their power 
of  influence and interest in solid waste collection and recycling helps 
identify that in line with what we know about the recent reforms, 
government organisations have strong power of  influence and interest 
in solid waste management, while almost all informal actors and local 
NGOs have strong interest but not much power of  influence. This 
provides an interesting point of  analysis. In theory, decentralisation 
reforms were meant to empower local actors in the management of  solid 
waste in the city (Taye and Tegegne 2007). In practice, Figure 4 shows 
that the system is highly controlled by government and its affiliated 
actors, and that most other interested actors exist on the periphery of  the 
system and have little say within decision-making processes. This implies 
that the system is largely non-participatory and that decision-making 
rests with formal state institutions, despite the existence and involvement 
of  a multitude of  other actors within the system that have high stakes 
within it, and depend on it for their livelihoods.
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6 Measuring network centrality of formal and informal actors
Both formal and informal actors were asked questions about the 
frequency of  their interaction with other actors, with regard to waste 
collection and recycling in Addis Ababa. Their responses are used 
to create the network of  interaction in Figure 5. The evidence shows 
that almost all actors, except for the media and academia, lie within a 
connected network, and engage with one another on a regular basis.
The frequency of  their interaction, however, varies. SBPDA, as the 
government organisation responsible for solid waste management, is 
the key player in the network. Table 2 provides further details of  the 
centrality of  each actor by providing measures for their degree centrality, 
closeness and betweenness. SBPDA has the highest number of  ties at almost 
47, indicating multiple ties with a number of  actors, such as government 
and formal private organisations. It is also the highest ranked actor in 
terms of  closeness and betweenness measures, which shows that it is the 
most active and best located actor within the network, and can access 
any other actor more quickly than anyone else.
What is important to note here is the extent to which SBPDA’s scores 
are replicated by the scores of  the informal Qoralés. Though their degree 
score is similar to a number of  other actors (such as middlemen and 
wholesalers), their betweenness and closeness measures are much higher 
than those of  other actors. Betweenness centrality is a measure of  the 
Figure 5 Actors’ frequency of interaction in solid waste management in Addis Ababa
Source Field data, 2016.
Foragers
Small artisan
Households
Street sweepers
Pre-collectors
Media
Academia
HOA-REC&N
SOS Addis
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0 2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0 2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.02.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0 3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.03.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
MSSEs
ILO
SBPDA
GTZ
AAEPA
MOH
Wub Consult
Kebele SW
Cooperatives
AACA
Sub-city SW
MOUD
Korales
IGNIS
Private companies
Middlemen
Wholesalers
Scavengers
ENDA Ethiopia
Rural 
traders
Recycling 
factories
2.0
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 2 March 2017: ‘Interrogating Decentralisation in Africa’ 53–70 | 67
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
extent to which a node serves as a bridge between other nodes, or 
actors. SBPDA clearly forms this bridge within the formal system with 
a high score of  45, but Qoralés have a fairly similar score and play an 
important role in serving as a bridge within the informal system with a 
score of  37. This is true also of  the closeness measure, where they score 
24, in comparison to SBPDA’s score of  26. This shows that the Qoralés 
are almost as well located within the network as SBPDA, and serve as an 
important bridging node that connect formal and informal actors.
The policy implication of  this finding is that despite all the recent 
changes, the Qoralés in particular continue to be central to the network 
of  waste management in Addis Ababa. They interact regularly and 
work closely with a large number of  actors within the system, and 
Table 2 Centrality measures: degree, closeness and betweenness
Stakeholders Degree Closeness Betweenness
Informal actors
Scavengers 10.000 20.270 0.000
Foragers  6.667  17.751 0.000
Qoralés 23.333 23.622 36.858
Middlemen 23.333 20.979 10.996
Wholesalers 23.333 20.979 10.996
Small artisan 10.000 20.270  0.000
Recycling factories 13.333 18.072  6.207
Rural traders 10.000 17.964 0.000
Households 20.000 22.901  4.023
Formal actors
Pre-collectors 26.667 25.210 16.309
Street sweepers 26.667 25.210 16.309
Cooperatives 26.667 23.622  1.442
MSSEs 30.000 23.810  2.017
Private companies 10.000 22.727  0.466
MOUD  6.667 20.979  0.000
AACA 23.333 22.059  1.845
SBPDA 46.667 25.641 44.895
AAEPA 16.667 22.059  3.333
MoH 13.333 21.583  6.379
Source Field data, 2016.
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connect a number of  other informal actors, not just to one another but 
also to various formal actors. This is mainly because they collect waste 
from households, pre-collectors and street sweepers and then sell this 
to different informal actors. It seems reasonable, therefore, to suggest 
that a system that integrates the work of  the formal and informal 
systems may provide more effective solutions to Addis Ababa’s current 
waste management issues. Such an integration would require the city 
government to recognise, once again and in particular, the role that 
Qoralés still play within the waste management system of  the city. This 
will allow for more coordinated service delivery, especially between 
waste collectors in the formal system and recyclers that lie almost 
entirely in the informal sector.
7 Conclusion
The decentralisation reforms of  2003 in Ethiopia were aimed at the 
improvement of  service delivery at the local level. Using the case of  
solid waste management in the city of  Addis Ababa, this article found 
that despite a considerable restructuring of  the city administration and 
its service delivery system, actual service provision has not improved. 
A large part of  the reason for this is that in restructuring its systems, the 
city has moved away from its previous close collaboration with informal 
actors in the delivery of  waste collection and disposal services.
This article investigated the network of  solid waste collection and 
recycling in Addis Ababa and found that informal actors continue to 
play a significant and central role within these. Yet they are ignored by 
the city administration. Informal actors have a high level of  interest and 
stakes in solid waste management, but they have no power of  influence 
and cannot affect decision-making, despite the fact that their livelihoods 
are directly affected by many policy decisions. They are particularly 
important players within waste material exchange networks, and given 
that the city has never developed any formal system to recycle municipal 
waste, most of  this is carried out by informal actors. Where the state 
sees ‘waste’ (something to get rid of), informal actors see ‘recycling’ 
(an opportunity). Despite this, the system continues to be controlled by 
government and its affiliated actors, and leaves most stakeholders out 
of  decision-making processes. The article concludes that by ignoring 
informal actors, the decentralised government has an incomplete view 
of  waste management, and that a reintegration of  informal actors into 
the system would lead to more coordinated and efficient service delivery.
Notes
* Acknowledgements: funds for this research were provided by the 
Partnership for African Social and Governance Research (PASGR). 
I am grateful for comments provided by two anonymous reviewers.
1 This is a local term for scrap buyers who purchase small quantities 
of  waste such as plastic, paper, glass, metals, etc. directly from 
households. The word is also sometimes spelt as Kurales, as in 
Figure 2. Qoralé comes from ‘Qorkoro Yaläh’ in Amharic, which literally 
means, ‘Do you have any scrap metals?’
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Staff Quality and Service Delivery: 
Evaluating Two Ghanaian District 
Assemblies*
Daniel Doh1
Abstract This study examines the nature of staff quality and the extent 
to which it can explain variations in service delivery outcomes using two 
selected District Assemblies in Ghana. Staff quality is measured by the 
interaction of individual-level competences and public service motivation. 
Depending on intensity, the interaction of competence and public service 
motivation produced four types of staff quality with varied implications 
for service delivery outcomes. It is argued that the relationship between 
decentralisation and service delivery remains complex, and therefore the 
role of staff quality remains critical. This is important in the light of calls 
to implement full devolution in Ghana where all decentralised services 
will operate directly under the District Assembly. It is imperative for 
public administration and human resource experts to look more closely 
at attracting employees with the demonstrable public service motivation 
and skillsets needed for decentralisation, and to create favourable social 
conditions that support family life.
Keywords: decentralisation, Ghana, public administration, 
organisational culture, service delivery, public service motivation.
1 Introduction
Ghana’s decentralised District Assembly system, which is funded 
primarily by central government transfers, uses a needs-based 
equalisation formula to distribute funds from the District Assemblies 
Common Fund (DACF). In this sense, it can be characterised as a 
fair or balanced form of  funding. Given this context, why do some 
sub-national units improve their levels of  service delivery more 
than others? In particular, how do variations in staff quality explain 
differences in improved service delivery among sub-national units? 
There are substantial ongoing debates about the relationship between 
decentralisation and service delivery. Whilst some of  the arguments 
demonstrate positive images of  these relationships (Ghuman and Singh 
2013; Mehrotra 2006), others show unfavourable relationships (Conyers 
2007; Oyugi 2000; Robinson 2007). There is recognition in the current 
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debate that the causal relationship between decentralisation and public 
service delivery remains complex with multiple causal factors shaping 
the process (Conyers 2007; Ghuman and Singh 2013; Robinson 2007). 
Ghuman and Singh (2013), for example, indicated that full devolution 
has better chances of  improving quality service delivery than a truncated 
system of  devolution. They also acknowledge the role of  financing and 
human resource management as important factors in improving service 
delivery. Similarly, Robinson (2007) and Conyers (2007) identified factors 
such as the nature of  the service, the decentralisation process, the mode 
of  implementation, the capacity of  individuals in charge and the overall 
sociocultural and policy environments of  decentralisation. Grindle 
(1997) and Crook and Ayee (2006) additionally proposed the context of  
organisational culture to explain differences in public service delivery 
across different organisations.
Whilst acknowledging the importance of  all these factors, this current 
article is concerned more about the capacity of  individuals managing 
sub-national units to shape service delivery outcomes.2 In particular, the 
article explores the following questions: (1) What is the nature of  staff 
quality in District Assemblies in Ghana? (2) To what extent do variations 
in staff quality explain differences in service delivery outcomes among 
District Assemblies?
The focus on staff quality for service delivery outcomes is important 
for two reasons. First, the debate over the years about the failure of  
decentralisation for service delivery in Africa has largely focused on 
financing difficulties (Banful 2009; Dafflon and Madiès 2012). For 
example, Schulze and Suharnoko (2014) noted that the level of  fiscal 
endowment of  a sub-national organisation explains variations in 
improved service delivery in Indonesia. Similar arguments were made 
by Bogere (2013) and Muriisa (2008) who stated that the challenge 
of  Uganda’s decentralisation is the issue of  inadequate financing for 
improved service delivery. Again, Banful (2009) attributed the challenges 
of  Ghana’s decentralisation to financing difficulties. In effect, theoretical 
propositions for improving service delivery have centred on improving 
fiscal decentralisation (Martinez-Vazquez, Lago-Peñas and Sacchi 
2015; Soto, Farfan and Lorant 2012) to the extent that there is very 
little discussion about how staff quality can affect the way decentralised 
institutions raise revenue independent of  intergovernmental transfers, 
which in turn can affect service delivery.
The second reason is that discussions on staff capacity for decentralisation 
have largely been concerned about the number of  people employed and 
their technical competences in managing sub-national units (Raga and 
Taylor 2012; Steiner 2007). Thus, the policy approach has always been 
to champion better conditions of  service including higher salaries to 
induce performance (Grindle 1997; Paul 2010). The argument here is 
that in the wake of  increasing country-level budgetary constraints on the 
capacity to provide higher salaries, and a decline in other external modes 
of  motivation to improve the performance of  employees in public service 
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(Paul 2010), there is a need to seek alternative approaches to improving 
performance for service delivery. These should include examining staff 
quality within the context of  technical or academic competences and 
individual-level internal motivation towards public service delivery 
(public service motivation, or PSM). There is also the need to examine 
how the interplay of  staff competence (technical and or academic) and 
the level of  PSM produce different types of  staff quality, with implications 
for service delivery outcomes.
2 Staff quality and service delivery outcomes: a conceptual framework
The central concept under consideration is staff quality. Conceptually, 
staff quality means different things to different people. Although the 
concept is rarely used in contemporary human resource literature, 
its implication in everyday usage connotes the idea of  efficiency and 
effectiveness of  employees to achieve results in a given context. In 
this study, however, staff quality is conceived as a two-dimensional 
concept which includes competence on the one hand and PSM on the 
other. Competence has been defined variously (Fernandez et al. 2012; 
Garside and Nhemachena 2013). However, within the context of  this 
study, competence is understood as the measure of  the individual’s 
knowledge and skills acquired through education and other job-
related trainings, and the individual’s experiences gained in years of  
work. This conceptualisation is in line with Rodolfa et al. (2005) who 
identified three dimensions of  competence in professional psychology: 
a foundation dimension, a functional competencies domain and the 
stages of  professional development (Fouad et al. 2009).
The concept of  PSM as a dimension of  staff quality in this study rests 
on the idea that people have an altruistic tendency to make an impact 
in society, irrespective of  the level of  rewards they gain (Perry 1996). As 
explained by Perry, Hondeghem and Wise (2010), PSM is considered as 
the orientation individuals have towards work in public life in order to 
do good things for others and society. Paul and Robinson (2007) referred 
to PSM as non‐materialistic motivation which is made up of  social, 
intrinsic and moral motivations. The theoretical assumption is that the 
nature of  public service is different from private sector business, hence 
any proposition that seeks to induce staff performance based exclusively 
on external motivations, as characteristic of  private sector business, will 
jeopardise the essence of  public collective interest. For example, within 
the context of  public service, Grindle (1997) observed that external 
motivation through higher salaries does not necessarily lead to better 
performance. Kim and Vandenabeele (2010) further argued that PSM 
includes three main elements, oriented towards values, identity and 
those that are instrumental. Value-based motives for PSM relate to 
the extent to which individuals aspire to achieve public values through 
their actions and behaviours (Bozeman 2007). In addition, the affection 
and bonding the individual has towards a group of  people that the 
individual intends to serve provides the identity motive for PSM. Crook 
and Ayee (2006), for instance, recognised that in spite of  low pay and 
demoralising work conditions among health and sanitation workers in 
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Kumasi and Accra in Ghana, the effect of  their organisational culture, 
induced to some extent by PSM, explained the relative success of  
service delivery. Their study demonstrates the important role of  PSM in 
understanding staff quality and the extent to which they contribute to 
service delivery. In terms of  measurement, as shown in Figure 1, PSM 
in this study is measured using four key indicators suggested by Kim et 
al. (2010) as derived from Perry (1996). The indicators include attraction 
to public policy issues, the extent of  public values, the individual’s level 
of  compassion and a propensity for self-sacrifice.
The concept of  service delivery as used in this study refers to basic social 
services provision which has implications for the wellbeing of  people. In 
particular, the services discussed in this article are directly drawn from the 
2015 Ghana District Ranking report (UNICEF and CDD-Ghana 2015). 
The District League Table (DLT) ranks all districts in Ghana in six key 
service areas with specific indicators for measurement.3 The purpose of  
the DLT is to understand the level of  wellbeing of  people in these districts. 
It is important to acknowledge, however, that since Ghana is not practising 
full devolution at present, some of  the direct service delivery systems such 
as health and education fall under the purview of  other decentralised 
(deconcentrated) institutions such as the Ghana Education Service and the 
Ghana Health Service. Nevertheless, by its mandate, the District Assembly, 
through its committee system and the District/Municipal/Metropolitan 
Coordinating Council (DCC/MCC), has significant roles to play in service 
delivery. Some of  these include providing facilities and resources to support 
other decentralised institutions to carry out their services. Also, DCCs 
design and implement medium-term development plans which include 
activities to promote service delivery in all the aforementioned service 
areas. The DLT shows districts that are performing fairly well and those 
that are not performing very well. Why is this so and what is the role of  the 
District Assembly in coordinating these services?
3 Research design
There are two specific questions of  interest to this current study. The 
first question seeks to examine the nature of  staff quality and the second 
question seeks to explore the causal mechanism through which staff 
Figure 1 Conceptual framework
Source Author’s own conceptualisation of staff quality.
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quality contributes to service delivery outcomes. Given the nature of  
these questions, an appropriate methodological approach is a concurrent 
mixed methods research design that combines medium-N cross-sectional 
surveys with in-depth interviews. As explained by Tashakkori and 
Teddlie (2003) and Creswell et al. (2003), concurrent mixed methods 
research is that which combines both qualitative and quantitative 
research approaches in a single project, giving equal priority to both 
approaches. In this instance, the survey is useful for describing the nature 
of  staff quality, leading to the creation of  a typology of  staff quality. 
In addition, a qualitative analytical approach that draws on in-depth 
interviews with selected staff within the study districts and some regional 
officials is used to explore the causal relationship between staff quality 
and service delivery outcomes as currently described in the DLT, whilst 
paying detailed attention to all possible antecedent factors to staff quality 
and other confounding factors within the causal chain. Arguably, the 
notion of  causality is complex and controversial (Sobel 2000); however, 
as suggested by Sloman (2005), there are a variety of  ways to establish a 
causal mechanism as to how an event has occurred.
3.1 Sampling and data collection
A multi-stage sampling was used to select participants for this study. 
In the first instance, given the aim of  the study, it was important to 
understand why service delivery outcomes were seen to have improved 
more in some districts than in others according to the DLT. On the 
basis of  the 2015 DLT, two districts were purposively selected. They 
include the best performing district (Tema) and the worst performing 
district (Gomoa West). (See Figure 3 for district locations on the map 
of  Ghana.) The second stage of  the sampling involved simple random 
sampling of  frontline staff of  the two selected districts. In this instance, 
a sample frame was drawn from the two districts and random numbers 
were assigned to each staff member on the frame using Microsoft Excel 
formula (=rand).4 Using the random numbers generated, 25 staff were 
selected from each district, making a total of  50 participants.5 The 
50 sampled respondents participated in a short survey that captured 
data on key socio-demographic variables and PSM. The PSM is a 
standardised measurement tool developed by Kim et al. (2010). It is a 
17-item measurement index of  PSM with four central dimensions.
A third stage of  the sampling for in-depth interviews involved 
purposively selecting District Coordinating Directors or Chief  
Executives, Planning Officers and other senior staff to provide in-depth 
discussions on how the districts and service delivery have evolved 
since they were established. The process also involved undertaking 
in-depth interviews with purposively selected regional oversight officers, 
civil society institutions and an official from the Ministry of  Local 
Government and Rural Development who also provided secondary data 
on human resource deployment for decentralisation in Ghana.
For the purposes of  this article, the functional units of  the District Assembly 
structure are considered. As shown in Figure 2, the District Assembly has 
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two central bodies. These include the legislative or deliberative body which 
is made up of  70 per cent elected members called Assembly Members, and 
30 per cent government-appointed members. This is called the General 
Assembly. Through their periodic General Assembly sittings, they provide 
legislative and deliberative support to the entire system. The second unit is 
the Executive Committee. This body is the highest administrative decision-
making body of  the District Assembly. There are at least five functional 
committees within the Executive Committee. These include Development 
Planning, Social Services, Works, Justice and Security, and Finance and 
Administration. The Executive Committee is chaired by the District Chief  
Executive (DCE) who is appointed by the government and confirmed by 
at least a two thirds majority of  Assembly Members. Other members of  
the Committee include the Presiding Member who is elected from the 
General Assembly, heads of  respective decentralised agencies such as 
Health, Education and Agriculture and heads of  other sub-committees 
of  the Assembly. The District Coordinating Director who is an appointed 
civil/public servant is the secretary to the Executive Committee (Gilbert, 
Hugounenq and Vaillancourt 2012).
The central focus of  study (shaded region of  Figure 2) is the District 
Coordinating Unit (DCU) under the Executive Committee wing of  
the Assembly. The DCU provides the overall management of  the 
Assembly’s public services. Even though the District Chief  Executive 
has the oversight of  the DCU, the day-to-day management of  the 
unit is led by the District Coordinating Director. He/she and all other 
staff of  the DCU, including the planning, budget, finance and central 
administration staff, are employees of  the Ministry of  Local Government 
and Rural Development. The DCU has total oversight of  administration 
of  the Assembly in terms of  facilitating planning, budgeting and 
service delivery. It provides infrastructure and other service support 
to deconcentrated agencies such as health and education to function 
Figure 2 Functional units of District Assembly and other agencies for service delivery in Ghana
Source Constructed based on author’s understanding of the structure of the District Assemblies in Ghana.
District Assembly
Legislative/DeliberativeExecutive Committee (DCE Chair)
Coordinating Council 
(DCC/MCC)
Development 
planning
Social 
services
Works
Finance/
administration
District 
Planning Unit Finance
Central 
administration
Deconcentrated
agencies
Decentralised
agencies
Justice/
security
District Coordinating Unit (DCU)
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 2 March 2017: ‘Interrogating Decentralisation in Africa’ 71–90 | 77
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
effectively (Gilbert et al. 2012). It also facilitates water and sanitation 
service provision throughout the district.
3.2 Data analysis
The first part of  the study examines the nature of  staff quality in the two 
selected study areas. In doing this, a descriptive analysis of  key socio-
demographic variables and PSM was conducted. The survey data on 
PSM was analysed using descriptive statistics. It also includes the aggregate 
score of  each participant on PSM and competence. Competence was 
computed using three main sub-variables with dichotomous measures that 
include education, years of  work experience and other job-related technical 
trainings. The scores were later used to construct a typological theory for the 
Figure 3 Ghana: selected districts for comparative case analysis
Source Redrawn from selected maps on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Districts_of_Ghana.
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classification of  different qualities of  staff based on the interplay between 
individual scores on competence and PSM. Descriptive statistics were used 
in this case to determine the proportion of  staff that fell into each of  the 
categories. The second part of  the study constructs a causal pathway that 
leads from antecedent conditions to the eventual outcome, using qualitative 
data from in-depth, key informant interviews. A theory-based analysis of  
how each type of  staff quality contributes to the outcome of  service delivery 
is conducted using stories associated with such classifications.
4 The nature of staff quality
4.1 Analysis of public service motivation (PSM)
A central objective of  this study is to measure the PSM of  District Assembly 
officers and to examine how PSM interacts with staff competence to 
produce different staff quality types within the selected District Assemblies. 
As indicated earlier, PSM was measured on four general dimensions 
which include attraction to public policy, public values, compassion and 
self-sacrifice, with a total of  17 items.6 The mean score of  each of  the 
Table 1 Public service motivation (PSM) score – Gomoa West (N=25)
PSM item N Minimum Maximum Mean
Standard 
deviation
APP1 25 3.00 5.00 4.36 0.907
APP2 25 2.00 5.00 3.88 1.092
APP3 25 3.00 5.00 4.44 0.651
APP4 25 3.00 5.00 4.40 0.764
APP5 25 3.00 5.00 4.24 0.723
CPV1 25 3.00 5.00 4.36 0.810
CPV2 25 1.00 5.00 3.56 1.083
CPV3 25 1.00 5.00 4.16 1.248
CPV4 25 2.00 5.00 4.32 0.900
COM1 25 2.00 5.00 3.72 1.021
COM2 25 3.00 5.00 4.12 0.833
COM3 25 3.00 5.00 4.36 0.810
COM4 25 2.00 5.00 4.64 0.810
SS1 25 2.00 5.00 3.92 1.077
SS2 25 1.00 5.00 3.60 1.258
SS3 25 1.00 5.00 3.32 1.145
SS4 25 2.00 5.00 4.00 0.957
Source Author’s own, based on analysis of data in this current study.  
Notes Overall mean PSM = 4.08. APP – attraction to public participation;  
CPV – commitment to public values; COM – compassion; and SS – self-sacrifice.
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17 items7 on a five-point scale was determined. First, a descriptive analysis 
of  public service motivation shows that overall, mean PSM score was 4.03, 
which is an indication of  fairly high PSM in both cases. However, there are 
variations with respect to the different dimensions, with the self-sacrifice 
dimension scoring the lowest. Furthermore, in Gomoa West, overall mean 
PSM score was 4.08, which is slightly higher than the mean PSM score 
of  Tema which is 3.97. Tema is slightly low on the self-sacrifice dimension 
of  PSM as well. Tables 1 and 2 provide detailed information on the PSM 
scores of  both Gomoa West and Tema. The implication of  this analysis 
is that PSM is generally high among respondents but slightly higher in 
Gomoa. However, PSM score alone does not tell us much about the nature 
of  staff quality, unless it is linked up with competence level.
4.2 Analysis of staff competence
Competence has been conceptualised as three sub-variables in this study 
in line with Rodolfa et al.’s (2005) conceptualisation of  competency. The 
variables used in this study include level of  academic knowledge and 
Table 2 Public service motivation (PSM) score – Tema (N=25)
PSM item N Minimum Maximum Mean
Standard 
deviation
APP1 25 1.00 5.00 4.00 1.291
APP2 25 1.00 5.00 4.16 1.106
APP3 25 1.00 5.00 4.00 1.118
APP4 25 1.00 5.00 4.04 1.136
APP5 25 2.00 5.00 3.96 0.935
CPV1 25 1.00 5.00 4.20 0.913
CPV2 25 1.00 5.00 4.32 0.627
CPV3 25 1.00 5.00 4.08 1.077
CPV4 25 1.00 5.00 4.28 0.936
COM1 25 1.00 5.00 4.08 1.115
COM2 25 1.00 5.00 3.88 1.481
COM3 25 1.00 5.00 3.80 1.190
COM4 25 1.00 5.00 4.32 1.345
SS1 25 1.00 5.00 3.72 1.370
SS2 25 1.00 5.00 3.56 1.356
SS3 25 1.00 5.00 3.60 1.291
SS4 25 1.00 5.00 3.52 1.503
Source Author’s own, based on analysis of data in this current study.  
Notes Overall mean PSM = 3.97. APP – attraction to public participation;  
CPV – commitment to public values; COM – compassion; and SS – self-sacrifice.
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skills, years of  work experience on the job, and other specific job-related 
technical skills acquired. These three variables were re-categorised 
from the data into dichotomous variables. Education was categorised 
as degree and above (2), below degree (1). Work experience was 
categorised as above average years of  work experience (2) and below 
average as (1). Other job-related trainings received was categorised as 
Yes (2) and No (1). An average score of  competence was then computed. 
For example, if  a respondent scored 2 on education, 1 on years of  
experience and 1 on other training, the aggregate score is 4. In order to 
fit into the model, the average of  the score was determined as  
4/3 = 1.3. A score below the midpoint of  2 was considered low.
As shown in Table 3, all (100) participants in Tema have attained a 
university degree or above. In Gomoa West also, almost all (90 per cent) 
had a degree and higher qualifications, except one participant. This was 
expected due to the nature of  the sample (frontline officers). On-the-job 
work experience, however, varied significantly between the two cases. 
There are more experienced participants in Tema than in Gomoa, 
counting those with more than five years on the job. The mean work 
experience in Tema was 7.2 years with a maximum of  22 years, and in 
Gomoa was 5.1 years with a maximum of  13 years. In addition, the data 
show that there were more participants in Tema (80 per cent) who had 
received other specific job-related technical trainings than in Gomoa West 
(56 per cent). In summary, competency levels in Tema were much higher 
among participants than in Gomoa West. As indicated, competency 
alone without the right mix of  PSM does not guarantee quality 
staff. Subsequent discussions will highlight the interactions between 
competence and PSM and the types of  staff quality they produce.
4.3 Typological theory of staff quality
In determining variations in staff quality and its implications for service 
delivery, there was a need to classify research participants into subgroups 
based on their score on competence which is measured by the aggregate 
Table 3 Descriptive analysis of competency variables
Measurement District
Variable Category
Tema 
N=25 (%)
Gomoa West 
N=25 (%)
Academic qualification
Below degree 0 10
Degree and above 100 90
Work experience
Less than five years 48 72
Five or more years 52 28
Other job-related training
No 20 44
Yes 80 56
Source Author’s own, based on analysis of data in this current study.
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Figure 4 Typology of staff quality in Gomoa West District (N=25)
Source Author’s own.
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Figure 5 Typology of staff quality in Tema Metropolitan Assembly (N=25)
Source Author’s own.
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score on academic qualification, years of  work experience on the job, 
and other related technical trainings, combined with individual scores on 
PSM. An appropriate analytic tool for this approach is typological theory 
(Bennett 2013; George and Bennett 2005; Cornelissen 2016; Fiss 2011). 
According to Bailey (1994), theory-based typologies can effectively be 
subjected to rigorous empirical testing using the quantitative models.
In this study, a two-dimensional figure with four different quadrants 
was developed to create types. As shown in Figures 4 and 5, the y-axis 
shows competence level, marked from 1 to 3 with a midpoint of  2, 
where scores below 2 were classified as low competence, and 2 and 
above were classified as high competence (academic qualification + years 
of  experience + other technical training). The x-axis shows the PSM 
dimension marked from 0 to 85, with 85 as the highest possible score an 
individual can score on the scale of  1 to 5 for the 17 items, and 66 as the 
mean individual-level score in the distribution. All scores above the mean 
were considered high and those below the mean were considered low.
As shown in Figures 4 and 5, four different types of  staff quality are noted in 
this study. These include those participants who were low on PSM and low 
on competence. This category is referred to as ‘loiterer’ staff in this study. 
Respondents in this category were very young staff with limited experience, 
knowledge and skills and who also did not demonstrate sufficient intrinsic 
motivation. Qualitative data show that many of  them chose to work at the 
District Assembly as the last resort. There were 16 per cent (four each) of  
this type of  staff in both Tema and Gomoa West. A higher proportion of  
such category of  staff can jeopardise service delivery considerably. A second 
category of  staff are those who were highly competent with all the requisite 
knowledge and skills, but with low PSM. This category is referred to as the 
‘lukewarmers’. These people were very apathetic towards their work with 
the Assembly and were not prepared to make sacrifices to see the work of  
the Assembly progress. There is a higher concentration of  this category in 
Gomoa West (12 per cent) than in Tema (8 per cent).
A third category of  staff are those who were high on PSM and low 
on competence. This category is referred to as the ‘hard workers’. 
They have the drive, the energy and the heart to work to serve the 
people. Their scores on compassion and self-sacrifice were higher 
but they do not have the requisite experience and technical training 
to undertake activities that promote service delivery. There is a very 
high concentration of  this category in Gomoa West (56 per cent) as 
compared to Tema (32 per cent). A fourth category of  staff are those 
who were both high on competence and PSM. These were referred to 
as the ‘quality workers’. In this study, this group are shown as the best 
quality of  staff who can spur on service delivery at the sub-national level. 
They are individuals with the right mix of  qualifications and experience 
and with a zeal for change in the respective District Assemblies. They 
demonstrated selflessness and willingness to improve performance, no 
matter the conditions under which they worked. As shown in Figures 5 
and 6, Tema has a higher concentration of  staff in this category.
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In summary, analysis of  the nature of  staff quality in this study shows 
that there are four different staff types working currently in District 
Assemblies in Ghana. They are ‘loiterers’, ‘lukewarmers’, ‘hard workers’ 
and ‘quality workers’. The hypothesis is that a high concentration 
of  quality workers with the right mix of  competence and PSM will 
be more likely to move service delivery to an appreciable level. This 
proposition is discussed next, using process tracing to track the historical 
and proximate factors that might explain why Tema is believed to be 
performing better in service delivery than Gomoa West, according to 
the 2015 Ghana DLT (UNICEF and CDD-Ghana 2015).
4.4 Staff quality and service delivery: constructing a pathway
There is significant agreement among researchers that the type of  
human resource has implications for service delivery (Grindle 1997; 
Hoogendoorn and Brewster 1992; Robinson 2007). However, the 
process through which this occurs is vaguely discussed within the 
context of  decentralisation and service delivery. The purpose of  this 
section is to show the contribution of  staff quality to the overall service 
delivery arrangements of  District Assemblies and the extent to which 
different concentrations of  distinct types of  staff quality can partly 
explain why service delivery outcomes vary across District Assemblies.
It is acknowledged that the relationship between decentralisation 
and service delivery can be complex with several factors acting 
independently of  each other or in conjunction to shape service delivery. 
However, the role of  staff quality remains distinct and appears to 
be a major factor among the causal variables of  service delivery in 
decentralisation. This can be demonstrated from our comparison of  
Tema and West Gomoa District Assemblies.
Tema Metropolitan Assembly was established in 2007 from the previous 
Tema Municipal Assembly. The current state of  service delivery in Tema 
Figure 6 Pathway from staff quality to better service delivery in Tema
Source Author’s own.
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developed over a period of  time. Historically, the commissioning of  the 
Tema port in 1962, the Volta Aluminium Company in 1967 and other 
industries within the port enclave of  Tema, and the activities of  the Tema 
Development Corporation has led to the development of  a modern social 
infrastructure. The presence of  these social infrastructures such as schools, 
hospitals and recreational opportunities created favourable conditions for 
family life which are the basic issues people consider in accepting postings 
to different places. At the same time, Tema benefits from proximity to the 
capital city, Accra, which offers different official and personal activities. 
Thus, prior to becoming an autonomous district council in 1974, these 
two antecedent factors set Tema apart. The conjunctural effect of  
favourable social conditions for family life and proximity to the capital 
city made Tema attractive to job-seekers and highly competitive to get in. 
As shown in Figure 6, this has led to the attraction of  high numbers of  
quality staff with the right mix of  competence and PSM over time.
In this instance, the critical point for Tema was the high concentration 
of  quality staff which led to the creation of  the appropriate management 
principles and work ethics necessary for any productive activity. These 
management principles and work ethics are what Crook and Ayee (2006) 
and Grindle (1997) referred to as a positive organisational culture. Crook 
and Ayee (2006) argued that a positive organisational culture was an 
important factor in shaping service delivery among sanitation workers in 
Ghana. In the case of  this study, it is argued that organisational culture is a 
creation of  the right quality staff. Furthermore, it is observed that as a result 
of  the development of  sound organisational culture, some appreciable level 
of  creativity and innovation was evident in the way the Tema Metropolitan 
Assembly developed its programmes and its fund-raising.
The District Medium Term Development Plan (DMTDP) of  Tema 
and its Composite Budget for 2015 to 2017, for example, are valuable 
evidences of  the extent to which creativity and innovation are 
Table 4 Internally generated funding streams of Tema Metropolis
Item 2015 Budget
Actual as at 
November 2015
2016 Projection
Rates  5,840,000  6,387,725.51  11,105,000.00 
Fees and fines  7,197,400  3,898,473.38  7,340,973.00 
Licences  5,788,500  5,304,806.64  8,297,500.00 
Land  100,000  1,773,414.20  250,000.00 
Rent  11,000  107,240.10  25,000.00 
Investment  5,000  -  10,000.00 
Misc.  279,584  110,797.96  305,000.00 
Total  19,221,484  17,582,457.79  27,333,473.00
Source Tema Metropolitan Assembly (2016).
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brought to bear on the planning process. As part of  this creativity and 
innovation, Tema now has online services for many activities and a 
very functional website. In addition, even though Tema has several 
economic advantages to raise extra revenue beyond state transfers, the 
role of  quality staff cannot be ignored in the process. There is evidence 
of  diversified fund-raising activities which ordinarily many districts have 
ignored. To this extent, actual internally generated revenue for Tema for 
2015 (GHS17,582,457.79) was more than five times actual government 
releases through the District Assembly Common Fund for the period. 
This represents more than 90 per cent of  projected revenue for the 
period. See Table 4 for fund-raising streams of  Tema Metropolis.
In addition to how staff quality contributed to improving fund-raising 
performance in Tema, the evidence also shows that the role of  staff 
quality in harmonising sector level plans to provide support for other 
deconcentrated agencies such as education and health was critical. 
For instance, the Assembly’s support for providing educational and 
health infrastructure is partly responsible for the improvement in basic 
educational outcomes and skilled deliveries. In effect, it is not surprising 
that a study of  the DMTDP and actual service delivery activities of  Tema 
shows that some appreciable level of  funds has been made available 
for direct service delivery, and this has translated into the current state 
of  service delivery outcomes within the Metropolis. However, it should 
also be noted that due to the proximity of  Tema to the regional and 
national capital, Accra, there is consistent oversight supervision from 
the Regional Coordinating Council (RCC). The evidence suggests that 
Tema Metropolis is one of  the most visited Assemblies in Ghana. This 
level of  consistent oversight supervision also contributed to some extent 
in modifying the emphasis of  performance towards service delivery. 
Similarly, the presence of  different community-based organisations, faith-
based institutions and other professional associations constantly puts some 
form of  social pressure on officials to demand for quality services in the 
areas of  water, sanitation and some road infrastructure services.
In Gomoa West, on the other hand, the district was only established 
in 2008 following the division of  the erstwhile Gomoa District. This 
happened a year after Tema was elevated to a Metropolitan status. Unlike 
Tema, Gomoa West, with Apam as the capital, is largely a farming, 
fishing, mining and tourism district. The district lies almost equidistant 
between Accra (69km), the national capital, and Cape Coast (68km), the 
regional capital. The social infrastructure necessary for family life such as 
good schools for children of  workers, good hospitals and other functional 
support systems is limited and this, coupled with the issue of  proximity to 
both the regional and national capitals, made the district an unattractive 
destination. As a result, the concentration of  high-quality staff was low. 
Some staff used the district as a conduit to better opportunities; many 
others have the right PSM but had limited competence in terms of  
experience and other technical training (‘hard workers’). This resulted in 
a fairly weakly developed positive organisational culture, evident in the 
way development activities have been organised. In effect, the issue of  
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creativity in programme and fund-raising activities remained unresolved. 
For example, actual internally generated revenue for Gomoa stood at 
GHS291,612.80 in 2014, a situation that was blamed on staff capacity 
and the lack of  sources of  income. The following is an extract from the 
medium-term plan, which strengthens the argument about staff capacity 
and revenue mobilisation:
The problem has been mainly due to low collection of  property rates 
which would need much attention. Some measures taken to mitigate 
the challenge include capacity building programmes by the district 
administration for all revenue staff, area council chairpersons and 
development planning, finance and administration sub-committee 
chairpersons and recruitment of  revenue guards to supplement 
the effort of  the revenue collectors and regular interface meetings 
with stakeholders to identify challenges and concerns (Gomoa West 
District Assembly 2014: 18).
As a result of  the difficulties in generating sufficient revenue beyond the 
DACF, the district is unable to allocate sufficient funding to planned activities 
leading to the current state of  weak service delivery outcomes. Furthermore, 
as a result of  limited staff quality in Gomoa West, the process of  harmonising 
sector plans for effective service delivery appeared uncoordinated resulting in 
service delivery gaps in basic education outcomes, skilled deliveries, water and 
sanitation, security and overall governance indicators.
5 Conclusion
Human resource deployment for public service remains critical for 
overall service delivery in sub-national institutions. Whilst there 
is substantive debate about human resource capacity for specific 
decentralised social services such as health and education (Channa 
and Faguet 2016; Couttolenc 2012; Frumence et al. 2013) there is little 
debate about the generally low quality of  staff who coordinate overall 
service delivery mechanisms in Ghana’s decentralisation system. Hence, 
although many of  the failures of  decentralisation have been blamed on 
inadequate financing for service delivery it is argued in this study that, 
while the level of  financial endowment of  a District Assembly may be 
important in explaining variations in service delivery outcomes (Schulze 
and Suharnoko 2014), it is important to look beyond funding. Overall, 
this study posits that given all possible antecedent causes, staff quality 
determines how the overall institution is structured, which in turn 
sustains flawless processes (organisational culture) capable of  providing 
a creativity and innovation in programming and revenue mobilisation 
that goes beyond the DACF. Such a capability is also necessary for 
implementing those plans, based on carefully prioritised activities, and 
is more likely to result in better service delivery outcomes. However, 
the process is dependent on the presence of  an effective oversight 
monitoring system and a functional social accountability system.
In the wake of  the unflinching quest to implement full devolution in 
Ghana, where all decentralised service institutions will operate directly 
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under the District Assembly (Government of  Ghana 2010), the subject 
of  staff quality for decentralisation must preoccupy contemporary 
debate. Moreover, given recent concerns about the extent to which 
staff can be externally motivated to improve service delivery amidst 
the dwindling fortunes of  country-level economic growth (Perry and 
Hondeghem 2008), it has become imperative for public administration 
and human resource experts to look more closely into attracting 
employees with the demonstrable PSM and skillsets for decentralisation. 
This is, however, dependent on creating the right preconditions to 
attract quality workers. In the case of  Gomoa, for example, the need for 
technical capacity building is imperative.
This current case study, whilst inevitably limited in scope, provides 
important insights into how staff quality affects service delivery. There 
is, therefore, the need for a broader national-level study into human 
resource capacities and service delivery in the District Assemblies of  
Ghana, focusing on PSM and competences.
Notes
*  I am grateful to the Partnership for African Social and Governance 
Research (PASGR) for a grant to carry out this research, and to two 
anonymous reviewers for detailed comments on this article.
1 School of  Arts and Humanities, Edith Cowan University, Western 
Australia.
2 Cf. Steiner’s study of  Uganda (Steiner 2007).
3 The services and their indicators include education (pass rate 
for Basic Education Certificate Examination), sanitation (open 
defecation), rural water (rural water coverage), health (skilled 
delivery), security (police coverage) and governance (functional and 
organisational assessment tool minimum conditions) (see UNICEF 
and CDD-Ghana 2015 for details).
4 This is an MS-Excel spreadsheet formula used to assign random 
numbers to a list of  items.
5 Given that this study is a pilot study and the nature of  the population 
of  frontline staff in the two districts, this sample size (approximately 
35 per cent of  the population), though relatively small, is considered 
appropriate according to the guidelines suggested by Hertzog (2008).
6 See Kim et al. (2010) for details on PSM measurement.
7 The items listed: APP1–5; CPV1–4; COM1–4 and SS1–4 in 
Tables 1 and 2 are PSM indicators based on questions in the 
questionnaire as shown in Kim et al. (2010). The acronyms stand for 
‘attraction to public participation’, ‘commitment to public values’, 
‘compassion’ and ‘self-sacrifice’, respectively.
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Improving Access to Maternal 
Health Care through Devolution 
in Western Kenya
Susan Kilonzo, Eunice Kamaara and Kitche Magak*
Abstract Devolution was greeted with great anticipation in Kenya as 
a means of bringing services closer to the people. However, since the 
implementation of the recent devolution reforms, criticism has mounted, 
with evidence of corruption, poor management, late payment of county 
staff and considerable disaffection among service providers, especially 
health professionals. In this study, we examine health-care users’ and 
providers’ perceptions of the effect of devolved health services on referral 
maternal health-care access in Kisumu and Uasin Gishu counties in Western 
Kenya. Our findings suggest that while health workers are dissatisfied, 
there is considerable satisfaction among users of referral maternal health 
services. Users largely associate their satisfaction with devolution. However, 
closer analysis suggests that improved access is not only linked to devolved 
health services but also to other developments both at the national level 
(health campaigns, increased mobile telephony) and county level (improved 
transportation, relocation of available funds).
Keywords: devolution, Kenya, maternal health care, access, citizen 
perception.
1 Introduction
Devolution, especially by central governments, transfers power to 
lower levels of  administration, thereby reducing top-down approaches 
in decision-making (Bossert and Beauvais 2002; Naeem et al. 2012). 
Article 174 of  the 2010 Kenya Constitution1 stipulates the role of  
devolution as enhancement of  self-governance, economic development 
and equitable sharing of  local and national resources. Yet, according 
to Robinson (2007), the history of  decentralisation reforms in Africa 
is full of  bad examples, mostly due to the absence of  meaningful local 
political process, over-centralisation of  resources, weak local revenue 
base, lack of  local planning capacity, and limited changes in legislation 
and regulations. Since the 1990s, there has been a shift in the aims of  
decentralisation – to enhance democratisation and reduce the role of  
central governments – as well as in its form, from deconcentration to 
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devolution (Conyers 2007). Still, the problem remains, with most central 
governments reluctant to devolve enough power to local governments 
for them to have a significant impact on service delivery.
Devolution affects every aspect of  governance, which in turn affects the 
totality of  development, including health. Recent devolution reforms 
in health care across Africa have displayed some interesting outcomes, 
although a key undercurrent remains: central governments’ reluctance 
to let go of  power. For instance, although health-care services have been 
devolved in Uganda, the national government still controls the budgets 
and provides conditional grants for the promotion of  primary health 
care (Bossert and Beauvais 2002: 24). The implication of  such controls 
is that the communities and administrators at local levels have limited 
say over the operations of  health-care services that affect them. Looking 
at cases of  what he calls ‘deep democratic decentralization’, Mehrotra 
(2006: 270) points out to the more successful cases of  Benin, Guinea 
and Mali, where decentralisation of  primary health-care services led to 
increased access to affordable health services, which in turn increased 
immunisation rates and reduced infant mortality. Part of  this success 
was the fact that in all three cases, the state remained a relatively weak 
central authority, that could not support public health services in the 
early 1980s. More recently, Inkoom and Gyapong (2016) highlight that 
despite advances in the implementation of  more ambitious health-care 
decentralisation plans in Ghana, Malawi and Tanzania, in all three 
countries policymaking is still based at the centre and local governments 
report a high dependence on central government for funds (usually 
earmarked), allowing for central government interference.
As a signatory to most international and continental agreements on 
improving access to maternal health, Kenya has launched several health 
campaigns. However, the country failed to achieve UN Millennium 
Development Goal 5 (to reduce maternal deaths by 75 per cent between 
1990 and 2015) and Kenyan mothers still experience many maternal 
health-care challenges including complications during pregnancy and 
childbirth, as well as HIV/AIDS-related issues (Maoulidi 2011). This 
problem is even more acute in some areas, with the centralised decision-
making system in Kenya being blamed for regional health disparities 
(MoH 2006). Still, there is a noted reduction of  maternal deaths and 
the country remains committed to the improvement of  maternal health 
through the implementation of  various strategic initiatives including the 
Free Maternity Services programme and Beyond Zero Campaign.2
Before the promulgation of  the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, the Ministry 
of  Health (MoH) had already committed to decentralising its services 
in order to provide increased local-level authority in decision-making, 
resource allocation and management of  health care. The aim was 
to involve communities in the management and implementation of  
essential clinical and public health services (MoH 2002, 2006). The 
2010 Constitution, which transferred the health service delivery function 
to the newly created 47 counties in 2013 (Baker et.al 2014), provided 
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an opportunity through a constitutional framework for an ongoing 
ministerial devolved health initiative. The health-care responsibilities 
that were devolved include community health, primary health care 
and county referral services. The national government retained the 
responsibility of  national referral services. Unfortunately, there have 
been various challenges including an unprecedented number of  
strikes by health-care workers: there have been more than two dozen 
strikes since the devolution of  health services in 2013 (Masika 2016). 
Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis (2016) caution that time is vital in 
assessing the full impact of  devolution in Kenya. Studies on devolved 
health services in Kenya have mainly focused on the job satisfaction of  
health workers, devolution as a strategic approach to health care, and the 
implementation processes (Baker et al. 2014; Oyugi 2015; Mwamuye and 
Nyamu 2014). Overall, most studies provide a general overview of  the 
effects of  devolved governments on health care. Our literature review did 
not find any study that focused on access to referral maternal health care.
This study fills this gap by exploring the perceptions of  maternal health-
care users, health providers and administrators on how devolution of  
health services affects access to referral prenatal and postnatal maternal 
health care in Kisumu and Uasin Gishu county hospitals. A United 
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) report (2014) indicates that 15 
of  the total 47 counties in Kenya account for 98.7 per cent of  total 
maternal deaths in the country. Within these, Kisumu County ranks 
seventh in this list with an infant mortality rate of  249/100,000 and a 
maternal mortality ratio of  597. While Uasin Gishu county is not within 
the top 15, it was chosen alongside Kisumu because both are urban 
counties in the Western Kenya region and they are both cosmopolitan. 
Besides, Uasin Gishu and Kisumu are the only two counties with a 
teaching and referral hospital to which the county hospitals across 
Nyanza, Western and North Rift regions of  Kenya refer maternal users. 
The main maternal health challenges in Kisumu County include poor 
access to reproductive health services, poor quality of  services, a high 
number of  unskilled birth deliveries (Maoulidi 2011) and HIV/AIDS. 
The county referral health facility is Kisumu County Hospital, but 
the county also hosts the Jaramogi Oginga Odinga Referral Hospital, 
a national referral facility. The Uasin Gishu County Hospital is the 
county referral facility and the Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital 
hosts the Riley Mother and Baby Hospital, a national maternal referral 
facility. The main maternal health challenges in Uasin Gishu include 
poor health systems, poor management skills of  health workers and 
poor community structures.
In this article, we examine health-care users’ and providers’ perceptions 
of  the effect of  devolved health services on access to referral maternal 
health care in these two counties. We start by describing what we mean 
by ‘access’, the relationship between health-care users and health-
care systems, breaking this concept into four dimensions – availability, 
accessibility, affordability and acceptability – which guided us in data 
collection, analysis and interpretation. In the subsequent section, we 
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outline our methodology, followed by a discussion of  our findings across 
the four dimensions of  access. Opposite to findings from previous 
studies on users’ perceptions of  the quality of  local government service 
provision (see Conyers 2007), and health providers having generally 
a negative view of  devolution, we found that users’ perceptions are 
overwhelmingly positive. We conclude by stating that while other 
health-related developments at national level (namely national health 
campaigns) have improved health-care access and played a role in users’ 
perception of  the effects of  devolution, county-level decisions have also 
contributed significantly to the perceived positive effects of  devolution 
in referral maternal health care.
2 Accessing health care: a framework
Worldwide, access is an essential element to the performance of  
health-care systems (Levesque, Harris and Russell 2013). In this 
study, we use a conceptual framework that builds on longstanding 
descriptions of  access to health services, drawing on the work of  
Penchansky and Thomas (1981) and further developed by Peters et 
al. (2008) and McIntyre, Thiede and Birch (2009). Like Penchansky 
and Thomas (1981), we think of  access as a multidimensional concept 
that summarises a set of  more specific dimensions describing the fit 
between the user and the health-care system. The interaction between 
these dimensions determines access, even though each dimension is 
distinct and focuses on a set of  clearly distinguishable issues (McIntyre 
et al. 2009). Ultimately, this framework provided us not only a structure 
to help our data collection, but also a conceptual lens to interpret the 
data collected on how devolved health services are perceived by health 
providers and users to impact access to referral maternal health care.
In this framework, we incorporate four dimensions of  access: availability, 
accessibility, affordability, and acceptability. By availability, we mean 
having the right type of  health services available to those who need them, 
that is, supplying the appropriate health-care providers and/or services 
in the right place and at the right time to meet the prevailing needs of  
the population. In accessibility, we refer to the relationship between the 
location of  supply and the location of  users, taking into consideration 
user transportation resources and travel time, distance and cost. 
Affordability deals with the relationship between the price of  services 
and the willingness and ability of  users to pay for those services. Finally, 
acceptability deals with how responsive health service providers are to 
social and cultural expectations of  individual users and communities.
3 Methodology3
For this study, we adopted a mixed methods approach combining initial 
observation of  hospitals with qualitative interviews with a range of  
stakeholders and a focus on perceptions. For the former, we engaged in 
participant observation to study and record the everyday life in spaces 
and places of  interface between health-care users and providers, and for 
the latter we mostly made use of  in-depth semi-structured interviews. 
As such, we relied mostly on ethnographic methods. Ethnography has 
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evolved from its traditional application in anthropology to be used in 
fields such as policy, design and engineering, helping us provide rich 
explanations of  the hows and whys of  peoples’ lives (Button 2000: 322). 
Ethnographic health studies focus on the health challenges that face 
people and provide frameworks of  how and why people access or do not 
access health care. We adopted this approach to understand the whys 
and hows of  existing perceptions of  the effect of  devolution on access to 
referral maternal health care. Using key ethnographic methods such as 
participant observation and qualitative interviews allowed us to provide 
narratives, verbatim reporting, and descriptions of  what we heard and 
observed regarding the effect of  devolved health services on access to 
maternal health care in the two counties. Ultimately, what emerged 
were the peoples’ interpretations of  their own health world.
We collected data sequentially in three phases, with each phase lasting 
about three weeks. The first phase involved participant observation of  
prenatal and postnatal referral contexts at Kisumu and Uasin Gishu 
county hospitals. The initial unstructured nature of  our participant 
observation allowed us to reduce potential researcher biases and 
assumptions by ‘looking around’ without a set agenda. In this first stage, 
a series of  issues became salient, namely, issues related to facilities and 
supplies, training and motivation of  medical staff, and application 
and effectiveness of  referral policies. We used these issues as themes to 
guide a more structured observation in a second phase of  our research, 
together with informal conversations with health-care providers and 
users. Subsequently, guided by what emerged from the second phase, we 
proceeded to develop semi-structured questions that guided qualitative 
interviewing (including in-depth interviews) of  key informants. We also 
made use of  our observations to select key respondents, as well as to 
triangulate their answers not only with themselves, but also with our 
observations.
We purposively selected 32 key informants for different purposes:
 l To provide us with individual perspectives on the hows and whys 
of  the perceived influence of  devolved health services on access to 
referral maternal health care, we interviewed eight maternal health 
users receiving care at Jaramogi Oginga Odinga Referral Hospital 
and at Riley Mother and Baby Hospital having been referred from 
Kisumu and Uasin Gishu county hospitals respectively (four from 
each hospital);
 l To provide us with the view from a managerial perspective, we 
interviewed eight national and county-level medical health officers 
and four hospital administrators from the two counties;
 l To provide us with vital perspectives (and perceptions) on the effects 
of  devolved health services on access to referral maternity health 
care, we interviewed 12 health-care providers, namely, two doctors, 
two nurses, and two midwives/birth attendants from each county.
96 | Kilonzo et al. Improving Access to Maternal Health Care through Devolution in Western Kenya
Vol. 48 No. 2 March 2017: ‘Interrogating Decentralisation in Africa’
Data collected from different sources and by different methods were 
triangulated to strengthen the validity of  findings on contextual issues 
specific to each county. The issues included perceptions on leadership, 
governance and effectiveness of  devolved health services policies, especially 
those related to access to referral maternal health care. The overall theme 
was access (using the 4As framework, as detailed in Section 2). Field 
notes emerging from jottings made over six weeks of  observations and 
recorded interviews were systematically transcribed, cleaned, manually 
coded, and thematically categorised. We made use of  this data to analyse 
the explanations, interpretations, examples, cases and illustrations of  the 
perceived effects of  devolution on availability, accessibility, affordability and 
acceptability of  referral maternal health care. We focused our interpretation 
of  the data on how and why devolved leadership and governance is 
perceived to affect access to referral maternal health care.
4 Unpacking access: initial findings
This study investigated perceptions on the influence of  devolved health 
services on referral maternal health-care access in Kisumu and Uasin 
Gishu county hospitals and the origins of  those perceptions. Overall, 
the study indicated mixed perceptions: while nearly all maternal 
health users agreed that devolved health-care services have a positive 
impact on access to referral maternal health care, health-care providers 
expressed various misgivings. Devolution of  health services has spawned 
a widespread perception among users that health services, including 
referral maternal health care is now closer to mwananchi (citizens) in 
terms of  availability, accessibility, affordability and acceptability. These 
positive perceptions of  improved access to referral maternal health 
care have led to an influx of  patients, an indicator of  acceptability of  
devolved health care by users. But the increase in patients has not been 
matched with expansion of  facilities and human resources, two factors 
that partly explain the misgivings of  health providers. Finally, and 
similar to what D’Arcy and Cornell (2016) suggest, some health-care 
providers think devolution has ‘devolved’ corruption to the county level. 
This perception is further strengthened by local newspaper stories and 
television programmes featuring the affluent lives of  county government 
officers, difficult to maintain on their current salaries.
Despite positive perceptions of  the effects of  devolution on access to 
referral maternal health care, there are still big challenges including fiscal 
dependence of  county governments on the national government and 
the delay in fiscal remittances from the national government. Over the 
period of  data collection, remittances were late by eight months. County 
governments in both Kisumu and Uasin Gishu continued to offer free 
services using funds from other sources, an advantage of  autonomous 
decision-making by county governments. This finding agrees with 
Cheeseman et al.’s (2016) argument that Kenya is a unique case in which 
central government may not manipulate county governments given 
the dynamism of  power relations and political actors, whose presence 
in the succeeding governments is highly determined by their ability to 
campaign for new powers and sources of  revenue.
(Endnotes)
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A key finding in this study is that users perceive devolved health systems 
to have positively influenced access to referral maternal health care. 
This is contrary to some of  the studies on effects of  devolution on 
health care, particularly maternal health care (see Bourbonnais 2013), 
where service providers remain insensitive to the needs of  women 
with respect to cultural and socioeconomic demands. Yet, we found 
that although users’ perceptions strongly associate devolved health 
services with improved referral maternal health care, there are other 
factors playing a role in this (real and perceived) improvement. Still, 
while the policies behind some of  these factors originated at central 
government (for instance, the Free Maternity Services programme and 
the Beyond Zero Campaign), the implementation happened because 
of  county governments choosing to do so. In other words, county-level 
decisions had a significant role to play in the perceived positive effects of  
devolution as regards to access to referral maternal health care.
Finally, users in Uasin Gishu county reported one negative implication 
of  devolution: tribal discrimination of  minorities. The perceived 
discrimination emanates from respondents associating devolved 
governance with tribal conglomeration. Health-care providers and 
administrators indicated a difference between this perception and the 
actual situation, indicating that priority service is provided only on 
the basis of  level of  emergency. As Cheeseman et al. (2016) observe, 
though the introduction of  devolution was expected to diffuse Kenya’s 
chronic ethnic conflicts, the findings of  this study suggest that this is not 
the case. We now present the specific findings of  this study along the 
4As of  health-care access: availability, accessibility, affordability, and 
acceptability.
4.1 Availability
Maternal health patients perceive devolution of  health services to 
have improved availability of  referral maternal health care. This 
availability seems to have increased the number of  users seeking services 
in public health facilities. The situation is still far from satisfactory, 
but it is a major step from the old centralised health system in which 
commodities were almost always unavailable. There are no new health 
facilities in either Kisumu or Uasin Gishu though there were visible 
repairs and improvements on already existing facilities. None of  the 
study respondents referred to an increase in facilities since devolution. 
However, they did indicate that with devolved health services, referral 
maternal health-care services are more readily available than before:
You cannot compare what is happening today with what was happening before. 
Before the new constitution, it was very difficult to come here. You could die 
at the district hospital as the doctors tried to transfer you. I say this from 
experience. My sister died in my arms at the UGC Hospital three days after the 
doctor told her that they were going to refer her. [She chokes with emotion 
as tears welled up in her eyes.] The first day they said there was no bed 
space in the referral hospital. The second day they said there was a bed but there 
was no ambulance. The third day my sister died. I was so scared when I was 
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admitted in that same hospital for delivery, but I was happily surprised when 
they brought me here so fast in a brand-new ambulance. (Twenty-five-year-
old postnatal user, Riley Mother and Baby Hospital4)
Closely associated with improved availability of  referral services is 
availability of  ambulance services which was commonly cited by both users 
and providers. Maternal care patients perceived ambulance services to have 
greatly improved with devolution. Observations at the four health facilities 
corroborated this positive perception about the availability of  referral 
maternal health care. During the course of  the study, many ambulances in 
good condition brought or took away patients to the maternal health-care 
sections of  both county and national referral facilities. Follow-up interviews 
confirmed that the ambulances delivered women who required emergency 
health care from lower level health facilities and even from homes.
Patient respondents attributed the availability of  ambulances to the 
ability of  county governments to access and make decisions over available 
resources, and so did other respondents. Although other bodies also 
operate ambulances across the country, and some of  them are donated, 
a health official indicated that the Uasin Gishu county government has 
bought many ambulances for both county and sub-county health facilities:
Before devolution, there were no funds at the local level to do this so ambulances 
were rare. And you see we in the county health departments can make decisions 
on whether to buy ambulances and how to use and maintain them. (In-depth 
interview, Uasin Gishu County Officer5)
Availability of  medicines was also perceived to have improved with 
devolution. Both interviews and observations revealed that most 
maternal health-care patients were able to get the prescribed drugs from 
the hospital pharmacy:
I notice that the pharmacy is well stocked. There are various kinds of  medicines. 
An expectant woman limps to the pharmacy. Her lips are dry and cracked and 
she appears tired. ‘Sema mama [yes ma’am]?’ asks the man. ‘Wamesema 
unipatie hii dawa [They said you give me this drug]?’, she replies, handing 
over piece of  paper to the man. […] The man gives the woman the drugs and 
she walks away. Other patients come, give a piece of  paper to the pharmacists, 
pick drugs and go. (Fieldnotes, Uasin Gishu County Hospital)
Some of  the patients interviewed noted that initially most hospitals 
lacked enough and readily available medicine and patients would always 
be given prescriptions to purchase drugs from private pharmacies. 
Referral maternal health-care users said that they can now get many, in 
some cases all, the medicines that they require.
Things have really improved since devolution. Now, you can be sure that you 
will get the medicines that the doctor prescribes for you. Before, it was like a 
miracle to get these medicines here in the hospital. That is why many patients 
only came to this hospital as a last resort. (In-depth interview with male 
partner of  a postnatal user, Uasin Gishu County Hospital6)
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While patients overwhelmingly opined that devolution has improved 
availability of  referral maternal health care, health-care providers were 
not so unanimous:
The perception out there is that devolution has been a magic bullet to all that 
ails public health services. This perception is mainly spearheaded by the county 
governments. Devolution has worsened some aspects of  health services. For 
example, the capacity of  this health facility has not been expanded to meet the 
increased referral maternal health-care demand that has been occasioned by free 
maternal health care policy. (Administrator, Kisumu County Hospital7)
However, the perceptions of  health-care providers seem to relate more 
to their working conditions and environments than to referral maternal 
health-care access. They noted that, though there is a significant increase 
in maternal health-care patients being referred from lower public and 
private health facilities, this is not matched by expansion of  the needed 
facilities and human power. This was clear at both the Riley Mother 
and Baby Hospital and the Jaramogi Oginga Odinga Referral Hospital 
where the maternity wards accommodated more than their capacity. 
Mothers and their children were forced to share beds. This was mainly 
attributed to both devolution and implementation of  policies that 
encourage maternal patients to seek services in public health facilities:
There is this general widespread notion that services are cheaper, free and better 
in the health facilities run by the counties. While this may not be necessarily 
true, this notion encourages users to seek prompt medical attention at various 
public health facilities. (Hospital superintendent, Kisumu County 
Hospital8)
In spite of  this observation, some health-care providers shared 
perceptions with users that devolved health services have improved the 
availability of  supplies and ambulance services.
4.2 Accessibility
Devolution in general and devolution of  health services in particular 
has had a visible impact on accessibility to maternal health care. For 
instance, we observed a remarkable improvement in the means of  
transportation and condition of  roads, both of  which directly influence 
physical and cognitive accessibility to maternal health care. Although 
the four health facilities under study have always been available, 
physical accessibility due to poor infrastructure created inaccessibility. 
Respondents indicated that there is improvement and construction of  
existing and new road networks by county governments.
The two county governments have also contributed significantly to 
improved physical accessibility to referral maternal health care through 
provision of  ambulances. As mentioned already in the previous section, 
both user and service providers averred that ambulances are now more 
available than before devolution. A patient narrated how she and her 
baby were quickly ferried by ambulance from the Uasin Gishu County 
Hospital to the Riley Mother and Baby Hospital on referral. Her baby 
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had developed breathing problems and needed support. This patient’s 
assertion was corroborated by a health official in Kisumu:
These days we have ambulances taking patients from mashinani [grass roots] 
to the referral health facilities. In terms of  referral maternal health, ambulances 
have become available and mwananchi – hata yule mama wa huko 
ndani, [the common person, including that woman at the grass roots] is able 
to access this referral hospital. Devolution has greatly improved health facilities 
and services. (In-depth interview, Kisumu County Officer9)
Motorcycle taxis locally known as boda boda have had a huge positive 
impact on physical access to referral maternal health care. The boda bodas 
have the ability to penetrate to the remotest parts of  the countryside 
along footpaths that even the hardiest of  four-wheel-drive vehicles 
cannot access. Both patients and service providers hailed the presence 
of  these two-wheeled taxis as a game changer in the provision of  timely 
maternal health care. The role of  boda bodas surpasses that of  ambulances 
not only because boda bodas can access areas that are impassable by cars 
but also because many taxi operators have personal relations with their 
patients which is beneficial to maternal health-care access. Nearly all 
maternal user respondents indicated that they have personal boda boda 
operators that they can call on any time, day or night. Although the boda 
bodas are not part of  devolved health services, the conducive environment 
created by devolution has allowed them to prosper, helping access to 
maternal health care. According to the World Bank (2016), between July 
2015 and May 2016, Kenya improved 21 positions (from 129th to 108th) 
in terms of  ease in doing business. In the same survey, Uasin Gishu and 
Kisumu were ranked first and second most investor-friendly counties in 
the country. In both counties, there are boda boda associations registered 
with the county government, which the county governments use to 
mobilise the boda boda riders for civic education on road safety.
Access to referral maternal health care has also had a major boost 
from the explosion of  mobile telephony in Kenya. According to the 
Communications Authority of  Kenya (2016), mobile penetration hit 
90 per cent in June 2016. Besides the most common use of  mobile 
phones to call taxis to take patients to hospital and to transfer money 
electronically to people in need of  health services, the digital revolution 
has provided a number of  mobile-based health-care services, thanks 
to information and communications technology (ICT) innovations. 
Mobile health services and innovations are fast emerging in Kenya such 
as: mHealth Kenya, a national company overseeing and managing 
mobile technology health projects; Daktari 1525, which enables 
over 25 million Safaricom subscribers access to doctors any time to 
receive expert advice on various health conditions; MedAfrica, a free 
mobile phone application that allows Kenyans to access health-care-
related information (including personalised first aid and reproductive 
health guidance, as well as access to reputable doctors and hospitals 
in their area); and the Health Information Technology (HIT) run by 
the Academic Model Providing Access to Healthcare (AMPATH), at 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 2 March 2017: ‘Interrogating Decentralisation in Africa’ 91–108 | 101
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Moi University, Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital and a consortium 
of  North American academic health centres led by Indiana University 
working in partnership with the Government of  Kenya. HIT provides 
automated patient-specific care suggestions and reminders. Although 
this digital revolution is independent of  devolved health services, the 
ubiquity of  the mobile telephone enables users to access maternal 
health literally at the click of  a button.
4.3 Affordability
Users of  maternal health care across Uasin Gishu and Kisumu counties 
perceive affordability of  referral maternal health care to have improved 
with devolved health services. All respondents were unanimous that 
the average cost of  prenatal and postnatal services was cheaper in the 
devolved health system than in the old centralised one. While the Beyond 
Zero Campaign and the policy on free maternal health care in all public 
health facilities in Kenya is responsible for this, county governments play 
a key role as devolved decision-making processes allow them to allocate 
resources to the health facilities even when the National Treasury delays 
the release of  health-care resources to county governments. Both counties 
grapple with the challenge of  inadequate and delayed funding from the 
national government. At Kisumu County Hospital, we learnt that the last 
disbursement received was eight months ago. The hospital is forced to use 
credit, cost-sharing and the Supply Systems Facility Improved Fund. This 
delay and inadequacy directly affects acceptability of  referral maternal 
health-care services due to low staff motivation, inadequate commodities 
supply and infrastructure. Cheeseman et al. (2016) argue that Kenya 
is a unique case in which the central government may not manipulate 
the county governments given the dynamism of  power relations and 
political actors, whose presence in the succeeding governments is highly 
determined by their ability to campaign for new powers and sources of  
revenue. There are efforts, however, for some politicians to be close to 
the ruling government, and when this happens, the focus is not only on 
electoral votes but development projects that the central government can 
afford for the counties.
On administration and management of  health facilities, health 
managers and patients in both Kisumu and Uasin Gishu county 
hospitals said that devolution has eliminated unnecessary bureaucracies 
that were bottlenecks to referral maternal health-care access. Some 
respondents said that the devolved health system had less barriers 
compared to the old centralised system:
I was referred to this hospital from a lower health facility. At first I thought 
I would be sent away the way it used to be. However, when I arrived, I was 
quickly attended to. I will happily return for the next appointment because I 
know I will be treated well. (Prenatal user, Kisumu County Hospital10)
Hospital management and personnel-related improved health-care 
access to devolved governance highlights issues such as ease of  
management of  hospital activities without necessarily consulting the 
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national government, easy planning and budgeting, quick decision-
making, ability to prioritise key areas of  urgent need, time management, 
better monitoring, supervision, more accountability and public 
participation. An official said:
In my view, there is improved governance in health-care provision in general 
because we can make decisions here. This is in spite of  financial constraints 
necessitated by late disbursement of  funds from the national government. At the 
county level we are able to quickly make decisions on what priority health issues 
to focus on and to allocate these funds without the red tape that characterised the 
situation before devolution. And of  course county governments are more closer 
[sic] to the people and are therefore able to identify the really [sic] needs of  their 
communities. (In-depth interview, Kisumu County Health Officer11)
Whereas the cost of  maternity services is presumed to be free, user 
respondents mentioned that they have to cater for costs such as 
transport, cotton wool and drugs. A prenatal user said:
I was once detained at a hospital due to delivery charges. Now I am not worried 
about delivering in hospital because of  high costs. However, I have to have some 
money for my fare and basic supplies such as cotton wool needed in preparation 
for delivery. (Referred prenatal user, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga Referral 
Hospital12)
Use of  mobile phones to call taxis and the facility of  mobile money 
transfers which have already been mentioned also help to make services 
affordable. With extended families and communalism relatively strong 
in Kenya, individuals can now quickly reach out to their relatives and 
friends for financial support. Boda boda transport is also cheap compared 
to taxis, charging about a quarter of  what vehicles charge.
4.4 Acceptability
Devolved health services have also had an overall favourable perceptual 
influence on the acceptability of  referral maternal health care. 
Acceptability is based upon the adequacy of  services, infrastructure, 
equipment, commodities and human resources to local social and cultural 
expectations. The influx is one of  the indicators of  acceptability of  
devolved health care. Yet, the increase in users has not been matched 
with expansion of  facilities and human resources, two factors that partly 
explain the negative perceptions of  health providers regarding the impact 
of  devolved health services on access to referral maternal health care.
While a good number of  patients seemed satisfied with the referral 
maternal care offered in both Kisumu and Uasin Gishu counties, 
health-care workers at the national referral hospitals are not 
comfortable with the situation essentially because they are overworked. 
The proportion of  doctors and nurses are important indicators of  a 
county’s capacity to provide adequate primary health-care coverage. 
With the deficits of  medical personnel noted in Kisumu and Uasin 
Gishu counties, the workload remains high yet the number of  patients 
has continued to increase. This breeds mixed reactions from patients 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 2 March 2017: ‘Interrogating Decentralisation in Africa’ 91–108 | 103
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
and health-care workers on levels of  acceptability of  referral maternal 
health-care services. At the Riley Mother and Baby Hospital, for 
instance, the number of  babies born daily has risen from an average of  
30 to 60 babies but the staffing remains unchanged. While the nurses 
are stationed either at the emergency, labour ward, prenatal wards, 
NICU13 or postnatal ward, at both Uasin Gishu and Kisumu County 
Hospitals we observed nurses in charge of  maternity wards attending 
to other stations such as emergency labour wards and postnatal wards. 
Some respondents noted that not only has there been an improvement 
in community health centres and clinics, but where services are not 
adequate, access to referral services to county and national hospitals is 
now easy. A respondent observed:
With devolution, a local dispensary in my village has been improved and 
maternal health services introduced, hence, I can secure prenatal services within 
my village on time. This time round I had complications with my pregnancy 
and I was quickly referred to Kisumu. (Prenatal user, Kisumu County 
Hospital14)
However, at Kisumu County Hospital focused observation revealed 
that patients overwhelmed primary care centres in both post-labour 
and labour wards. There was only one operation theatre, no ambulance 
dedicated to the maternal wing and the patients outnumbered the beds. 
We witnessed two or three mothers and their children at the postnatal 
ward sharing a bed with no mosquito net. One user respondent 
observed:
Whatever is hanging here as mosquito nets are mere decorations, they are torn 
and mosquitos have littered every corner of  this ward. To make it worse, I have 
witnessed medical staff attending to us with borrowed equipment. (Postnatal 
user, Kisumu County Hospital15)
Devolved health services face a huge increase of  patient self-referral, 
putting a lot of  strain on staff. We heard that patients who refer 
themselves to county or national referral hospitals are never turned back 
because childbirth is always an emergency situation. But it would seem 
that the strain effect depends on the cadre of  staff:
For the doctors, most of  us who are teaching with Moi University, we like it 
when there are many patients because we want our students to learn. And as you 
know our learning method is problem based (PBL) so the more cases the better 
for us. Our students are able to encounter all the different kinds of  emergencies 
that a mother or a neonate can have. Actually in this hospital you find more 
doctors than nurses. You can find that you are doing a ward round with six 
doctors but there is only one nurse. (Medical doctor, Riley Mother and 
Baby Hospital16)
According to the doctor, the solution lies in enhancing ‘down referral’ 
where expertise from the national hospital is posted to train staff in 
lower level hospitals and also in improving facilities and equipment and 
enhancement of  supplies in lower level hospitals.
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Finally, another negative implication of  devolution is a deepening of  
cultural and religious differences within counties (KPMG International 
2013): tribal discrimination of  minorities was perceived to negatively 
affect access to referral maternal health services in Uasin Gishu county. 
The perceived discrimination emanates from respondents associating 
devolved governance with tribal conglomeration. As Cheeseman et al. 
(2016) observe, though the introduction of  devolution was expected 
to diffuse Kenya’s chronic ethnic conflicts, the findings of  this study 
suggested that this is not the case. Yet, devolution in Kenya largely 
followed ethnic lines and as D’Arcy and Cornell (2016) observe elsewhere, 
some ethnic minorities within some of  the counties feel marginalised. 
This may explain why some maternal health users perceived devolved 
health services to fan tribalism. Some respondents believed that the 
dominant tribe in a county receives better services than ‘outsiders’:
In these hospitals, there is ubaguzi wa ukabila [discrimination based 
on tribe]. For those of  us who do not belong here [are not indigenous], 
devolution means that we do not get good services if  we are not in our home 
counties. In those other hospitals, all the doctors and the nurses are local people. 
One feels out of  place there. (In-depth interview at Riley Mother and 
Baby Hospital17)
5 Conclusion
There are clear differences in the general perceptions of  the effect 
of  devolved health services on access to referral maternal health care 
in Kenya. If  at one end health workers and other providers seem 
discontented with devolved health services, at the other end there seems 
to be considerable satisfaction among users of  referral maternal health 
services and their partners. Users largely perceived county governments 
to have improved access to referral maternal health care through a 
series of  actions, namely: speeding up referral services, as well as by 
providing medicines and ambulance services that were previously not 
available (availability); improving transport to and communication with 
both county and referral hospitals (accessibility); and supporting the free 
maternity health-care service even when money is not remitted from 
the national government promptly (affordability). While the increasing 
number of  referral maternal health patients is perceived to have 
increased tremendously, there are still some problems of  acceptability, 
including the deepening of  tribal discrimination along ethnic lines in 
provision of  services.
Resource mobilisation at the county level and the opportunity for quick 
decisions have contributed significantly to the perceived positive effects 
of  devolution in referral maternal health-care access in Kisumu and 
Uasin Gishu counties. However, improved access is partly related to 
developments that are not directly connected to the devolution of  health 
services, such as free maternity services, the Beyond Zero Campaign, 
boda boda transport, and mobile telephony. Yet, perceptions matter, 
and based on that, devolution can be seen to have contributed to 
improving health systems, specifically in maternal health care. Besides, 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 2 March 2017: ‘Interrogating Decentralisation in Africa’ 91–108 | 105
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
positive perceptions by users (who are citizens and voters) provide an 
opportunity for elected officials in Kenya to seek to maintain and even 
increase levels of  user satisfaction.
Devolution is not devoid of  challenges. Improved accessibility to referral 
maternal health care has increased pressure on equipment, commodities, 
infrastructure and personnel. This renders meaning to the discontent 
generally found among the health workers involved in this study. 
Discontent among health workers has been exacerbated by delays in 
fiscal remittances from national government. There are also perceptions 
that devolution has increased tribalism. In the study, we did not find 
any effort to mitigate this even though the perception is not unexpected 
given the broader Kenyan political context. Therefore, the challenge for 
policymakers in Kenya at both national and county level is not only to 
maintain and increase levels of  user satisfaction, but also to simultaneously 
address the misgivings of  health workers and mitigate against the 
perception that corruption and tribalism have increased with devolution. 
Better governance and accountability structures are critical for success.
Notes
* We wish to thank all respondents who took part in this study. We 
are grateful to the Partnership for African Social and Governance 
Research (PASGR) for a grant for this research, and to two 
anonymous reviewers and the IDS Bulletin team for detailed 
comments on our article.
1 The Constitution of  Kenya (2010), www.kenyalaw.org.
2 The former (enacted in June 2013 through presidential declaration) 
encourages women to give birth at health facilities under skilled 
personnel, in keeping with the African Union resolution to exempt 
user fees for pregnant women and children under the age of  five, 
and the latter (led by the First Lady since 2014) aims to promote 
maternal, newborn and child health – while controlling the 
prevalence of  HIV/AIDS – through mobile clinics.
3 The research protocol was approved by the Institutional Research 
and Ethics Committee of  Moi University’s College of  Health 
Sciences and Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital.
4 Interview, 28 May 2016.
5 Interview, 18 May 2016.
6 Interview, 27 May 2016.
7 Interview, 22 June 2016.
8 Interview, 23 June 2016.
9 Interview, 22 June 2016.
10 Interview, 28 June 2016.
11 Interview, 4 July 2016.
12 Interview, 6 July 2016.
13 Nursing Intensive Care Unit.
14 Interview, 29 June 2016.
15 Interview, 8 July 2016.
16 Interview, 28 May 2016.
17 Interview, 18 May 2016.
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Local Governments and Primary 
Education in Uganda
Emilly Comfort Maractho*
Abstract Decentralisation was one of the major reforms in the 1990s in 
Uganda, geared towards improving democratic governance and service 
delivery. However, districts have had variable performance, especially in 
providing primary education through public schools. In this article, I ask 
what explains the difference in local governments’ performance across 
two districts that were given similar powers and share a similar history. 
I explore this through in-depth interviews in the two districts and find that 
local governments are severely constrained in their performance by a lack 
of funds, which, along with development priorities, are controlled by the 
central government. Within this scenario, variable performance is explained 
to a great extent by the presence of donors and investments by the private 
sector, but that these funds are attracted to areas where greater capacity 
exists. While this improves education performance, it can contribute to 
growing inequality in educational attainment across districts.
Keywords: decentralisation, Uganda, service delivery, primary education, 
donors.
1 Introduction
The main legal framework for Uganda’s current local governments is 
the Decentralisation Statute 1993, aimed to transfer power to the people 
and promote equitable distribution of  resources. The 1995 constitution 
detailed the modalities of  a decentralised government while the Local 
Governments Act of  1997 made Local Government Council responsible 
for ensuring implementation and compliance with government policies 
(GoU 1997). According to Saito (2003: 203), ‘Uganda today probably 
has the most elaborate legal framework for decentralising measures 
in Africa and is firmly committed to decentralisation. The amount of  
financial resources transferred to local governments is one of  the largest 
in Africa’. Whereas it can be argued that the amounts of  financial 
resources transferred are significant, what really matters is whether these 
financial resources have over the years translated to effective service 
delivery as promised in the decentralisation objectives.
110 | Maractho Local Governments and Primary Education in Uganda
Vol. 48 No. 2 March 2017: ‘Interrogating Decentralisation in Africa’
One of  the areas of  transfer of  power is primary education, which 
became the responsibility of  local governments after decentralisation. 
The Universal Primary Education (UPE) programme was introduced 
in 1997, becoming part of  the mandate of  local governments. While 
initially the policy was to target four children per household, it later 
expanded to include all school-aged children. The reform led to the 
empowerment of  ordinary Ugandans and improved implementation and 
monitoring of  primary education (Mukunya 2007: 233). There was initial 
excitement about the policy as Ugandans would for the first time access 
free education (Buwembo 2016). Within this plan, local governments 
were to be responsible for education planning and management, school 
inspections, teacher management and classroom construction.
Almost two decades later, there is growing public concern over the 
quality of  service delivery by local governments. Existing research 
shows that local government delivery failures are connected to a host 
of  factors, including multiple leadership conflicts across different tiers 
of  government, low levels of  revenue collection and limited financial 
autonomy, distortions inherent in the decentralisation policy, and 
central government’s control of  the national budget resources (ACODE 
2014: 3). Yet, not all local governments are performing badly. Some 
local governments are able to perform well in delivering their functions 
as per their mandate while others are not (ACODE 2014). What are the 
reasons for this differential performance?
Using the two cases of  Arua and Nebbi districts in the West Nile 
region, I examine reasons for differences in performance across two 
areas with similar history, geography and powers. The question I pose 
is: What factors explain the difference in local government performance across 
two districts that were given similar powers? The outcome I consider here is 
local government performance in service delivery and the factors that 
account for variations in outcomes. An analysis of  the two cases leads 
to the finding that in the case of  primary education – a key mandate of  
local government – external factors such as private sector engagement 
and donor involvement contribute to the difference in performance.
For the past 15 years, there have been several studies on Uganda’s 
decentralisation, local government and service delivery (Saito 2003, 
2006; Golooba-Mutebi 2004, 2006; Uwezo Uganda 2016; Green 
2010, 2013; ACODE 2014). While these have largely focused on 
the challenges of  decentralisation or its impact on specific service 
delivery and popular participation, they left unexplained most of  the 
reasons for variations in outcomes and why some districts emerge as 
‘islands of  effectiveness’. While concurring with Crook (2010) that 
lack of  organisational commitment is a key variable to explain why 
some districts underperform, I contend that this gets exacerbated in 
contexts where local governments have little capacity to deliver services, 
limited financial autonomy and decision-making powers, and remain 
dependent on central government, with their powers limited to legal 
frameworks only. Comparing the two districts of  Arua and Nebbi allows 
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us to make some propositions in terms of  which other factors account 
for these variations.
This study thus examines why there are variations in local government 
performance in service delivery when local governments have similar 
powers, and face similar challenges vis-à-vis the central government. This 
article is organised as follows. In the next section, I revisit decentralisation in 
Uganda, focusing ultimately on service delivery, and in particular, primary 
education. In Section 3, I explain the rationale for the use of  comparative 
analysis in my methodology, and in Section 4, I analyse the two cases. In 
Section 5, I present the key reasons for variations in performance across the 
two cases, before concluding with policy implications in Section 6.
2 The promise and reality of decentralisation in Uganda
Uganda’s decentralisation and its extensive legal framework is 
considered impressive on the African continent, and represents ‘a radical 
reengineering of  the mechanisms of  governance towards political, 
administrative and fiscal devolution’ (Steffensen 2006: 93). ‘What is 
beyond dispute […] is that Uganda’s local government reforms in the 
last 20 years count among the most ambitious and arguably the most 
successful on the African continent’ (Golooba-Mutebi 2006: 61). This 
claim of  success in comparison to decentralised systems in Africa is 
difficult to make today in light of  service delivery challenges in local 
government districts that are commonplace in the media and in debates 
about decentralisation. A recent television discussion, one of  many 
commentaries, debated the relevance of  decentralisation. The debate, 
entitled ‘Is Decentralisation Dead?’, led to an open questioning of  the 
usefulness of  decentralisation today among participants of  the show 
(People’s Parliament on NTV), who are Ugandan citizens from all walks 
of  life. Throughout the dialogue, various participants echoed ongoing 
popular debates by affirming that Uganda’s decentralisation was 
ineffective and was doing little to improve service delivery, which has 
been the main objective of  the reforms all along. Members of  various 
local governments invited for the show expressed concern over how the 
decentralisation policy has evolved over the years, wondering if  it still 
existed. This questioning is not limited to citizen participation on national 
media, but also research has indicated that decentralisation is in trouble. 
Green (2013) discusses the rise and fall of  decentralisation, in which he 
argues that much of  the initial gains of  the 1990s have not been matched 
in recent years and excitement about programmes has tapered off.
Decentralisation in Uganda happened within larger economic 
reforms driven by neoliberalism and structural adjustment policies 
that prioritised the role of  the market and private actors. As a result, 
while services like primary education delivery were transferred to 
local governments, this process was implemented through a system 
of  partnerships with the private sector and other development actors 
that reduced the role of  the local state as the primary provider. This is 
evident in the way that government documents differentiate between 
service delivery and service provision:
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Service provision refers to the whole process of  planning public 
services while service delivery refers to mechanisms of  policy 
implementation. In Uganda’s local government system, service 
delivery approaches include: direct provision by the local 
government, public–private partnerships (PPPs), participation of  civil 
society (CSOs) and privatization (GoU 2013: 10).
Any assessment of  local government performance must inherently 
take into account all of  these elements rather than focus on the one 
approach of  direct provision. The government of  Uganda perceived 
many benefits of  decentralising education service delivery, including 
the elimination of  what it saw as unnecessary bureaucratic channels; 
reduction of  corruption; increased level of  monitoring; management of  
the education system according to local priorities; improved financial 
accountability; and increased local revenue to fund services (Namukasa 
2007). Empirical evidence on how things have worked out, however, 
is mixed. Decentralisation opened the way for more realistic planning 
and mobilisation of  resources (Mukunya 2007) and brought significant 
improvements in service delivery (Katono 2007; Ssemakula 1996). The 
purported significant improvements in service delivery now remain 
under question in light of  new developments such as the impulsive 
creation of  new districts that are deemed unviable for service delivery, 
but formed in the spirit of  political patronage as compensation for 
lost reforms (Green 2010) with full knowledge of  their political and 
economic limitations (Green 2013).
In addition, a number of  issues have created hindrances to positive 
results. These include lack of  human and social capital; local power 
structures obstructing citizen participation; public disinterest in payment 
of  taxes if  not accompanied by improved services; and an inability of  
the state to effectively involve civil society (Saito 2003) and what has been 
termed an obsessive creation of  districts (Green 2010). Dependence of  
local governments on the central government, limited autonomy, and 
limited community participation in local government decision-making 
processes (Nkalubo 2007) are some of  the other limitations.
Evidence from the annual reports series, Are Our Children Learning? 
(Uwezo Uganda 2011) and from local government scorecards 
(ACODE 2014) seem to confirm this discouraging perspective in 
the area of  service delivery and in particular primary education 
provision. According to an analysis of  the last 2016 Uwezo report, 
60 per cent of  P.3–P.71 pupils attending private schools could read and 
understand a P.2 English story and P.2 maths division while 49 per 
cent of  P.3–P.7 pupils attending government schools could read and 
understand the same work (Nassaka 2016: 17). All six reports Uwezo 
have released so far indicate that the quality of  education within the 
UPE framework, which is the direct provision option, is something the 
government needs to be concerned about, with persistent low learning 
outcomes. The same report indicates that the performance based 
on districts reflects regional inequalities. All the ten best performing 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 2 March 2017: ‘Interrogating Decentralisation in Africa’ 109–124 | 113
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
districts were from central and south-west Uganda while all the ten 
worst performing districts were from the East, North and West Nile 
regions (Uwezo Uganda 2016). Despite this gloomy outlook, rankings 
such as these of  Uwezo, based on primary education, and ACODE, 
based on performance of  local government in various social service 
delivery areas, indicate that there are variations in outcomes, with some 
performing well and others dismally. What is also crucial is that some of  
these variations fit within regional inequalities identified previously.
3 Research design: comparative case study method
This study is based in the West Nile region of  Uganda. Largely rural, 
among the poorest in the country, and with literacy rates below national 
averages, this region’s limited access to government services – due to its 
remoteness, a history of  war, and a continuing lack of  community voice 
– makes for an interesting case (AFARD 2011: 4). The West Nile’s level 
of  relative deprivation in comparison to other regions of  Uganda means 
that if  we can find pockets of  better performance here, we may be able to 
identify the factors that can work to raise the quality of  service delivery.
The West Nile today consists of  eight district local governments, with 
Arua and Nebbi districts lying in the North-Western corner of  Uganda. 
Both partly border the Democratic Republic of  Congo and Arua also 
borders South Sudan. Both cases were selected primarily because they 
were the only two of  West Nile’s eight districts that were assessed as part 
of  the most recent round of  the Local Government Councils Scorecard 
Assessment (LGCSCA) 2013/14 (ACODE 2014). They make an 
interesting pair for comparison because they are similar in many ways. 
They are contiguous districts that share a common history – together 
they formed the West Nile district before independence (Karibwije 
2005) – which allows us to hold most social and cultural practices 
constant. They also received full district status at the same time in 1980, 
and have similar local government powers.
Yet, though they lie close together, they have had divergent outcomes 
in social service delivery. The local government performance in service 
delivery is measured by three indicators, namely primary education 
(including both private and public schools), primary health services, and 
water and sanitation services. The performance of  primary education 
is also measured by three indicators, namely the net enrolment ratio, 
completion rate and the Primary Leaving Examination Performance 
Index.2 Nebbi was among the worst performing districts in primary 
education delivery, ranking 6th from the bottom out of  a total of  
30 districts, while Arua ranked 12th from the bottom. While exploring 
Arua’s performance allows us to look into an ‘island of  effectiveness’ 
(Crook 2010), Nebbi allows us to look into complexities of  local 
government service delivery.
I used the comparative method of  difference to study these two districts, 
based on the fact that they are similar in many ways that matter for 
the delivery of  primary education – such as the power and functions 
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of  district governments, revenues transferred to them by the central 
government, capacity for revenue mobilisation to complement service 
delivery, quality of  school teachers, shared history of  deprivation, 
formerly a single local government unit and school infrastructure – 
but which have different outcomes, with Arua performing better than 
Nebbi in the delivery of  primary education. I use local government 
performance in service delivery because they present the divergence 
in outcome between the districts relevant for interrogating issues of  
variation in outcome. This design allows us to explore both cases in 
detail to see what might be causing the difference in performance.
I made use of  secondary data and media reports to establish the nature 
of  allocation to education and to examine local government role in 
primary education in both districts, including on primary education 
performance in Nebbi and Arua. I strengthened this with carefully 
selected interviews in both districts. I conducted in-depth interviews 
with 12 purposively selected key players, people who worked in the 
education department, council and office of  the chief  administrative 
officer. At the district level, I interviewed senior staff at the education 
office, chief  administrative offices, and local councils. The choice of  
these key informants is based on their role in the district, specifically in 
planning and management of  education services.
4 Local government capacity in primary education delivery in the 
West Nile region
Local governments, and in particular district councils, have the power 
to deliver primary education services in Uganda with ‘overall control 
over the expenditure on services for which they were responsible’ 
(Golooba-Mutebi 2004). Their roles include inspection of  schools, 
funding, management of  teachers, school administration and planning, 
and school construction (Saito 2003). However, transfer of  responsibility 
is not synonymous with capacity. As Widmalm (2008: 44) reminds us, 
‘[T]he fact that responsibilities are given to a certain institution does not 
mean that the institution in question has the capacity to fulfil them… 
[nor] any possibility of  influencing the method of  implementation of  
the duties for which it is made responsible’. Capacity, be it human, 
financial and infrastructural, is crucial. The lack of  capacity to deliver 
has raised questions about the effectiveness of  decentralisation in 
Uganda. For instance, a respondent in Nebbi3 who coordinates a local 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) argued:
What I don’t agree with most is the word decentralisation… It is only the 
word itself, but there is no practice called decentralisation in Uganda. They say 
power belongs to the people, that now they have transferred every responsibility 
to people to make their plans. If  you go to the school and look at their plans, you 
will see that their plans are excellent, but now the funds are not controlled by the 
school, the funds are controlled by the centre at the district level… You cannot 
decentralise power when there is no money. There should be money and also 
power to plan.
(Endnotes)
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For others, such as a member of  the local government in Nebbi, the 
problem is more to do with how decentralisation has evolved:
Decentralisation would have added value if  every stakeholder was playing their 
role, because I think decentralisation says manage your own issues. Where you 
think the classrooms are not enough, put them there… but you know now there 
are some things that stakeholders have to do themselves to better this education. 
If  it is not being done, we are not going to blame decentralisation.
Particular to the case of  primary education, local governments are 
directly responsible not only for the delivery of  primary education 
within the UPE framework, but also for the supervision of  both 
public and private schools. Although private schools do not receive 
financial aid from the government, they still write the same exams 
and their performance contributes to the ranking of  local government 
performance in a particular district. While schools depend on the 
district, local governments depend on the central government for 
funds. The UPE programme funds come with an expenditure formula 
for every district. Most of  the education expenditure is earmarked 
for teacher salaries. District councils are mandated to mobilise local 
resources to supplement the regular flow of  funds from the central 
government in order to support other activities. However, in both Nebbi 
and Arua districts local government contributes under 5 per cent of  
the total budget. The responsibility for providing development funds 
remains with central government and other stakeholders.
Also, the role of  district councils in ensuring improved performance 
in service delivery appears to be quite limited in both districts. In 
Arua, district officials try to do so by organising community meetings 
to discuss issues related to the delivery of  primary education (which, 
according to some respondents in Arua’s education department, is 
improving the quality of  education through parents’ commitment to 
education), while in Nebbi the district meets the challenge of  having few 
inspectors by hiring former head teachers as assessors and inspectors. 
Finally, both districts have developed education bylaws, but they seem to 
have little role in ensuring the implementation and quality of  primary 
education in the public schools studied here.
An interesting indicator of  the poor quality of  primary education 
in public schools managed by local governments is the fact that the 
children of  district government staff and even public school teachers 
attend private schools. A respondent in Arua local government echoed 
the views of  many when he explained, ‘Our children are not in 
government schools. We sell the wrong thing to the people. There are 
many children of  the poor who are brighter than our children but are 
condemned to this [UPE school] education’. There is a sense of  regret 
among government officials that they are aware UPE is not working 
well, and yet, they have to continue to present it as a great policy to 
enable all children access to education. A respondent from the civil 
society sector in Nebbi expressed a similar sentiment when he shared, 
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‘Teachers in UPE schools send their children to private schools. They 
are better off having their children taught by private schools. They are 
sure their children will pass’.
According to various respondents in the two districts, public schools 
perform poorly in both districts due to a wide range of  factors, which 
include lack of  teaching materials, late arrival of  government funds, 
head teachers seldom being in school to supervise teaching, late 
arrival and early departure of  teachers, and infrastructure challenges 
ranging from lack of  classrooms and desks to pit latrines. Although the 
availability of  UPE has provided poor children with access to education, 
it has also created marked disparities between the educational quality 
that poor children in these schools receive, and that offered in private 
schools that are attended by the children of  families with higher 
incomes (Uwezo Uganda 2016).
These facts illustrate the current poor quality of  public education and 
the failure of  local government officials to fix the broken school system. 
Interviews provided strong evidence of  the fact that most stakeholders 
shifted responsibility in terms of  where the blame for poor delivery lies. 
Teachers face most of  the blame from other stakeholders, while teachers 
in turn blame local government limited capacity and parents’ lack of  
commitment to the education of  their children. Yet, Arua District has 
a comfortable lead on Nebbi on primary education outcomes, as per 
the 2013/14 scorecard assessment rankings (ACODE 2014), despite 
the many similarities identified here. What explains Arua’s better 
performance? I use evidence from my interviews to identify the main 
features that can help explain this.
5 Variations in education performance: the nature of partnerships
A comparative analysis of  Arua and Nebbi local government 
performance is a useful exercise to reveal how despite most local 
governments facing similar challenges and having similar powers and 
mandates (including local governments that share geography and 
history), varied outcomes are possible largely due to external factors 
such as donor interventions, and other partnerships. While in both 
Nebbi and Arua, local government state schools performed almost 
similarly, I argue that the role of  donors and the nature of  public–
private partnerships significantly account for variations in overall 
educational outcomes. The level of  involvement by donors and private 
sector investment is crucial for success.
5.1 How central government dependency accounts for variations at the 
district level
At the district level, the degree of  dependence on central government is 
crucial for investment in education. It is also important to note that the 
capacity to deliver implies that funds directly transferred from central 
government are likely to achieve their aim. This comparison starts with 
the understanding of  the financial situation in both local governments 
as seen in Table 1.
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By observation of  the two local governments, we can see that Arua has 
many business enterprises, and thus greater revenue mobilisation but 
its share of  local revenue is less than 1 per cent. This, local government 
officials argue, is because the Uganda Revenue Authority collects most 
of  the revenue. The little that is collected within the local governments 
goes to support council activities rather than services like education, 
which therefore remain dependent on central government transfers. In 
Arua, a senior local government official expressed his dilemma:
Most of  the lucrative sources of  revenue are taken up by the central government, 
they are collected by the Uganda Revenue Authority [URA]. Most of  the taxes 
are collected by it. What is left for the local government is very hard to collect. 
At some times we even said, now since URA is specialised in revenue collection, 
why don’t they collect 100 per cent?
Studies have in the past indicated the erosion of  local government 
autonomy with the abolition of  graduated tax (Golooba-Mutebi 2006). 
Although local governments had the mandate to levy tax, central 
government abolished graduated tax, draining districts of  the most 
reliable source of  revenue. In addition to market dues, other sources 
include trading licences (largely collected by the urban councils), 
licensing which is more of  a regulatory service, and thus limited as a 
source of  funds. Fees for a limited number of  billboard advertisements 
are another potential source, but if  they fall under road reserve, Uganda 
National Roads Authority collects it. The local service tax is a more 
reliable source but very small. Another revenue source is council court 
fees, but these provide revenue for the court system in most cases. In 
short, multiple state agencies collect revenue from districts.
Local governments are thus vessels through which resources from 
central government flow for specific activities, rather than units with 
power. The real question is whether local governments have any liberty 
to plan for activities. In the case of  primary education, most of  the 
Table 1 Revenue sources and education allocation for Nebbi and Arua districts for 
the financial years 2012/13–2014/15 (Shillings 000)
Revenue source
Total revenue 
(Nebbi)
Percentage of 
total
Total revenue 
(Arua)
Percentage of 
total
Central 
government
73,017,274 95.7 133,880,657 91.9
Local revenue 998,758 1.3 1,302,488 0.9
Donor funding 2,309,702 3.0 10,485,589 7.2
Total annual 
budget
76,325,734 100.0 145,668,734 100.0
Education 
allocation
38,940,425 51 78,162,787 53.7
Source Local government budget estimates, MoFPED.4
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grants are conditional and allow little flexibility. Central government 
controls, even though there may be good reasons for such controls, 
impact negatively on service delivery. The dysfunctional nature of  
decentralisation is demonstrable through the practice of  recruitment 
of  teachers or making capital expenditures – for a district to recruit 
teachers or buy a vehicle, they need clearance from the central 
government. This is in line with what ACODE (2014) found, that 
dependence on the central government and inability to generate local 
revenues are highlighted by 75 per cent of  the districts.
5.2 How donor involvement accounts for variations at the district level
Currently, local governments are overly dependent on the central 
government for resources, particularly conditional grants. One main 
reason is that the central government and the donors are not fully 
convinced that local governments are capable of  managing large 
amounts of  funds (Saito 2003: 145).
Although Nebbi has a larger contribution of  local revenue (1.3 per 
cent), Arua’s dependence on central government is lower due to 
contribution from donors (7.2 per cent) while that of  Nebbi stands 
at 3 per cent (see Table 1). Whereas the difference appears small as 
a percentage of  a district’s total budget allocation to education, it is 
substantial in absolute terms. Donor criteria for more involvement in 
Arua is not explicit, but may be connected to the fact that it is a regional 
centre, and as such, has more NGOs and thus more capacity to deliver 
on funds outside the local government structure.
Donor contribution differentials, as seen in Table 1, boosted the capacity 
of  Arua local government through budget support but also through 
direct investment in schools. Arua local government department of  
education, as a result, has developed higher capacity in terms of  human 
capital and infrastructure. This is not the case in Nebbi, which has 
continued to face both human resource and infrastructural challenges for 
several years. This was corroborated by staff in the education department 
in Nebbi, who lamented, ‘[A]ll our vehicles are now grounded in the 
garage. We have no means of  transport for supervision and inspection’. 
This is attributed to a ban on departments purchasing vehicles. Sitting 
at the Arua District local government headquarters, I observed at least 
three vehicles for the education sector, procured through non-state funds, 
and none of  the interviews in Arua identified such challenges.
The quality of  administrative staff accounts for differences in 
performance and creation of  effective organisational culture, and 
this too was connected to the role of  donors and a regular flow of  
funds by respondents. Arua District has experienced a considerable 
level of  continuity and consistency in political and administrative 
leadership. Most members of  council had been there for over a decade 
and understood the problems of  their area well. On the other hand, 
Nebbi faced staff shortages, but was unable to recruit new staff due 
to a pending wage bill. Within Nebbi’s district council, respondents 
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suggested that these administrative problems were not helped by limited 
donor intervention. For instance, two members argued:
The problem with Nebbi is that we have limited NGOs, limited stakeholders 
to support Nebbi. We have only the NGO Forum and now we have UNICEF. 
The major one is UNICEF. And UNICEF mainly supports us with sports.
UNICEF cannot do it alone, not even the government, not even the councillors. 
At least I would suggest that if  other NGOs or donors could come around, it 
would be fairer. It is becoming too big for UNICEF alone to handle it.
These revelations, by a male and female member of  council, all 
underscore the important role of  donors in improving capacity 
of  the district to better deliver educational outcomes. This is also 
acknowledged in the literature. For instance, Boko notes:
The contribution of  international donor agencies to the development 
of  local communities in Africa must not be underestimated. For 
though they have gained the political power for self-determination, 
the vast majority of  local communities in Africa lack the financial 
resources to assert that power, making financial and technical support 
from international development organisations a very important 
source of  development action (2002: 61).
In the case of  district performance, given the current dependence on 
central government for funding of  programmes, re-centralisation of  
functions, compounded by creation of  districts that are not viable, 
suggest that indeed contributions of  international donor agencies cannot 
be underestimated. Donor support fills capacity and budgetary gaps, 
especially when channelled through districts in specific areas of  need.
5.3 How private sector involvement accounts for variations at the district level
Arua also performs better overall because of  the extent of  private 
sector investment in education. Arua has several private schools, which 
contribute to the better performance and ranking of  the district. Nebbi 
has far fewer private schools that can contribute in a similar way. As one 
respondent in Nebbi put it:
If  you are talking about government-aided schools, I don’t think Arua is doing 
any better. The difference is, Arua has so many private schools. So when they 
say Arua has got so many first grades, nobody says government schools has got 
this, private schools has got this. It’s just like Zombo [neighbouring district] 
here. Zombo gets more first grades than Nebbi because of  one private school. But 
if  you are talking about government schools, then it’s all the same. People don’t 
look at which schools are private schools and which schools are public.
Respondents in Arua District local government agreed with this 
position. A recent analysis that deals with the country as a whole, the 
2016 Uwezo report, also suggests that the role of  the private sector in a 
district’s performance in education cannot be ignored considering that 
district rankings take into account private schools as well. It reveals that:
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… for P.3 to P.7 pupils, attending private schools boosts their 
competence over their government school peers 17 percentage points 
in English, 10 percentage points in mathematics and six percentage 
points in local languages (Nassaka 2016: 16).
There are, therefore, large attainment inequalities between pupils 
attending private schools and those enrolled in schools run by local 
government.
6 Local government and primary education delivery: implications for policy
Our two cases show that contrary to claims that local governments 
have power as per the legal frameworks, districts still largely depend on 
central government for the delivery of  primary education under their 
mandate. Local government contribution in terms of  local revenue is 
non-existent due to the limited collection of  local revenue, despite the 
existence of  taxable private businesses in these districts. And although 
there is an argument that decades of  reform efforts, capacity building 
and huge donor spending appear to have brought little improvement in 
service delivery, where direct donor involvement in schools is available, 
primary education performance is significantly better. The larger donor 
contribution to Arua’s local government – as compared to Nebbi – gives 
it an added advantage in improving performance, not only by building 
local level capacity, but also by reducing its degree of  dependence on 
central government.
The ad hoc nature of  partnerships between local governments and other 
stakeholders has benefited some local governments at the expense of  
others. Both private sector investment and donor monies flow to certain 
districts, often the same ones because of  capacity issues, and not to 
others. This calls for greater coordination among central government, 
local government, the private sector and donors in defining where 
donors and other partners are most needed depending on existing 
challenges, and so that available funds can be distributed more evenly 
across districts. Results of  the 2016 Uwezo survey show that the ten 
best performing districts are all located in central and south-western 
Uganda while the ten worst performing districts are all located in the 
East, North and West Nile regions. If  this continues, not only will 
inequalities increase between poorer and less poor children attending 
public and private schools respectively, but also regional inequalities are 
bound to become worse. There is a need for a comprehensive review of  
the powers of  local governments and the services they can realistically 
deliver in line with the resources they can mobilise. While many of  their 
powers remain as stipulated in the constitution, the context has greatly 
changed in the face of  liberalisation, privatisation and government 
re-centralisation of  some functions.
The promise of  decentralisation was to create an effective system 
of  service delivery, where local governments would bring services 
closer to the people and infuse local populations with the power 
of  popular participation. But this does not seem to have happened 
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in Uganda. Based on the analysis presented in this article, I draw 
three broad conclusions, which manifest the difference between 
decentralisation rhetoric and reality. First, that there is a disconnect 
between decentralisation as policy and as practice, as demonstrated by 
local government delivery of  primary education. Second, with central 
government controlling at least 95 per cent of  the financing of  districts, 
development priorities are still decided by central government, through 
pre-determined indicative figures to guide budgeting. Local governments 
have little power and freedom to decide what their priorities might be 
and even if  they do, even less power to act upon them. Third, because 
local governments fail to achieve meaningful local revenue collection, the 
quality of  the delivery of  public services suffers, as central government 
disbursements are, by themselves, inadequate and local governments 
have minimal capacity to contribute. The case of  West Nile suggests 
that the performance of  districts in delivering services such as education 
has much to do with donor presence and the extent of  involvement by 
the private sector. Local governments that succeed do so through the 
strength of  partnerships with donors and the private sector.
Notes
*  I wish to thank the Institute of  Development Studies, University 
of  Sussex (in particular Shandana Khan Mohmand for invaluable 
contributions made towards this article) and the Partnership for 
African Social and Governance Research (PASGR) for funding this 
research. I also thank my research assistant, Jude Omondi, without 
whose support this research would have been difficult to conclude.
1 The Ugandan Primary Education cycle runs from Primary One (P.1) 
to Primary Seven (P.7) when pupils write the national primary leaving 
examination from which they join secondary education, which runs 
for six years.
2 Net Enrolment Ratio (number of  primary school children aged 
six–twelve years to the number of  children of  the same age range 
in the population); completion rate (ratio of  total number of  pupils 
who successfully complete the last year of  primary education); and 
Primary Leaving Examination (PLE) Performance Index (number of  
candidates that sat for PLE examination multiplied by the weight of  
the highest grade) (MoES 2013).
3 All interviews took place in May 2016, either in Nebbi or in Arua.
4 Ministry of  Finance, Planning and Economic Development,  
www.finance.go.ug.
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Glossary
AACA Addis Ababa City Administration
AACG Addis Ababa City Government
AAEPA Addis Ababa Environmental Protection Authority
ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
ACODE Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment [Uganda]
ADLG Arua District Local Government [Uganda]
AFARD Agency for Accelerated Rural Development [Uganda]
AM Assembly Member
AMPATH Academic Model Providing Access to Healthcare
APC All Progressive Congress
CCMS Centre for Communication, Media and Society [University of  
KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa]
CDD-Ghana Ghana Center for Democratic Development
CDR Committees for the Defence of  the Revolution [Ghana]
CSA Central Statistical Authority [Ethiopia]
CWS Church World Service
DA District Assembly 
DACF District Assemblies Common Fund
DCC/MCC District/Municipal/Metropolitan Coordinating Council
DCE District Chief  Executive
DCU District Coordinating Unit
DDF District Development Fund
DFID Department for International Development
DLT District League Table
DMTDP District Medium Term Development Plan
dRPC Development Research and Projects Center [Nigeria]
ELLA Evidence and Lessons from Latin America
ENDA Environmental Development Action [Ethiopia]
FDRE Federal Democratic Republic of  Ethiopia
FeMSEDA Federal Micro and Small Enterprise Development Agency
GHS Ghanaian cedi
GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
[German Corporation for International Cooperation]
HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Countries
HIT Health Information Technology
HOA Horn of  Africa
IDEP African Institute for Economic Development and Planning
IIAG Ibrahim Index of  African Governance
ICT information and communications technology
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute
ILO International Labour Organization
IMCC Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Committee [Ghana]
ISEAS Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies
KNHCR Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
LGA local government area
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LGCSCA Local Government Councils Scorecard Assessment
MoES Ministry of  Education and Sports [Uganda]
MoH Ministry of  Health
MOUD Ministry of  Urban Development [Ethiopia]
MSSE micro- and small-scale enterprise
NDC National Democratic Congress [Ghana]
NICU Nursing Intensive Care Unit.
NGO non-governmental organisation
NPP New Patriotic Party
NRM National Resistance Movement [Uganda]
NSCDC Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps
ODI Overseas Development Institute
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PASGR Partnership for African Social and Governance Research
PBL problem-based learning
PCRC Police-Community Relations Committee
PLE Primary Leaving Examination
PPP public–private partnership
PSM public service motivation
RCC Regional Coordinating Council
SBPDA Sanitation, Beautification and Park Development Agency
SSS State Security Service 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNN University of  Nigeria, Nsukka
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UPE Universal Primary Education
URA Uganda Revenue Authority
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WCC World Council of  Churches
WENDI West Nile Development Initiative
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